

The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region

Islamists and Post-Arab Spring Challenges

Editor

**Dr. Mohammed
Abu Rumman**



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The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan
The Deposit Number at The National Library
(2018/2/529)

277

AbuRumman, Mohammad Suliman

The Prospects Of Political Islam In A Troubled Region / Mohammad Suliman Abu Rumman; Translated by William Joseph Ward. – Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018

(178) p.

Deposit No.: 2018/2/529

Descriptors: /Politics//Islam/

يتحمل المؤلف كامل المسؤولية القانونية عن محتوى مصنفه ولا يعبر هذا المصنف عن رأي دائرة المكتبة الوطنية أو أي جهة حكومية أخرى.

Published in 2018 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq
FES Jordan & Iraq
P.O. Box 941876
Amman 11194
Jordan

Email: fes@fes-jordan.org
Website: www.fes-jordan.org

Not for sale

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The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the editor.

Translation: William Joseph Ward
Cover and Lay-out: Mua'th Al Saied
Printing: Economic Press

ISBN: 978-9957-484-80-4

The Prospects of Political Islam in a Troubled Region

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Foreword

Whether in positions of power, parliamentary seats, peaceful legal opposition, or outside the rules of the political game, Islamist movements are an important and leading player in Arab politics and society. Yet from its very first moments in 2011 "since the outbreak of revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen", and on through its subsequent stages "the Syrian and Libyan revolutions", the Arab Spring has re-shaped the roles of these movements and created new trends, and political, social, and cultural environments altogether different from anything with which Islamists had previously dealt.

In the first phase of the Arab Spring, Islamists came to positions of power through elections, entering parliaments and later forming governments in Tunisia and Morocco. Then, after obtaining an overwhelming majority in parliament, they gained control of the presidency in Egypt. With international and western communities no longer fearful of political Islam as in previous decades, and with global attempts to test them in the future as ruling powers in the Arab world, it seemed as if the "era of political Islam" had finally arrived.

But by 2013, things began to change, the Muslim Brothers fell in Egypt and returned to prisons, out-law status and confrontation with the state, Syria, Yemen, and Libya descended into civil war and internal militarism, and militant Islam drew new breath in the form of a hybrid entity that surpassed even al-Qaeda in its extremism and radicalism and succeeded in establishing a state in the name of Islam and a Caliphate stretching from Iraq to Syria, reshaping agendas, priorities, interests and international and regional positions towards the Arab region.

Despite taking center stage, Islamists in the Arab Maghreb, with the exception of Libya, survived scenarios of internal wars and maintained a relatively democratic transition by partnering with other forces in Tunisia, understanding the rules of the game alongside the Makhzen in Morocco, and avoiding a return to violence in Algeria.

These changes, reflected in the various trends that exist within the spectrum of political Islam, and their various ideological, dynamic and political ramifications, have imposed significant and fundamental questions on political Islam, its prospects, its predicament, and its future.

In fact, these questions did not stop at the limits of the internal equations, structure, role, or ideologies of Islamist movements. In general, local and regional factors have become intertwined, and with internal and civil wars, proxy wars, the rise of sectarian, ethnic, and religious identities, the ambiguous agendas of political Islam, Sunni and Shia

sectarian and religious tendencies, Russian intervention, and the United States' declining role in the region, we have entered into new stages in the Arab Mashreq.¹

On the one hand, we are faced with a storm passing through the Arab region, and on the other, Islamist movements undergoing major multi-level changes. Similarly, we are not faced with an analysis confined to the internal equations of Arab states but a mixing of overlapping regional and international factors.

This book, which seeks to deconstruct the growing pains experienced by Islamist movements, and indeed their effects, is the outcome of a regional conference held by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung/Amman "on May 23, 2017, at the Crowne Plaza Hotel" in which experts, researchers, and specialists in Islamist movements, from nine Arab countries, as well as several well-known Western researchers participated.

The aim of the conference was to examine the state of Islamist movements, as well as the crises, indicators and trends related to their future. To that end, and after extensive discussion at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office/Amman, a process of dividing the conference's themes, discussions and working papers was organized in accordance with the nature of the political circumstances and specific situations of each country. It was then agreed to divide the themes as follows:

- A session discussing the state of the field of Islamic movement studies to solve the problems, concepts, methods and research priorities of the field in the context of comparison between these studies prior to, during, and after the Arab Spring to develop new research trends examining the "phenomenon".
- A session on the experiences of Islamists in countries where they came to power as active forces in government as a result of the Arab Spring. Here we find examples in Tunisia, Morocco and pre-coup Egypt "as well as the impact of the coup on the Brotherhood in Egypt and abroad".
- A session on the experiences, trends, and roles of Islamists in countries that have fallen victim to civil wars and the emergence of armed and radical movements, particularly ISIS, whose name has become synonymous with the Arab Spring in Arabic and Western literature. Examples of this model include Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
- A session on the experiences of Islamists who remained outside the confines of power and did not enter into the experience of direct governance during the Arab Spring and which did not get involved in armed conflicts, namely the Arab kingdoms and Algeria "which experienced its own bout with civil war and a power struggle from 1992-2002, called the 'black decade'". Within this theme, we took both Algeria and Kuwait as examples.
- A special session on the Jordanian model was held in order to reach a more in-depth study on the debates and discussions taking place among the Islamists and within their ranks. In particular, within the context of those movements that are witnessing internal divisions and disagreements, we wanted to more closely examine the internal

¹ See Mohammed Abu Rumman, lecture, "al hawiyat wal aman al qowmi al 'arabi," "Identities and Arab National Security", delivered at the Abdol Hamid Shoman Foundation on 16 October, <http://bit.ly/2Br2stS>

climates and better understand the internal dynamics of the developments occurring within the ranks of these movements.

- And a closing session discussing the results and conclusions made by the researchers, experts and actors during the sessions of the conference, working papers and discussions that took place in the meetings.

In this book we did not stray too far from the methodology chosen at the conference in terms of the book's chapter division or the research presented therein.² As such, the chapters are presented as follows: chapter one deals with the theoretical aspects as well as the state and future trends of the research field examining Islamist movements. "This chapter includes two studies, the first on the state of the field, and the second on the impact of the emergence of ISIS on the study of Islamist movements and the problems posed in that regard". Chapter two addresses the experiences of Islamists while in power "in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt". Chapter three deals with Islamists' interactions within the dynamics of civil and internal wars; in it we approach the cases of Syria, Yemen, and Libya, whereas the fourth chapter is devoted to the study of Islamists' experiences outside the confines of power and deals with research studying Algeria and Kuwait. Finally, chapter five deals with the Jordanian situation and studies the parties that grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, internal debates and future trends.

Neither this book, nor the conference before it, would have been possible without the extraordinary efforts of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung/Amman and its staff, in particular Anja Wehler-Schoek "who, with this conference, concluded five years of work in Jordan that included publishing many studies and holding a number of regional conferences specific to the topics of political Islam, most of which were translated into English, and some to German" and Amal Abu Jiries, the institution's director of programs in Jordan.

It is also necessary to mention the efforts of the FES staff who participated in the majority of the administrative arrangements and logistic support associated with the completion of this book, as well as those of the Jordanian researcher specializing in the field of Islamic movement studies, Hassan Abu Hanieh, and the book's editor, Mohammed Abu Rumman.

² It is important to note here that some researchers did not submit their research or papers, so they are absent from the chapters of this book, which relied on documented academic research, so that the final product would consist of academic studies and writings benefitting researchers and those interested in this field of study.

Chapter 1

Islamists in the Laboratory of Change: The State and Challenges of the Research Field

Introduction

The course of 2011's Arab Spring was short-lived. In 2013, just two years after the collapse of the Arab regimes that once served as a dam holding back Islamists seeking to establish their own state, the Arab Spring began to take conflicting, contradictory, and divergent paths. In some Arab states, the path to democracy followed a thorny path, while in others, political reforms pushed Islamists to power. In a third scenario, Islamist wavered in their relations with authorities, as if the Arab Spring had never happened, and in others, infighting derailed its course, imposing in its place sectarian, ethnic, and religious-based identity politics. It was in these environments that ISIS emerged and took root, declaring the establishment of a caliphate that would last nearly 3 years and stretch across a geographical area larger than many Arab states.

The Arab Spring is not then a single historical moment, but two; the popular revolutions and the ensuing reaction to them, separated by two years, and spanning the period from 2011 to 2017 "the period in which these studies were written". During this period, the Arab world has undergone tremendous changes, witnessed dramatic new developments, and experienced extreme volatility. In turn, these shifts have affected Islamist movements to the core, not only at the political level, but in their own ideology and relationship with society, affecting their foundations and internal structure. As such, this six year period could prove to be one of, if not the most, notable turning points in the history of Islamist movements.

With transformations and developments of this kind sweeping Islamist movements, with their various ideological, political, and organizational topologies, it is both natural and logical that they would profoundly impact the field of Islamic movement studies, both in terms of the specialized approaches and research methodologies used to study these movements, and the concepts, questions, and priorities developed by researchers. It is also natural that they would drive us to revisit and re-examine the state of the field and its associated changes.

In this chapter, two studies will discuss the field of Islamist movement studies. The first addresses the extent to which the changes and transformations that took place during the Arab Spring impact the study of Islamist movements in terms of the many perspectives, understandings, methodologies, priorities, questions, and research tasks required.

The second tackles the repercussions, consequences, and implications that the rise of ISIS has had for research circles and programs of study, as well as the controversies and problems associated with Islamist movements, particularly given the profound impact

the rise of ISIS has had on the state of Islamist movements, how they view themselves, and how they are viewed by the outside world.

On the whole, an important objective related to the epistemic aspect of the study of Islamist movements emerges throughout this chapter; that is, to restructure the field specializing in the study of Islamist movements to reflect the changes and transformations we talk about, and to be able to reformulate the right questions and consider new approaches and inputs.

Study 1
Islamist Movement Studies
"A Situation Estimate"
Dr. Mohammad Abu Rumman

The Arab Spring, which began in 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia before spreading to other Arab countries, turned the Arab political scene, and the roles of major players and powerbrokers, upside-down, as it toppled regimes in some countries and undermined civil peace and stability in others.

The effects of the Arab Spring have not been limited to only internal changes either. Over the past six years, the rules of the Arab regional system have collapsed, and the principle of sovereignty has eroded. Ethnic and sectarian considerations have become intertwined with political calculations, and international and regional forces have once again intervened directly in the region. Likewise, radical Islam has returned, and now counts dozens of new countries among its many theaters of operations.

Throughout the course of this historical moment in time "since the Arab Spring and on through the counter-revolutions and civil wars", peaceful Islamist movements have gone through a pivotal stage in their modern history. The political environment changed, and the conditions and circumstances that formed the standard framework through which these movements operated for nearly half a century was turned on its head. Today, they find themselves in a new phase that is altogether different in its dynamics, nature, and challenges than anything that had come before it.

Prior to this, Islamist movements had adapted, acclimating themselves to coexistence with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. Facing two alternatives, Islamists could either boycott the political process and confine themselves to detention, imprisonment, and the doctrine of "victimization" or accept limited participation in the political process under the banner, "participation, not domination."³ This second option allowed Islamists to avoid confrontation with the semi-authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco that allowed periodic elections, but which controlled results and outcomes so as not to change the rules of the political game in terms of decision-making or the concentration of power in the hands of a select political elite or specific institutions.⁴

³ What is meant here by victimization is to be satisfied with the position of the opposition, and to be subject to arrests, imprisonment and trials, the case in many Arab countries, see Mohammed Abu Rumman, "al-ikwhan al-muslimoun wal-mustaqbal: al-haraka al-islamiyya wa asila almahana" "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Future: The Islamist Movement and Questions of Tribulation", Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 11/9/2013: <http://bit.ly/2EooPyA>

⁴ See, for example: Nathan Brown, "When Victory Is Not an Option, Islamist Movements in Arab Politics", translated into Arabic by Saad Mahiou, Arab Network For Research and Publishing, Beirut, 1st Edition, 2012, pp. 33-35. As well as: Nathan Brown and Amir Hamzawy, "Between Religion and Politics", Arab Network for Research and Publishing and Carnegie Endowment Middle East Center, Beirut, 2011, 1st Edition, pp. 256-256. And: Muhammed Abu Rumman, "Khiyarat al-

With the goal of accessing the greatest number of parliamentary seats possible while improving their political station and strengthening their institutions, Islamists were content with limited change, almost as if they had colluded with Arab regimes to that end. During this time, Islamist movements were, for the most part, split between two currents: one that was conservative, focusing on proselytization, ideology, and the principles of the movement and one that was pragmatic, reformist, and realistic in its political practices.⁵

Debates within Islamist circles typically revolved around only a few key points, but the most prominent and glaring issue manifested itself in their stance towards democracy. One current believed in conditional acceptance and in dealing with democracy as an alternative, transitional phase, i.e. a temporary improvement on the dictatorial regimes of the past, in the short term, while the other embraced democracy as a definitive system of government and accepted political pluralism and rotation of power.⁶

Arab regimes and other political forces, nevertheless, had their doubts as to the seriousness and credibility of Islamists' acceptance of democracy and the extent to which they truly believed in it. US and Western policies also generally favored alliances with conservative autocratic regimes to secure their interests over the risk of testing an unknown "Islamic alternative" ideologically and politically incompatible with the Western or American outlook.⁷

This political reality, which had been in place since the founding of contemporary Islamist movements and continued on through to the rise of their political efficacy during the Arab Spring, has profoundly impacted the study of Islamist movements in terms of the concepts, methods, tools, research questions, hypotheses, and epistemic priorities used. In fact, most research questions and hypotheses have focused on the ideological aspects of Islamist discourse and the historical development of Islamist movements, while the majority of research questions have asked whether or not Islamic ideology is compatible with democracy and questioned the credibility and seriousness of Islamists' acceptance of the democratic game.

In western circles, the same ideological question regarding the credibility of Islamist movement's acceptance of democracy dominated one side of academic discourse, while the debate surrounding the criteria used to classify them - as either moderate or extremist - dominated the other. Here, questions arose about their attitudes towards

musharika as-siyyasiyya fi dimukratiyya muqayyida: halat al-ikhwan al-muslimin fil-Urdun" "Options for Political Participation in a Restricted Democracy: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan", Journal of the Association of Arab Universities for Literature, 12th 2nd, 2015, pp. 447-471.

⁵ See: Mohammed Abu Rumman, "Khiyarat al-musharika as-siyyasiyya" "Options for Political Participation", Ibid, pp. 476-470.

⁶ See: Group of Authors, "al-harakat al-islamiyya wal dimukratiyya, dirasat fil fikr wal mumarisa" "Islamic and Democratic Movements, Studies in Thought and Practice", Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1st Edition, 1999. There are several studies in the book on Islamists and Democracy highlighting more than one Arab experience. For comparison, see: Haid Ibrahim Ali, "at-tiyyarat al-islamiyya wa qadiyyat al-dimukratiyya" "Islamic Currents and the Question of Democracy", Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2nd Edition, 1999, pp. 379-399.

⁷ See: Mohammed Abu Rumman, "indimaj al-islamiyyin fil dimukratiyya: al-furas, al-'awa'iq, at-tahadiyyat" "Integrating Islamists into Democracy: Opportunities, Obstacles, and Challenges" in "nahwa khitab islami dimukrati madani" "Toward Civil Islamic Democratic Speech" Al-Quds Center For Political Studies, Amman, 1st Edition, 2007, pp. 215-237.

violence, women, minorities, and the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other questions generally associated with western interests and values.

Yet, with so many changes and variables intruding onto the reality of Islamist movements since the emergence of popular revolutions in early 2011, including the Islamists' rise to power, the military's intervention in political life in Egypt, the imprisonment of former president Mohammad Morsi, the prohibition of the Muslim Brotherhood and its designation as a terrorist organization, and Tunisia and Morocco's experiments with political partnerships between Islamists and non-Islamists in government, the rise of the so-called Islamic State, and the splits, fractures, and divisions that erupted within many Islamist movements, it has become necessary to reformulate our questions, methodological approaches, conceptions, and research priorities and perhaps even necessary to restructure the field of Islamic movement studies entirely.

Such realities call for an in-depth study of what has happened with Islamist movements since the revolutions of 2011 and then the outbreak of internal wars, until now, to monitor the new trends that have emerged within these movements and to allocate prospective research tasks. In this paper, we will seek to do that by creating something of a "position assessment" in the field of Islamic movement studies.

1. The Arab Spring...Fundamental Variables

Between other Islamists, regimes, and western policies, the calculations, equations, and specific conditions that framed the actions of the Islamists who publically embraced the democratic political game and rejected armed and violent action were turned upside down. As Arab revolutions took place, first in Tunisia and Egypt, then in Yemen, Syria, and Libya as a result of revolutionary and anti-establishment demands, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan began to formulate approaches for dealing with these new realities. At the same time, conservative Arab governments started to think about how to absorb the shock and took the reins in support of conservative anti-Islamist movements across the Arab region. As the counterrevolution in Egypt took hold, the regional order entered a state of polarization, split between two camps, the first: pro-Islamist, sponsored by Turkey and Qatar, and the second: anti-Islamist, sponsored by Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Jordan.

Islamists' attitudes concerning the revolutions were no less confused than those of the regimes. Despite active participation from their youth in protests in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as other countries, these revolutions seemed to take Islamists by surprise. Traditional leadership, which had conformed and adjusted to decades of dealing with authoritarian regimes, was afraid that the protests would break up without any profound changes and that they would once again be left alone in the cold to pay a heavy price for their support for a failed revolution. Many Islamists were initially reluctant to adopt the revolutions' call to overthrow the regime, while those in other countries, like Jordan and Morocco, failed to take up the slogan all together, instead, they were content with calls to "reform the regime" and attempts to change the rules of the political game from the

inside, without the direct confrontation of Egypt and Tunisia.⁸

The next phase of the revolutions would reveal even more profound changes, ones that not even the most optimistic Islamists could not have predicted. Regimes fell in Egypt and Tunisia and conditions changed. Westerners, Islamists, and the people themselves began to believe that the entire Arab system was crumbling, and that it was only a matter of time before the dominoes would begin to fall in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, and then in other countries. Expectations skyrocketed; talk in political circles began to coalesce around the end of authoritarianism and the advent of a new democratic era in Arab politics. Later, it would become clear that such talk was not grounded in a solid historical, political or philosophical reading of events but was an emotional response to the unprecedented historical nature of a moment that saw the fall of some of the region's most powerful strongmen and a loosening of the security apparatus' iron grip as people went to the streets and toppled regimes with peaceful protests. All of this created an exceptional moment in the Arab political experience, which quickly led to rising expectations without an in-depth study of the subsequent phase or how realistic was the dream of democracy in the Arab world.

Islamists, fully prepared to take advantage of the changes, embraced the revolutionary atmosphere and returned to the political limelight in record time, both in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Libya. In Egypt, they opened once banned Muslim Brotherhood offices and founded the Freedom and Justice Party; even Salafists, which did not recognize the legitimacy of the political or democratic game, had a change of heart and established parties, most notably Hizb Al-Nour. In Tunisia, branches of the Ennahda Party multiplied, and in Libya, the Brotherhood and Salafists raced to form Islamist parties of their own.⁹

These rapid developments carried Islamists to positions of power and parliament on the back of the ballot box. At the same time, they revealed the extent of disparity and divergence in the political beliefs of Islamists and their readings of the situation. While Islamists in Morocco and Tunisia preferred to form agreements and alliances with other political forces through unity governments, and refrained from outlining a clear Islamic or organizational agenda while making ideological concessions in their negotiations with secularists and other forces, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood controlled a parliamentary majority and saw a president from its own ranks ascend to power. The Brotherhood in Egypt did not, however, realize the dangers of the transitional phase, nor did it accurately gauge the power that still remained in the hands of regime loyalists. They failed to fully appreciate the attitude of the bureaucratic security institutions opposing them and the

⁸ See: various studies and research contained in the book "ar-rabi' al-'arabi: thawrat al-khalas min al-istibdad: dirasat halat" "The Arab Spring: Revolutions of Deliverance, Case Studies", L'Orient Des Livres, The Arab Network for the Study of Democracy, 1st Edition, 2013, for Egypt see: Emad Siam, "25 yanayir ath-thawra as-silmiyya li shabab at-tabaqa al-wusta wa tahadiyyat al-mustaqbal" "25 January: The Revolution of the Middle-class Youth and the Challenges of the Future", pp 59-60, and Fuad Saeed, "thawrat misr: tafa'ulat al-marhala al-intiqaliyya al-mumtada wa sinariohat al-mustaqbal" "Egypt's Revolution: Reactions of the Intermediate Stage and Future Scenarios", pp. 78-83, and for Jordan see: Musa Shteivi and Suleiman Suweis, "al-hirak as-siyasiyya fil urdun" "Political Movements in Jordan", pp. 315-360.

⁹ See: Mohammed Abu Rumman, "as-salafiyyin wal rabi' al 'arabi, su'al ad-din wal dimuqratiyya fis siyassa al 'arabiyya" "Salafists and the Arab Spring: Questions of Religion and Democracy in Arab Politics", Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2nd edition, 2014, pp.129-151.

position of those segments of society most affected by their rise to power. The Brotherhood then entered into conflict with secular forces, including the liberal political elite that stood by their side before the Arab Spring, who were concerned about the "Brotherhoodization" of state institutions, particularly given the strong presence of the Salafist Hizb Al-Nour and other Islamist parties.

The rivalry that existed between Islamists and secularists once again led to a struggle for the identity of Egypt. In this environment, two competing narratives took shape, one Islamist, fearful of a secular agenda seeking to alter the Islamic identity, and the other secularist, concerned about an agenda for the Islamitization of society and the state, the imposition of a theocratic regime similar to other theocratic regimes and about falling into the clutches of a theocratic dictatorship even more rigid than the political dictatorships of the past.

However, the purpose of this document is not to dissect this short period in the Brotherhood's rise in Egypt, whether in terms of parliamentary majorities or Mohamed Morsi's time as president – an important paper has already been published by a contingent within the Brotherhood offering a critical view of its behavior at that stage. What happened in Egypt was important and impactful, not just for the trajectory of Islamists in the Arab world, but for the Arab landscape as a whole – in many different Arab countries.

Following the military coup of July 2013, many Arab states issued decisions banning and designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Then, Jordan licensed a new society of Muslim Brothers and deemed the parent organization illegal and confiscated its property for the first time in the history of the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Hashemite state.¹⁰

The military coup – and the subsequent crackdown on the Brotherhood's popular assemblies in Rabia al-Adawiya, the imprisonment of its leaders, and the brutal media, security, and political campaign against it – was ingrained in the minds of a large segment of Islamists, particularly in the Arab East, who were betting on significant historical changes accompanying the Brotherhood's rule in Egypt. This was especially true in Jordan, Syria, and Yemen. Meanwhile, Hamas, because of its close ideological and political ties to the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, paid a heavy price for its relationship with the new government in Egypt.¹¹

When the Muslim Brotherhood's wager to thwart the coup in Egypt through political and popular means that included marches, demonstrations, rallies, and at times even riots, fell through, disputes among the ranks of the Brotherhood began to grow. With thousands of members in prison, and with others fleeing or dead, multiple currents emerged. The group's traditional leadership tried to take control, but a younger generation

¹⁰ See: the Brotherhood's revisions and the documents issued by the so-called Kamalist trend "associated with the Brotherhood leader killed by Egyptian security, Mohammed Kamal" entitled "Pre-Vision Assessments", at the following link: <http://bit.ly/2Gci0Ro>

¹¹ See: "hukm bi hathr anshata al ikhwan fi masr wat tahafuth 'ala mumtalikatihim" "Ruling Banning Muslim Brotherhood Activities and Confiscating their Property", Al Arabiya Net, 9-23-2013, <http://bit.ly/25Nnahy>. As well as; Josef Bishara, "mu'adalat l'an masr al ikhwan jama'a irhabiyya" , "The dilemma of designating the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization", Elaph Electronic, 12-30-2013, <http://bit.ly/2BYDAKY>

more inclined towards the use of force emerged, albeit without the direct use of weapons. In contrast, another generation of Islamists pushed for deep revisions to be made in order to formulate a critical take on the Brotherhood's actions during this period.¹²

The situation was not much different in other Arab countries. In Jordan, the Brotherhood experienced splits and the establishment of new parties. Much of the group's moderate leadership broke from the ranks of its political wing, the Islamic Action Front "IAF", and established new parties of their own such as the Zamzam Initiative and the Partnership and Salvation Party. Meanwhile, the state banned the official iteration of the Brotherhood in Jordan and forced the old guard to operate under the banner of the IAF.¹³

Disputes and divisions also overcame the National Rally for Reform in Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Party in Iraq, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Lebanon, as there emerged from these groups and parties other forms and frameworks, or splits. In conflict areas, a kind of stalemate and weakness took hold of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, radical Islamic forces and Salafist currents became the largest and most influential powers in their respective societies. It is still unclear if the Brotherhood's failure to make headway in this context was due to the group's decision to avoid getting involved in internal conflicts and struggles or if it was the result of internal differences, organizational gridlock, and weakening popularity.

Nevertheless, it is clear that when compared to the marked and unprecedented rise of radical Islamic groups and movements of a Salafist and jihadist nature, the parties associated with the Muslim Brotherhood or similar organizations were not as effective as their rivals in their official organizational formula within these civil conflicts either in terms of recruiting and military effectiveness or in adopting "the identitarian conflict" with "Iranian influence" and Shia forces in the Arab region.

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood's low visibility in areas of civil conflict "specifically Iraq, Syria, and Yemen", it has found other avenues of activity. By operating through political and partisan frameworks and leading figures in the internal political arena in Iraq, cooperating with an existing Arab-backed government, like the Congregation for Reform in Yemen, and working from the outside via opposition frameworks and relief efforts in Syria, the Brotherhood has been able to maintain a limited level of influence in areas dominated by Salafist and Jihadist currents.

In any case, one of the salient variables to emerge from the past few years is the change in, or more accurately, the reversal of the Brotherhood's overall rhetoric towards Iran. Ever since Hamas became a bridge of communication and alliance between Iran, Syria, and Islamic forces throughout the Arab region after its political office was moved to Syria, and later, after the 2006 Lebanon war, there have been two camps in the region: the first being the axis of resistance "Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas", and the second,

¹² See: Khalil al Anani, "ikhwan misr wa 'ustourat' al 'unf al mumanhaj" "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the Legacy of Systemic Violence" al Arabi al Jadeed, 31/7/2017

¹³ See: Mohammed Abu Rumm, "ikhwan al muslimin bil urdun: nihayat as sira' al da'iri wa bidayet at-ta'wim as-siyasi" "The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: The end of the ongoing conflict and the beginning of political buoyancy" at the following link: <http://bit.ly/2Bof05h>

that of Arab moderation "Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Egypt". However, these political and regional formations completely changed with the outbreak of events in Syria, the departure of Hamas' leadership from Damascus, and Hezbollah's intervention, and constituted a turning point for Sunni Islamic discourse in general, and the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. The Brotherhood's discourse, which was directly influenced by the political hostility of Iran and its proxies, and indirectly by sectarianism, turned one of its most prominent authorities of Islamic Jurisprudence, Dr. Yusef al-Qardawi, who had called for sectarian dialogue with Iran, into one of its most prominent enemies in the Islamic and Arab world.¹⁴

In a relatively different approach to governance, two Islamist experiments took place in Tunisia and Morocco. Here, the political behavior of Islamists was characterized by great flexibility, as they adopted the principle of political negotiation and gave priority to pragmatism over ideology in their discourse and in the relationships of the Ennahda and Justice and Development parties with other political forces.

The Ennahda Party made important compromises in the process of drafting the Tunisian Constitution. They did not cling to ideological issues and agreed to civil and personal status laws relating to women that were adopted during the Habib Bourguiba era, nor did the party attempt to impose its religious agenda. After the party failed in its attempt to soften the Salafist jihadist position and attract its adherents to the political process, it entered into a confrontation with them and stood in opposition to them.

On the level of "the rules of the political game", Ennahda did not nominate a party member for president; instead, it supported the former Tunisian president, Moncef Marzouki, in the first presidential elections. Then, when Nidaa Tounes emerged and made progress in the elections, Ennahda allied with them, making them their partner in government today.¹⁵

The situation as it relates to the Moroccan Justice and Development Party "JDP" is not much different. In an apparent understanding of the differences between the nature of the monarchy and a republic, the JDP avoided the urge to reproduce the experience of Tahrir Square in Morocco and did not call for the overthrow of the regime. It then formed an inclusive government with other political parties despite its own feelings that it faced resistance, attempts to thwart its success in the previous elections, and the failed efforts of former Prime Minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, to form a government. Current Prime Minister, Saadeddine Othmani, a member of the JDP, has also displayed considerable

¹⁴ See, for example, the report of the French news agency "al-qardawi yuhajim bi-shidda iran wa hizbollah wa yad'u al muslimin lil qital fi souriya" "Al-Qaradawi strongly attacks Iran and Hezbollah and invites Muslims to fight in Syria", Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 1/6/2013, which can be accessed via the following link: <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=49777>

¹⁵ See: Ghannouchi, "harakat an-nahda lan tafriid al hijab 'ala nisa' tunis" "Ennahda Movement won't impose hijab on the Women of Tunisia", Essahra Institute for Policy Studies and Consultations, <http://bit.ly/2C16uKz> Also: Rajaa Basly, "mustaqbal harakat an-nahda fi tunis" "The Future of Ennahda in Tunisia", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4-20-2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=43677> And: Sarah Mersch "dustour towfiqi fi tunis" "Tunisia's Compromise Constitution", 1-21-2014, <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=54261&lang=ar> See also: "an-nahda wa nida' tunis yad'amani hukumat tunis ba'd at-ta'dil" "Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes support Tunisia's New Government Following Amendments", Aljazeera, <http://bit.ly/2F3JIWu>

flexibility in dealing with the regime and other political forces.¹⁶

It is not yet possible to gauge the success of democratic transformation in Tunisia and Morocco. There are still major challenges blocking its path and the experience of Islamists there, like secular and Islamic disputes, new and reactionary forces at odds with one another, the surrounding regional agenda unconducive to democratic transformations, and a severe economic crisis and a limited capacity to address it. Despite all that, Islamists in Morocco and Tunisia are still on a much better path than the other political and Islamist experiments that descended into a state of internal disputes, divisions, and structural crises amidst the renewal of authoritarian regimes and the outbreak of civil wars where radical forces have risen up as an alternative response to sectarian and identity conflicts, dictatorial methods, and civil strife.

2. General Trends of Islamists

These historic and pivotal developments, both in terms of the political and social conditions in the Arab region, particularly in the Arab East, and of the Islamist movements themselves, have created clear qualitative changes to the course of Islamist movements and produced three distinct trends.

a. The first is apparent in Morocco and Tunisia and can be summarized as a shift towards professional political parties, a clear distinction between religious proselytization and political aims, a greater degree of political pragmatism in dealing with other forces, and a separation of the ideological aspect of the parties' discourse and their political behavior.

Through the group's Shura Council, the Islamist Ennahda party fully adopted this shift towards becoming a professional political party, officially separating religious proselytization from politics. And by deferring all religious aspects of its work to the Unity and Reform Movement, Morocco's Justice and Development Party predated Ennahda in that regard, effectively separating the party's politics from its religious dimension. Both Ennahda and the JDP have largely abandoned Islamist slogans and traditional Islamic discourse like "Islam is the solution" and have become more involved in the political game, allowing them to avoid scaring secular political forces with an agenda for the Islamization or Brotherhoodization of society.¹⁷

This kind of trend appears to be the most effective and successful among Islamists, but is still in its early going. Its success is, on the one hand, linked to the extent to which the democratic process can be consolidated and established in these countries, and the ability of these parties to avoid "mine fields" on the other, particularly as a global, Arab, and regional push seeks to exclude Islamists from power in the Arab world.

¹⁶ "khilafan li benkirane...othmani sebda' oula mushawirat tashkil hukuma ma' hizb al isala wal mu'asira" "Unlike Benkirane, Othmani will begin initial consultations to form a government with the Authenticity and Modernity Party", Huffington Post Arabic, http://www.huffpostarabi.com/2017/03/19/story_n_15472984.html

¹⁷ "harakat ennahda tufasl al 'amal as siyassi 'an ad da'wah" "Ennahda Separates Political and Missionary Work", Al Jazeera, <http://bit.ly/2o9vzK3>

Expectations that these parties would fracture have subsided and it seems that there is a realization among the mainstream that the democratic path, despite the concessions it involves, still holds better results for Islamists, and for their countries, than the alternatives. The existence of leaders with a presence and support among these parties has also preserved their cohesion and ability to overcome difficult tests during the transitional period.

b. The second trend is a scenario of divisions within Islamist movements, outlaw status, confrontations with governments, and clashes with other political forces, legal prohibition, boycotts of the political process, arrests and executions. This trend has resulted in more than one main outcome;

1. "The first is one of divisions and internal crises within the ranks of these movements. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood experienced a series of defections and internal splintering. In 2012, Abdel Moneim Abdul-Fotouh, one of its most prominent leaders defected and founded the Strong Egypt party. Before this, a group of young men left to set up the Islamic Centrist Party, and after the revolution, another group of young men who had taken part in the revolution but who disagreed with the leadership's way of dealing with the subsequent developments managing the transitional period also broke away.

The situation was not much different in Jordan either, as the ZamZam initiative broke with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and later announced the formation of the Partnership and Salvation Party, in other words the majority of the reformist current is now outside of the framework of the Islamic Action Front.¹⁸

2. "The second main outcome is one of reconsiderations. Throughout the Islamic Action Front's return to participation in parliamentary elections, its decision to drop slogans like "Islam is the solution" in its election campaign, changes to its internal structure in order to become completely independent from the Egyptian Brotherhood, its efforts to signal to the state its openness to dialogue and reconciliation, and amendments to the Party's by-laws in order to introduce more reforms and improvements to its organizational structure, we find a clear resonance of reconsiderations in Jordan. 19

However, by monitoring rumors and discussions within the ranks of the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brothers it would appear that the conservative trend, which has reservations regarding the idea of a secular state, the group's full engagement with political pragmatism, and the separation of religious proselytization and politics, is still an organizational player, resisting the process of change that is taking place, and does not easily accept these reconsiderations or attempts to move closer to the experiences of Tunisia and Morocco.²⁰

¹⁸ See: the report, "abraz al-ishqaqat fi tarikh al-ikhwan al muslimin" "Most Important splits in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood", SasaPost, 29/3/2015, <https://www.sasapost.com/muslim-brotherhood/>

¹⁹ See: Firas Abu Halal, "madkhal li fahm azmat al-ikhwan al-muslimin fil urdun" "An Introduction to Understanding the Crisis of the Muslim brotherhood in Jordan", 5-3-2015, <http://bit.ly/2F0x1WQ> Also: "al urdun: al-'amal al-islami yuqirru intikhabat aminihi al-'am min mutamir al-'am lil hizb" "Jordan: Islamic Action Front Recognizes Election of General Party Conference Secretary General", Al Quds Press, 1-9-2016, <http://www.qudspress.com/index.php?page=show&id=14311>

²⁰ See: Hadeel Gaboun, "al-'amal a-islami yatahafath 'ala mafhum 'dawla madaniyya'" "Islamic Action Front Maintains

c. The third trend is characterized by the decision of an unknown percentage of young people to leave the ranks of these movements, not on the basis of divisions to establish a new Islamic party, but to go off in other directions; either to join armed movements "like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra" in Iraq and Syria, to completely abandon political Islam "as was the case among some Muslim Brotherhood members in Syria after the 1984 Hama Massacre", or even abandon political activity altogether. Such an outcome is looking increasingly likely in Egypt in the event the situation there continues as is, with no "deal" between the new regime and the Brotherhood and as the likelihood of a new popular revolution subsides.²¹

3. Expected Research Tasks

The above places us before important transformations in the field of Islamic movement studies, as well as new approaches, understandings, questions, and assumptions compared to the previous state of the field. At the analytical level, there is now more than one field of study and research.

The first field deals with the levels of analysis of the political roles of Islamist movements and goes beyond the national framework of these movements, i.e. the context of interaction between the movement and the state, to four levels: The international level, the regional level, the national level, and the organizational level.

Level "a": the international level. This level encompasses the policies of Western countries and foreign powers with regard to Islamist movements and the attitudes of such movements towards those countries. Since the Arab Spring, there has been significant movement in this regard, starting with the United States' discussions, hearings, and debates on its position towards Islamists and their relationship to power that resulted in a temporary openness between the US and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Islamists in other Arab countries after decades of estrangement. But this era of openness and reconciliation did not last. In later stages, particularly under President Donald Trump, the United States' position changed and returned to a more traditional and pragmatic school predicated on alliances with Arab governments against Islamists.²²

However, the US position cannot be applied to all Western countries. In Britain and

Conservative View of 'the Civil State'", Al Ghad, 1-8-2017

²¹ See: Mohammed Abu Rumman, "muwajihat da'ish...al-'atma as-sisulujjiyya" "Confronting ISIS: Sociological Darkness", Al Arabi Al Jadeed, 11-8-2016.

²² See, for example: Shadi Hamid, Peter Mandaville, and William McCants, How America Changed Its Approach to Political Islam, The view from Washington has shifted a lot over the decades. The Atlantic, 4-10-2017, Stephen M. Walt, Making the Middle East Worse, Trump-Style, Foreign Policy, June 9, 2017. See also, Omer Abdel Ati, "qira'a fi taqirir amrika wal islam as-siyasi: tahawul min al-'askara ila al-indimaj wat-tahaluf," "Understanding America and Political Islam: From Militarism to Integration and Alliance", Al-Jazeera Net, October 2011, and "ar-ru'ya al amrikiyya lil islam as-siyasi fil qarn al-hadi wal 'ishrin" "How the US views Islam in the 21st Century", Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, 31-12-2016, <http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/37643>, Middle East Online, "amrika wal islam as-siyasi, qati'a mu'aqita wa da'm da'im" "America and Political Islam: A Temporary Break and Permanent Support", 11-9-2012, <http://bit.ly/2HaOmgT>, and Mohammed Abu Rumman, "Trump wal 'arab...hadhaf al dimuqratiyya," "Trump and the Arabs: Erasing Democracy", Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, 28-7-2017.

other European states, internal discussion and disagreement loom large.²³

Therefore, attention must be given to this international level in any future analysis, particularly since the policies of these countries are – at times – an independent, or even a dependent, variable in determining the political roles of Islamists in the context of peaceful political Islam. At the level of armed or violent political Islam, as is the case with ISIS, these policies take on even greater dimensions, through the war on terror and the emergence of new concepts and roles such as "lone wolves."

Level "b": regional policies: The regional variable has evolved to play an important role in defining countries' attitudes towards Islamist movements. In turn, these movements have become regionalized. With the processes of change and partial transformation occurring in the attitudes of states or movements since 2013, we have been faced with three regional camps in the Arab region. The first is Arab conservatism. This camp includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. Its position towards political Islam is based on pure animosity and the prohibition of Islamist movements, regardless of whether they belong to the Muslim Brotherhood or participate in the political process. The second is Turkey, which supports Islamists as a force for change associated with the Arab Spring, and the third is Iran, which has supported Shia movements.

Each of these camps has actively impacted the role of Islamist movements politically. With increasing pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other states, Turkey has become a regional nexus point for Islamists. Qatar has also become a major supporter of Islamists fleeing Egypt and other countries, taking up the role historically and traditionally occupied by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, which welcomed the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists fleeing Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the past.

With regard to internal and armed conflict, there was a decline in the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and an uptick in Salafists in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In Libya, the Brotherhood allied with other powers and took part in armed action. At the Shia level, Islamists' relationship with Iran is an important area of research in and of itself.

Therefore, with regard to research tasks, questions, levels and priorities, regional policies assert themselves strongly on the study of the political roles of Islamist movements.

Level "c": The national level: is a familiar and traditional level in the field of Islamic movement studies that deals with movements' relationship to power. Nevertheless, the behavior of these movements while in power, and not just as the political opposition, is an important and new development that requires follow-up research, monitoring, and analysis. This also faces researchers and experts in Islamist movements with two major epistemic tasks:

The first is to frame past events within a general epistemic paradigm. In other words, exiting the realm of practical description to cognitive theory, by bringing to bear

²³ See, for example, Mohammed Abu Rumman, "al-watha'iq al-britaniyya al-jadida" "New British Documents", Al-Ghad, 9-3-2017

a number of basic questions; how do we understand what has happened over the last six years? Why did it happen? What are the causes behind the creation of the relatively similar Tunisian and Moroccan models compared to their Levantine counterparts? Does it stem from the movements and Islamic parties themselves, the nature of effective institutional and political forces in these countries, divergent regional factors within the two experiences "Levantine and Maghrebi", or to the attitudes of the West and international community?

How can we read these transformations in the context of the transitional periods of these societies and countries? Is it normal in the course of Islamists to do as the political parties in Eastern Europe, democratic Christian parties of the west, and even left-wing parties have done and move from revolutionary ideology to reform programs? Or, is there a peculiarity to the Arab and Islamic condition that is linked to a lack of certainty and finality in matters of the relationship between religion and the state or the effective presence of deep state powers, the military, and security apparatuses in these countries?

Thus, there is a need for knowledge, methodology, and research to explain what happened, both theoretically and epistemically. By calling on various fields of knowledge, comparative history, the literature of democratic transformations, the problems of modern Arab political thought, Islamic political culture, and other methodologies, theorems, and approaches, it should help us to construct the necessary epistemic framework.

The second task is to delineate current trends, starting from what has already occurred, to predict the future and to read expected developments at the level of Islamist movements.

Some of the questions raised in this context are: Where can the Moroccan and Tunisian experiments go with the introduction of political Islam and democratic transformation, and Islamists' own transformation into a professional political party? What challenges does this process face? What obstacles are expected to stand in its way? Then, what form and formula might Islamic parties arrive at the conclusion of this transitional period?

Conversely, what scenarios dominate the Levantine Islamic scene? What is the future of the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt? In Jordan, as well as those countries experiencing conflict and civil war "Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya", how can we read the barometers and determinants that shape the behavior and future of these movements and parties?

The organizational-structural level deals with the structure of these movements, parties, and forces, interpreting splits, conflicts, and internal wings, and the study of their organizational structure and its association with their political roles, internal education, and the extent to which these "institutional structures" and internal approaches are compatible with their official public discourse. We can add to this the "sociology of Islamists," i.e., the study of the internal society of Islamist movements and their interaction with the surrounding social environment.

The second field deals with questions, concepts, and methodological approaches. Over the past decades, research questions related to the nature of Arab political equations and the ideological discourse of Islamists dominated. Today, however, there have been changes in the study of Islamist discourse. The experience of governance in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia has put us in a position to redesign this question, to become: How do Islamists understand democracy? What is the attitude of Islamists towards individual freedoms and women's rights and towards religious, sectarian, cultural and political pluralism?

Textual and discourse analysis are still important to the study of Islamist movements, but, today it is also necessary to add to that other approaches, such as political behavior analysis as well as sociological and economic approaches that analyze the discourse of Islamists and their economic policies.

With other currents, sects and minorities fearful of an agenda of Islamization that would enlist democracy to serve Islamist ideology through legislation and give religious institutions the authority to interpret laws and religious texts, the question of the relationship between religion and the state is a pressing one in much of the Arab world.

One of the new research questions deals with the position of Islamists towards the state and civic culture. It is a question that became a topic of discussion among the Islamists themselves and among educated Arab elites once it became clear that their position on democracy alone was not a sufficient guarantee to others that they would not establish a theocracy. Some Islamists encouraged debate on the concept of the civil state to counter the return of military rule and to act as a buffer preventing the establishment of fundamentalist governments and to alleviate concerns about the freedoms of individuals and minorities.

The third field includes priorities and research agendas. Within this complex map, there is a shifting in the agenda of the field of Islamist movements in terms of concepts, questions, hypotheses, methodological approaches, levels of political analysis and research priorities. It is therefore necessary to rearrange the matrix of the research agenda in the field and to classify it by importance, perhaps in each country or geographic region.

But if we are going to think at the macro level, from the most important to the important, in the field of these movements, it is necessary to engage in the four levels of analysis first; namely the international, regional, local, and structural levels, since we cannot separate them from the field of Islamic movement studies. With the Arab region witnessing waves of sectarianism and racialism, the disintegration of national identities, and the emergence of sub-identities and proxy wars, these levels – i.e. the four levels of analysis of the political role of Islamists – deserve to be among the priorities of the research agenda in the field.

Key questions include: questions of religion and the state, and of Islamists' devotion to the separation between social, service, and proselytization roles and their political one, and to the formation of professional political parties, different in style to the traditional image that represented the slogans and objectives of Islamists, i.e. "Islam is the solution," and the establishment of an Islamic state, are key. Alternatively, research that looks to

the future of current ideological formations and to the likelihood of political Islam's shift towards parties analogous to the conservative and Christian democratic parties of the west, are also important research topics on the agenda of the researchers and scholars in this field.

In fact, a seemingly independent research agenda studying radical and extremist movements has emerged alongside peaceful political Islam in recent years, in particular following the Islamic State's rise to the top of the political agenda of many. Despite the overlap between them, there is a sharp contrast and rather significant variance between the study of peaceful and radical political Islam. Armed political Islam has taken on different global and regional dimensions when compared to its peaceful counterpart, and has become an important subject for many think tanks, Western and Arab officials, and politicians. The study of violent Islamism has entered into distinct fields of political knowledge, such as extremism and its causes, counter-strategies, counter-terrorism and a conceptual field far different from the one with which experts and researchers in the field of peaceful political Islam typically concern themselves.

4. Conclusion

Free of the preconceived notions, precepts and predictions about the defeat, collapse or death of Islamist movements espoused by their opponents and a handful of scholars, or of those who speak about the inevitability of Islamists' victory and the continued rise and survival of this Islamist trend as a constant in local, regional and internal equations, the epistemic and research tasks of today for dealing with and analyzing political Islam, and developing scenarios and future outlooks, seem even more complex and difficult.

The research field is intertwined. It cannot be separated from local, regional, or even global Arab policies as long as Islamists are active forces on the ground and have multiple roles. Likewise, the field is not independent of questions of identity, culture, ideology, heritage and modernity, all of which are important questions in the field of modern and contemporary Arab thought, nor is it independent of the questions of democracy, social justice, corruption and the crisis of the Arab national state, etc.

It is therefore necessary that the next research agenda in the field of political Islam studies stick close to these data points and landmarks, and of the deep questions related to religion's relationship to the state and democracy and to religious reform as linked to political or economic reform, etc.

All of this confirms that as specialists and researchers in this field, we are set face-to-face with new research tasks and an ever increasing laboratory of change in Arab and Islamic world.

Study 2

Political Islam and ISIS:

Methodological Approaches

Hassan Abu Hanieh

Introduction

The rise of the Islamic State in the Arab world was a critical juncture in the course of the region's Islamist movements. Because of this, the Muslim Brotherhood and the parties and movements that emerged from it as representatives of political Islam have faced an unprecedented two-pronged challenge from deeply-rooted national military and security apparatuses and movements whose ideological and military apparatuses straddle borders.

The decline of political Islam was not the result of a democratic political process through the ballot box, but through the "bullet box." In most of the elections that took place throughout the region following the protest movements that swept Arab states in early 2011, Islamists managed to win and access positions of power before being overthrown. This short period of time characterized by Islamists' rise to power coincided with the emergence of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria in April 2013. The Egyptian military establishment removed Egypt's first Islamist president from the Muslim Brotherhood in its July 3 coup and proceeded to overturn the results of the elections that brought the Brotherhood to power.

Then, through a series of military and legal steps that led to mass-killings and sweeping arrests, the deep-rooted national apparatus delivered a deathblow to the organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood and removed the group's political legitimacy by classifying it as a terrorist organization. Similarly, the Islamic State worked to strip the Brotherhood of its ideological potency via a coordinated propaganda campaign based on exposing the contradiction within its ideological and political discourse as a grassroots theological movement that abandoned the Islamic identity and religious lexicon related to the restoration of the Caliphate and application of Sharia law in favor of a politicized dynamic that adapted to the requirements of the nation-state and accepted democracy, pluralism and pacifism.

The challenge posed by the Islamic State to the ideological underpinnings of political Islam was on full display following its capture of Mosul on June 10, 2014 and the creation of a new geopolitical space, stretching from Mosul in Iraq to Raqqa in Syria, that represented an unprecedented challenge to the international system established by Sykes-Picot in 1916. The challenge of the Islamic State then doubled on June 29, 2014 with the organization's declaration of an Islamic Caliphate and the swearing of an oath of

allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph.

In this context, political Islamist movements faced a two-fold challenge unlike any other since their founding during the colonial era following the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 and the emergence of the seeds of political Islam, the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, and the establishment of other chapters in most parts of the Arab and Islamic world.

1. Political Islam : Contradictory Views

Post-Arab Spring developments and the rise of the Islamic State in 2013 led to the emergence of local, regional, and international approaches that were altogether different from those that prevailed after the attacks of September 11, 2001. By looking at questions of ideology, and returning to theories that link violent extremism to ideology and culture, these approaches contributed to expanded perceptions of "terrorism." As the Trump administration began to do away with the term "countering violent extremism" - the standard since the Bush era - in favor of "countering Islamic extremism" or "countering radical Islamic extremism" following the consensus that Islamic extremism poses a direct threat to US national security, the ideology of political Islam came under attack and was accused of being a facilitator of violent extremism. Adopting this stance means that any serious efforts to combat the extremist ideology that drives groups like the "Islamic State" and "Al Qaeda" must be part of a larger strategy to prevent and combat the full range of extremist ideologies, including that of political Islam and its largest representative, the Muslim Brotherhood, which is effectively treated as a terrorist organization in this context.²⁴

The debate surrounding political Islam can be divided between what might be called "lumpers" and "splitters." Lumpers place all Islamists in the same basket and view "radical Islam" as a broad, coherent movement rooted in religion rather than conventional politics. Splitters on the other hand, view the field of Islamist politics as one divided among a wide range of competing ideological and political strands. The lumper group typically views "radical Islam" as a coherent whole, with the likes of Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood playing different roles, but ultimately ones that are more similar than different. While these groups may deviate over tactics, lumpers ultimately believe they share the same religious and civilizational goals, and pursue the same ultimate strategic objective of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.²⁵

In this context, Islamist movements have been subjected to a two-fold misunderstanding that led to a brutal campaign against their ideology and organizational existence. On the one hand, the Islamic State views the members of these movements as hypocrites who abandoned their Islamic identity and sided with the West, while on the

²⁴ See: Matthew Levitt, Defeating Ideologically Inspired Violent Extremism, Washington Institute, March 2017, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/defeating-ideologically-inspired-violent-extremism>

²⁵ See: Mark Lynch, In the Same Basket, or Not?, Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 2017, <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/68805>

other, the international community and autocratic Arab states view political Islam as a contemptuous ideology that flirts with the precepts of radical Islamism.

Because of this confusion and the prevalence of alternative approaches, political Islam came under siege and was seemingly incapable of dealing with such a challenge. As a movement, the Muslim Brotherhood derives its moral legitimacy from the Islamist identity lexicon, which is based on the overlap of the religious and the political. It exists between reform and struggle. In looking at the historical paths traversed by the Muslim Brotherhood and its transformations in terms of discourse, ideology, and behavior, a social movement that simultaneously internalizes the radicalism of Sayyid Qutb and the reformism of Hassan al-Hudaibi emerges. The writings of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, are intentionally ambiguous and allow the group to comfortably position itself between two opposing spheres; Dar al-Islam, the world of Islam, in which Sharia law dominates, and Dar al-Harb, the secular world represented by the modern nation-state. As such, it was not surprising to see divergent iterations of the group in different countries, places, and circumstances. This has led to confusion and differing definitions of the group and its role between moderation and extremism, which at times treat it as a firewall against extremism and at others as a conveyor belt for violent extremism.

The specific trajectories of political Islam, in particular, and of social movements, in general, are subject to the forces of sociological change within the context of survival and transformation. Over the last three decades, it has become abundantly clear that the Muslim Brotherhood has embraced "politicization" out of self-interest created by the constraints of reality and the balance of power. These constraints led to a series of positions, options and practices that slowly gave rise to declining religiosity and growing political pragmatism. The Brotherhood's beginnings were dominated by an ideological orientation contingent on a religious lexicon based in theological concepts like the Caliphate, the Ummah, and Jihad, which was later transformed into a national movement grounded in a political lexicon and terms like democracy, the people, and resistance by the trend towards politicization and an acceptance of the democratic game.

Throughout its transition from religious organization to semi-political movement and then political party following the emergence of "post-Islamism," political Islam's path has become a duplicitous hybrid that is the product of the shift of the Arab nation-state away from authoritarian regimes towards the possibility of democracy. This shift gives Islamist movements real incentive to adapt to changes in the political environment in order to take advantage of newly present opportunities. Politicization forces these movements to make the necessary adjustments to engage in the political process, but the more they penetrate the process and the more they adjust their attitudes and discourse to align with their new commitments to accept democracy, pluralism and the rotation of power, the more they diverge from their ideological considerations. They move away from thoughts of violence and armed action and are pushed towards the democratic track and negotiation, for the benefits it provides. But, politicization also requires many sacrifices and the dynamics of change generate additional crises that must be weighed as a part of their overall cost-benefit calculations.

It is only natural then that the proponents of competing theories on political Islam would find pause in the question of ideological similarities. Splitters are confronted with a counter argument wherein the formation of contemporary Islamic political ideology is rooted in the Wahhabi version of Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. And, while the frame of reference of the Wahabbist version of jihadism emerged in the absence of anti-colonial nationalism, the other authoritative reference of jihadism was born out of colonial imperialism and took shape with the Brotherhood's formation following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate. This second authoritative reference, with its Muslim Brotherhood influence, later evolved with the thought of Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi.

Despite the theoretic tug of war over the intellectual identity and religious background of contemporary jihadism, and the attempt to delegitimize its reliance on a Sunni Salafist identity within the context of propaganda battles and ideological warfare, the references on which global jihadism are based do not deviate from the same Sunni source material, regardless of whether the jihadist reading of these references is literal, selective, or interpretive. Contemporary Islamist movements are rooted in a religious reference principally based on the various schools of Salafist thought, while the intellectual origins of present-day global jihadism are irrecoverably tied to the Salafist tradition in its Saudi Wahhabi version, and to Salafist movements represented by the Qutbist Muslim Brotherhood. Contemporary Salafi Jihadism is also closely related to the legacy of Sheikh Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab "1703-1791" and its subsequent evolution, as well as the legacy of Sheikh Hassan al-Banna "1906-1949", who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, and the emergence of the radical wing of the group with Sayyid Qutb "1906-1966".

2. The Rise of ISIS : A Historical-Sociological Reading

The challenge of the Islamic State as a critical juncture in the course of political Islam lies in its efforts to apply the theory of an Islamic Caliphate and Sharia Law in areas under its control, the same provisions and practices that were applied by the Wahhabis. Indeed, the writings of Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab and the scholars of Dawa Najdiyyah are considered the main references of the religious curricula taught within the scope of the rule of the Islamic State.²⁶

From another angle, the group's behavior is similar to that of Wahhabis, in that it is characterized by a strict, literal, and uncompromising application of Wahhabi principles. This is reflected in the implementation of harsh sentences on anyone who falls short of or is negligent in their application of correct religious behavior, such as late attendance to prayers or the practice of certain behaviors that are forbidden in the eyes of Wahhabism, i.e. smoking, singing, shaving the beard and above the ankle clothing, or a woman's failure to observe modesty, etc. Such "distractions" were dealt with by beating, flogging or

²⁶ See: Jacob Olidort, "Teaching Terror: The Islamic State's Textbooks, Guidance Literature, and Indoctrination Methods," August 2016, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus/147-Olidort-5.pdf>

imprisonment.²⁷

The trajectories of jihadist currents in the colonial and post-colonial context, with the founding of Arab nation-states, show that the attractiveness of the "utopia of the Caliphate" was a critical factor in establishing a consciousness based on the restoration of the Islamic religious identity - a fundamental theme of political Islam in its formative stages before integrating into the nationalism of the nation-state. Mawdudi's vision is derived from the Indo-Islamic subculture, political consciousness, and legacy of Islamic rule that shaped Indian Muslims' worldview and laid the ground work for the Muslim political agenda. Mawdudi was also clearly driven by this vision, "which tended to emphasize the separation between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the rejection of the duality that imposes the law of non-Muslims on Muslims."²⁸

Throughout the formative stages of early political Islam, the differences between it and jihadism were not immediately clear. This ambiguity would later prompt the Islamic State to emphasize political Islam's deviation from its historical course, its abandonment of its objectives at the expense of the values of Western civilization, and its reliance on a different political lexicon. Because of the Islamic State's literal ideological and religious orientation, it will see the evolution of political Islam as an unforgivable betrayal and will emphasize the early writings of political Islam which stress the questions of the Caliphate and jihad. In 1928, Mawdudi classified the message of jihad in Islam as the establishment of a jihadist identity and in the early 1940s, when he founded Jamaat-e Islami, it was based on the fact that the "Islamic community" as an identity was threatened by Westernization.

The ambiguity of the ideological identity of political Islam and jihadism is clearly evident in the concept of jihad. In its various dimensions, the concept of jihad has occupied a central position in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood ever since its establishment in 1928 as an ideology of identity and a strategy of liberation. In his 1947 essay entitled, *The Message of Jihad*, the group's founder, Hassan Al-Banna, classified the nature of the Brotherhood's understanding of jihad and its universal function, when he wrote, "a nation skilled in the profession of death and that knows how to die a noble death will be granted by God a glorified life on earth and eternal bliss in the afterlife...so seek an honorable death and thereby attain perfect happiness. God has bestowed on us and on you the honor of martyrdom in His cause."²⁹

The Islamic State, like the lumpers, overlooks several key historical developments in the metamorphosis of political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in Egypt within the context of a confrontation with the policies of colonialism and the process of identity removal as a universal international movement based on the foundations of a revivalist, reformist identity.³⁰ In its early years, the group carried out the tasks of organization

²⁷ See: Abdullah Al Maliki, "al-wahhabiyya wa ikhwan man ta'a allah wa daesh... hal a'ada at-tarikh nafsu?" "Wahabbism, the Ikhwan, and ISIS: Has History Repeated Itself?"

²⁸ See: Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, translated by Ghada Bin Amira, Hekmah, 2016, <http://bit.ly/2EHIs87>

²⁹ Hassan al-Banna, "majmu' min risa'il al-imam ash-shahid hassan al-banna," "The Messages of Hassan Al-Banna", Al Wafa Printing Press, Mansoura, Egypt, undated, Pg. 171.

³⁰ For more details on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, see: Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*,

building and proselytization by peaceful means, but its preference for spiritual power over material strength did not deter it from engaging in political activity,³¹ or from jihadist preparations. In 1928, the first Riyadiya groups were established in Ismailia and in 1935, the Jawala were established. Later, the Kata'ib were formed in 1937, before the Usar and the Nizam al-khass finally took shape in the early forties – all paramilitary organizations established amidst the Brotherhood's proselytization and reform work.

Jihad was present in most of the messages of Hassan Al-Banna. Nevertheless, as the Brotherhood was busy sending donations to Palestine and anti-occupation memos,³² organizing popular protests, and smuggling weapons, its jihadist ideology in this period focused on spiritual education and solidarity. The group did however fight alongside the remnants of Palestinian jihadist groups during the 1936 Arab revolt.³³ Indeed, the Brotherhood's secret military apparatus, known as the Nizam al-khass, was only formed for Palestine and the Palestinian cause. There, the Brotherhood was involved in the work of the national committees that were re-established immediately after the declaration of the 1947 UN partition resolution, with the city of Jaffa being one of the most important locations where the Brotherhood contributed to the fighting. The Brotherhood established independent forces in the village of Silwad east of Ramallah and took part in the Battle of Qastal, led by Abd al-Qadir al Hussayni, the commander of Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas, and also participated in the fighting elsewhere through a group of Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood volunteers and through its contribution to committees to defend villages.³⁴ It is important to note here how the concept of Jihad at-Tadammun "solidarity jihad" accompanied all stages of the group's development.

Within the context of the crisis of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasserite political authority, an alternative to the Brotherhood's traditional vision influenced by the legacy of the reformist movement began to take shape, led in its ideological foundations by a new group of Muslim Brotherhood thinkers that included Abdul Qadir Oudah, the author of "Islam and Our Political Condition."³⁵

But the most significant influence in the transformation of the Brotherhood's reformist vision came at the hands of Sayyid Qutb, who established a clear revolutionary ideology based on criticism of the founding of nation-states in Muslim countries after the exodus of colonialism, in favor of the establishment of an Islamic state in which rulership "hakimiyyah" and sovereignty are God's alone.

Sayyid Qutb's dissertations led to a change in the establishment of the jihadist

translated by Mahmoud Abu Saoud, commentary Saleh Abu Raqeeq, Cairo, 1979

³¹ The Brotherhood admitted to participating in political activities for the first time in the first issue of Nazir magazine in May, 1938. Ibid., pp. 88

³² Hassan al-Banna, "mudhakkirat al-da'wa wad da'ayya" "Memoirs of Hassan al Banna Shaheed", Zahra Arab Media, Cairo, Egypt, 1990, pp. 279-286.

³³ Richard P. Mitchell, op. cit., pp 142

³⁴ For more details on the history of the Brotherhood's experience with Jihad in Palestine, see: Kamel Al-Shareef, "al-ikhwan al-muslimeen fi harb filistin" "The Muslim Brotherhood in the War for Palestine", Zahra Arab Media, Cairo, 1987.

³⁵ Abdul Qadir Oudah was executed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 after the famous Manshiyya incident. The book was authored in the late 1940s and the great book, "at-tashri' al-jina'i al-islami muqarinan bil-qanoun al-wada'i" "Islamic Criminal Legislation and Positive Law: A Comparison" is considered the most famous of his works.

situation in general, and his book, *Milestones*, is a foundational declaration of the Jihadist movement's philosophy and methodology, as well as a mechanism of change and action in the context of the post-colonial nation-state and the struggle for the identity of the state and society via the concepts of "hakimiyyah" and "jahiliyyah."³⁶

The Nasserist policies of exclusion, and later the Muslim Brotherhood's political integration during the sixties and seventies, led to the emergence of two main trends within the group: one that is radical and one that is reformist. The first calls for changing the regimes and replacing them with Islamic systems by force and holds Sayyid Qutb as one of its most prominent symbols. The second relies on the use of the mechanisms of gradual reform to change the system of government by peaceful means and is represented first and foremost by Hassan al-Hubaidi, the author of the famous book, *Preacher, Not Judges*.

Beginning in the 1970s, Sayyid Qutb's writings took on a confrontational dimension. His ideas became more pointed and started to have a greater impact on the minds of an entire generation of jihadists in Egypt and abroad. Throughout the seventies, "Islamic rage" organizations emerged,³⁷ which focused their efforts on local internal affairs and understood the nature of the secular dictatorial system and ways to confront it. These organizations began theorizing and embedding themselves in the concept of *Dar al-Islam*, the restoration of the Caliphate, and the practice of Jihad as a revolutionary ideology. They began to push Qutb's discourse about the "vanguard," "spiritual detachment," the "unique Quranic generation," and "superiority" toward different objectives. In their definition of the state and society, these movements began using the traditional historical terminology of Islamic jurisprudence such as, "Takfir wat-Tajhil" "accusations of unbelief and ignorance", "at-Tawaqquf wat-Tabayyun" "repose and meditation" and "al-Wala wal-Bara" "loyalty and disavowal" dominated their discourse and identity lexicon.

3. The Crisis of Political Islam: A Methodological Reading

For understandable and objective reasons, namely the military coup on the results of the democratic process in Egypt following the Arab Spring revolutions, the militarization of the Arab revolutions in Syria and Libya, and their respective subversion and sectarianism in Yemen and Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood is witnessing an irreversible decline in the Arab World – in stark contrast to the progress of jihadist movements as a major player in several Arab countries. Nevertheless, the central question is one of the permanence of the Muslim Brotherhood's retreat and the progress of jihadist ideology. Since its emergence in the Arab and Islamic worlds more than three decades ago, political Islam, and its main representative, the Muslim Brotherhood, has yet to be defeated in any electoral contest based on authoritarian and semi-authoritarian principles. The Muslim Brotherhood has also proved after the Arab revolutions that it is a reformist force that cannot be overcome through the ballot box, and that its influence and popularity in the

³⁶ Ibid. pp 10.

³⁷ For more, see: Rafat Sayyid Ahmad, "tan imat al-ghadab al-islami fis saba'inat" "The Islamist Rage Organizations of the Seventies", Madbouli, First Edition, 1989.

public domain cannot be ignored.

With the Arab world's entry into a new era in early 2011 through uprisings and revolutions against authoritarian regimes, the Muslim Brotherhood posed a fundamental challenge to both jihadist movements and authoritarian regimes alike. It managed to access power under democratic mechanisms representing the "will of the people" through free and fair elections from parliament to the presidency through the Constitution, but, the January 25 revolution in Egypt still faced the challenges of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The totalitarian post-colonial state and its oppressive and ideological apparatuses viewed democratic changes as an existential threat to its existence and authority, and led a counter-revolution that brought together the losing parties, locally, regionally, and internationally, by manufacturing a "revolution" on June 3, 2013 based on a dictatorial "legitimacy of the masses" backed by the state's oppressive and deep-rooted ideological security apparatus which seized control on the pretext of saving the revolution and democracy from so-called "Islamofacists," and which proceeded to adopt the strategy of a "war on terror."

After a short Arab Spring, a new jihadist approach emerged that went beyond traditional jihadist approaches of "defensive jihad" and jihad to cause damage to the enemy "jihad al-nikaya". At a time when al-Qaeda's central organization insisted on staying the course in its fight against "the far enemy" through the use of attrition tactics, and an approach to bleed its enemies and draw out the fighting, the Islamic State put forward a new model predicated on fighting "the near enemy" through strategies of empowerment "tamkeen", and an approach of cleansing, control, and confrontation. It put great emphasis on the fact that it was on the frontlines representing the Ummah and fighting the "apostate" regimes associated with the West, seeking to deprive them and their allies of stability and control. It adopted an "identity war" based on sectarian religious lines without paying attention to the policies of the war of traditionalist elements and sought to impose control, cleanse territory, and subjugate its enemies while taking the reins of governance as a dominant authority amid a climate of chaos and savagery.

The systematic crackdown on political Islamist movements has led to the growing attractiveness of the "Islamic State." In fact, it has become a preferred option for new jihadists. Entire branches of political Islam have leaked into its ranks and it has become the center of attraction for jihadists from around the world of both sexes. Contrary to past experiences of jihadism, the goal of new jihadists is no longer confined to the conventional approaches of solidarity jihad, defensive jihad and jihad al-nikaya, but to migration and establishing themselves, to contributing to the struggle for empowerment, to state building and to living within the borders of its Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, and voluntary compliance with its strict socio-economic and political system and hardline political governance.

Despite the establishment of an international military alliance to attack its strongholds and the strict measures taken by most of the world's countries on all legal, political, and media levels to stem the flow of foreign fighters, the Islamic State

continues to attract young people in droves.³⁸ Since the emergence of global jihadism as a phenomenon in the 1980s, no other group has managed to attract more foreign fighters in such a short amount of time.³⁹

In the era of "jihad," the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt continues to maintain its grassroots approach to reform and resists the enormous pressures to become a violent armed movement. Despite its classification as a "terrorist" organization and its subjection to systemic violence, the Brotherhood insists on the narrative of peace and reform; even so, the Brotherhood's extensions throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds have historically married the two approaches in areas like Syria, and has recently taken up jihad in Libya and Syria, while taking a more reluctant approach in Yemen and Iraq.

Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood has adopted the concept of defensive jihad and solidarity jihad, a concept firmly established in the theory of "repelling aggression" "daf' as-sa'il". In many cases, its application was manifested internally during the colonial period and externally as it related to the Palestinian question and Afghanistan. The issue of defensive jihad and solidarity jihad is essential to the jurisprudence of Sheikh Hassan Al-Banna and his successors on down to Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, and is a phenomenon within Hamas. Despite Sayyid Qutb's attempt to include the near enemy, represented by oppressive regimes, during the group's plight during the Nasser regime and the July revolution, the Brotherhood retained the approach of Hudaibi and his successors that kept the Brotherhood a reformist movement.

Following the rise of the "Islamic State" and its growing ideological attractiveness and extensive territorial control, the Muslim Brotherhood's internal crisis become more complex. The image of the Muslim Brotherhood was altered and its reputation as an icon and symbol of Islamist populism was sullied as it lost its institutional capacity to control its members and maintain its structure. Some of its members embarked upon the path of violence in multiple ways in Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen and some leaked into jihadist organizations. The Brotherhood was forced to compete on unequal footing; it could integrate no further within semi-authoritarian regimes in marginal roles and its ideological and organizational choices towards post-Islamist movements remained unsettled. As regimes lost confidence in the Brotherhood's ability to integrate, the theses related to the Brotherhood as a "moderate counterweight" and "firewall" against extremism began to change and the arguments for the "conveyor belt" theory increased.

Thus, with the beginning of the uprisings and protests, the efficacy of the Arab Spring would transform from a window of opportunity for realizing the Muslim Brotherhood's

³⁸ The latest UN report, prepared by the UN Security Council's Monitoring Committee on 19 May 2015, indicated a 71 per cent increase in the number of foreign fighters between mid-2014 and March 2015. The report also indicated that the number of fighters who left their home countries to join Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and other countries amounted to more than 25,000 individuals, from more than 100 countries. According to the report, more than 20,000 foreign fighters went to Syria and Iraq, with the primary intention of joining the Islamic state and Jabhat al-Nusra. See: UN: More than 25,000 fighters joined al-Qaeda and Islamic State, BBC Arabic website, <http://bbc.in/19LTp51>

³⁹ Compared with the two prior top mobilizations, the numbers for the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria are much larger and have occurred over a far shorter time span. From 1979-1992 it is believed that about 5,000 individuals went to Afghanistan for the anti-Soviet jihad. Additionally, during the last decade from 2003-2007, around 4,000 foreigners decided to take up the cause of jihad during the Iraq war. See: Aaron Y. Zelin, Sunni Foreign Fighters in Syria: Background, Facilitating Factors and Select Responses, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, <http://bit.ly/1rQXXyW>

aspirations and dreams of governance, into a terrible nightmare threatening the legitimacy of the group in terms of its historical, legal and Islamic identity and which forebodes its fracturing and division on ideological and organizational grounds. Despite allusions to the remote historical causes of the crises plaguing the Brotherhood, their direct causes involve the immediate fallout of the post-protest movement, the Brotherhood's continued politicization, and the demand for an active political role as a key partner in governance, since the traditional historical roles governing the relationship between the Brotherhood and governments have changed forever. The region's most conservative monarchies have historically dealt with the Brotherhood as a firewall against the challenges and dangers posed by radical leftist and nationalist movements, organizations, and trends during the Cold War and against radical Islamist and jihadist organizations and movements in the advent of the neoliberal era of globalization, something the group is no longer capable of as it is, itself, now a threat to the system following the revolutions of the Arab Spring.

Before the Arab uprisings, Islamists argued that mainstream Islamism served as a buffer against the presence of the most violent extremists, and the Muslim Brotherhood spoke publically about the ideology of non-violence and democratic participation, competed with al-Qaeda for recruits and mass influence, and kept its members firmly committed within its institutional structures. In this regard, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to compete with al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in ways that liberals and state elites could not.

After the Arab uprisings, many long-standing debates about the Muslim Brotherhood are simply no longer relevant in an entirely new institutional and political context no longer marked by durable authoritarianism, tolerated but constrained Islamist movements in the role of permanent political opposition, and a clear distinction between mainstream Islamists and violent radical groups, such as al-Qaeda. The arguments about whether inclusion promotes moderation, for instance, were based on political institutions and opportunities which have radically changed.⁴⁰

At present, the Muslim Brotherhood is experiencing an unprecedented self-inflicted two-fold and subjective crisis on the internal level, related to the management of ideological and organizational adaption, and on the external level, related to the management of its relationship with the semi-authoritarian political system. Following its own brief spring after the Arab Spring revolutions in early 2011 with the Arab world's entry into a new era through uprisings and revolutions against semi-authoritarian regimes, the Muslim Brotherhood posed a fundamental challenge to certain Arab political systems, as it delivered impressive electoral results that enabled the group to govern briefly in Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt, it managed to access power under democratic mechanisms representing the "will of the people" through free and fair elections from parliament to the presidency through the Constitution, but Egypt's January 25 revolution still faced the challenges of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.⁴¹

⁴⁰ See: Mark Lynch, Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization or Firewall against Violent Extremism?, Ibid

⁴¹ See: Georges Fahmi, The Struggle For the Leadership of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Carnegie Middle East Center, <http://ceip.org/2o6jXaz>

The Brotherhood in Egypt failed to meet the demands of the popular revolution and failed to manage dissent at the level of society and the state. As Brown and Dunne put it, "the one-year tenure of Mohammad Morsi was rocky for the Brotherhood, which was unprepared for governance. It was even more difficult for the movement's political opponents and allies alike, who were infuriated by the Brotherhood's majoritarian style, insensitivity to non-Islamist input into the constitution, confrontation with the judiciary, and tendency to isolate itself or bandwagon with Salafists."⁴²

The crisis peaked on 30 June 2013, when the opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood took part in massive demonstrations to demand early presidential elections. With the support of the demonstrators, as well as the judiciary, the political opposition and prominent religious representatives, the armed forces intervened to remove Morsi and put the country on a new political path.⁴³ The military coup against Morsi in July 2013 set off a cycle of action and reaction: The Brotherhood and its Salafist and other Islamist allies resisted the coup via large and persistent demonstrations. The authorities put down those demonstrations with great brutality "including the mass killing of more than 1,150 pro-Morsi demonstrators at Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares in August 2013."⁴⁴

Following the Muslim Brotherhood's fall in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE quickly welcomed the marginalization of the group and the removal of President Mohamed Morsi. But the coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was not limited to its political removal from power and authority, it developed into a coordinated campaign to delegitimize the group, and by December 25, 2013 it resulted in the movement's classification as a terrorist organization.⁴⁵ Nor was the process of de-legitimization confined to Egypt. It spread to many Arab countries, in general, and to Gulf countries in particular, where Saudi Arabia added the Brotherhood to the list of terrorist organizations on 7 March 2014,⁴⁶ before the United Arab Emirates followed suit on 15 November 2014.⁴⁷

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt quickly lost its historical gains and became a local, regional and international pariah. The Brotherhood's marginalization and eradication exceeded the material and political, reaching the symbolic and moral domains through the mechanisms of its political and legal de-legitimization as a "terrorist" movement. Many countries proceeded to take a series of steps that included reevaluating the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood, its interpretations and activities, and introduced draft legislation to deal with the group as a terrorist movement. In the UK, a December 17, 2015 report by the British government on the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood found that membership in or association with the movement could be a possible indicator

⁴² See: Nathan Brown & Michelle Dunne, *Unprecedented Pressures, Uncharted Course for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood*, Carnegie Middle East Center, <http://ceip.org/1L2MhPZ>

⁴³ See: Georges Fahmi, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ See Nathan Brown & Michelle Dunne, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ See: "al hukuma al-masriyya tu'tabir al-ikhwan jama'a irhabiyya" "Egyptian Government Considers Brotherhood 'Terrorist' organization", Al-Jazeera Net, <http://bit.ly/2sB8v1>

⁴⁶ See: "awal qa'ima sa'udiyya lil-munazzimat al-irhabiyya tashmal al-ikhwan wal nusra wa daesh" "Saudi List of Terrorist Organizations Includes Brotherhood, Nusra and ISIS", BBC Arabic, <http://bbc.in/2spu5jS>

⁴⁷ See: "al-imatat tasimu tanzimat abrazaha al-ikhwan bil-irhab," "The UAE Labels Organizations as Terrorist, Most Importantly the Brotherhood", Al-Jazeera Net, <http://bit.ly/2ClhjTc>

of extremism and terrorism, but was reluctant to consider the group a terrorist organization.⁴⁸ In the United States, a draft resolution was introduced in Congress calling for the State Department to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization on 24 February 2016. In the end, the project reached the same conclusions contained in the British report.⁴⁹

The crisis of political Islam is characterized by the challenge of the Islamic State and the nation-state, both of which emphasize the hypocrisy of the movement through two contradictory frameworks: one that renounces its authority and another that emphasizes its fundamentalist origins. So, according to the theoreticians of the nation-state, it is impossible to integrate political Islam within the framework of the Arab nation-state in its current form, which was formed after the colonial period, given the differences between the reference authorities of each. An equation integrating the two worlds is seemingly impossible. The former seeks the Islamization of the national state and the latter demands compliance with and acquiescence to its conditions. Thus, the concept of moderation in the context of the modern nation-state means unilateral adaptation and subordination. Since the establishment of the Arab national state, it has sought its legitimacy in Western secular nationalist thought and institutions and pushed Islamist reformers aside.⁵⁰

Political Islam's two-fold problem with the Islamic State and the nation-state is based on the fact that the modern Arab nation-state was founded on the idea of nationalism, liberal democracy, leftist socialism, or a combination of the three.⁵¹ However, despite its ideologies, the nation-state oscillated between authoritarianism and semi-authoritarianism. Following the revolutions of the "Arab Spring" and the shaking of the nationalist authoritarian system, Islamist movements emerged confused by religious and political tendencies, as the debate and conflict over the identity of the state and society, and religion's place in the public sphere intensified, and the question of moderation became problematic based on perceptions of the religious and civil nature of the state, the grounds for integration, and the relationship between religion and the state.

4. Islamists and the Sociology of Change

Political Islam's challenge is based on a complex dilemma surrounding religion's relationship with the state in an Arab world influenced by contrasting ideological and political backgrounds. After the collapse of Ottoman authority, the shock of friction with the modern western reality imposed its civilizational agenda, and from the 1920s to the 1950s, the colonial reality worked to bring the problem to its final conclusion. According to Radwan al-Sayed, during the colonial era and the beginning of the formation of the

⁴⁸ See: "nass al-taqir al-britani li-i'tibar al-ikhwan munazzima irhabiyya," "Text of British Report Declaring Brotherhood Terrorist Organization", Youm 7, <http://bit.ly/2BykhqW>

⁴⁹ See: "nass al-taqir al-amriki li'i'tibar al-ikwhan munazzima irhabiyya" "Text of US report declaring Brotherhood Terrorist Organization", Al-Rai, <http://www.alrai.com/article/772706.html>

⁵⁰ See: Radwan al-Sayed, "siyasat al-islam al-mu'asir: muraji'at wa mutabi'at" "The Politics of Contemporary Islam: A Follow-up and Review", Dar al Kitab al Arabi, Beirut, 1st Edition, pp. 171-174.

⁵¹ For more about the nation-state and reformist movements please refer to: Ali Oumlil, "al-islamiyya al-arabiyya wad-dawla al-wataniyya" "Arab Reformism and the Nation-State", Arab Cultural Center, Beirut, 1st Edition, 1985.

nation-state, a stage in which grassroots Islamic religiosity emerged, and one dominated by the concept of identity, Muhammad Rashid Rida, a disciple of Mohammed Abduh and mentor to Hassan al-Banna, was among the first to respond to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who separated the Caliphate from the Sultanate "1922" in his treatise entitled *The Caliphate or the Great Imamate*. In this treatise, he said, "The Islamic caliphate was a religious state. Then Atatürk abolished the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924 and established the secular republic, which is creating a sense of fear concerning the identity of societies and states among a section of the elites at the time of the emergence of the nation-state in the interwar period. The problem is no longer about progress, but on the preservation of our identity and religion, of which one of the most important symbols is the Caliphate."⁵²

In the decades since the 1950s until the wave of the Arab Spring in 2011, debates about religion's relationship with the state evolved within the womb of the nation-state and dissident or independent Islamist movements and organizations multiplied in number. Although they all defended the idea of the comprehensiveness and perfection of Islam, considering Islam to be a comprehensive way of life in societies and states in all its social, economic, and political aspects, their ideas were based on three interrelated premises: replacing nationalism with Sharia as the basis for legitimacy in society and the state, i.e. the only way for the society to remain Muslim, the Islamic state, and the necessity of the state and the political system for the survival of religion. The primary function of the state was to apply Sharia, God's rule. According to Hassan al-Banna in the first formulations of the thesis, "Islam is a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, a holy text and a sword." According to Abdul Qadir Oudah, "the state is the religion and the religion is the state," and to Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, "the core of religion lies within the state and within the application of God's law on earth" and for this reason, God deputized man, and in particular the believers among men. This is the inevitable meaning of the Islamic solution as crystallized by Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi in the 1970s.⁵³

The fallout from the Arab spring revolutions and the emergence of the Islamic State led to an explosion of the question of the identity of the state and society. Here, the Muslim Brotherhood was a challenge to the foundations of the national state. Despite stressing its commitment to democracy, pluralism, and citizenship in its electoral programs and its interpretations of the issue of the civil state, the Brotherhood's behavior frightened authoritarian regimes, and reinforced the idea that political Islam and democracy are paradoxical, since the Muslim Brotherhood's transformative path from a revivalist religious organization to a civil political party was ambiguous and overlapping, and its guiding authorities oscillated between the traditional and the modern, and in fact still do. For this reason, political authorities describe the movement as malevolent, hypocritical, and opportunistic. Meanwhile, jihadist groups described the Brotherhood as a traitorous apostate party of unbelief.⁵⁴

⁵² See: Wajih Kawtharani, "ad-dawla wal-khilafa fil khitab al-'arabi iban ath-thawra al kemaliyya" "The State and the Caliphate in Arab Discourse during the Kemalist Revolution". 1st Edition, 1996, pp. 47

⁵³ See: Radwan el-Sayed, "as-sira 'alal islam" "The Struggle for Islam", Dar al Kitab al Arabi, Beirut, 1st Edition, 1997, pp.179-188.

⁵⁴ The Islamic State described the Muslim Brotherhood as apostates, collaborators, and unbelievers. In the 14th issue of Dabiq, the Islamic State says the Muslim Brotherhood abandoned the application of Sharia Law in favor of democracy,

The crisis facing the Muslim Brotherhood falls within the framework of the sociology of its transformation from the religious to the political. This framework is one of the results of the "inclusion-moderation" hypothesis and is essential to understanding the methodological approach of this hypothesis and its effects on the behavior of the regime and society. Over the years, this approach has proven its interpretive mettle in the area of understanding the behavior of social and political movements of various political and ideological orientations in general and of political Islamist movements in particular. "The inclusion-moderation hypothesis, long debated with respect to the inclusion of Islamist parties into state-dominated processes of limited political liberalization in the Middle East, has new importance today as even many regimes that did not see revolutionary mobilization explore the possibilities of democratic reform. In some cases entirely new sets of institutions are being established, while in other cases existing institutions are being reformed to allow for greater participation and, possibly, an increased role for elected assemblies."⁵⁵

Strengthened by the transformations of semi-authoritarian regimes, the Muslim Brotherhood has become a quasi-political movement. These transformations have created a tendency within the Brotherhood to politicize in order to adapt to the changes in the political environment. But the benefits of the Brotherhood's political transformations invited further politicization which opened the door to disagreements and divisions within the group related to its ideological and political identity and its role and objectives. What began as minor changes snowballed and gave birth to a hybrid movement, confused in its identity, projects, and objectives. With its components and wings beset with division, the Brotherhood stalled between the ideological and the pragmatic. Politicization forced it to make the necessary adjustments to engage in the political process, but the more it penetrated the political process, the more it deviated from its ideological considerations and the more its attitudes and discourse drifted towards new commitments like acceptance of democracy, pluralism, rotation of power, and alliances with other political parties. It moved away from any thoughts of violence and armed action and was pushed towards the democratic track and negotiation, for the benefits it provided. But for all its benefits, politicization requires many sacrifices and the dynamics of change generate additional crises that must be weighed as a part of the group's overall cost-benefit calculations.

One of the methodological approaches to understanding the crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, and of political Islam, in general, is not limited to politicization in the context of a semi-authoritarian regime, but rather the nature of the modern Arab state, which Taha Abdurrahman calls the "suspicious state," i.e. a "state which practices a kind of "politicization of religion" characterized by the combination of the secular requirements of modernity and the requirements of faith." Unlike the secular state, where religion is a personal matter attributed to the individual alone, the suspicious state

political participation, and pluralism. The article also described the group as a "devastating cancer," which "mutated and spread, attempting to drown the entire Ummah in apostasy" and that "this cancer produced a religion other than Islam, in the name of Islam." See: Dabiq Magazine, Al Hayat Center, Issue 14, <https://issdarat.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/14.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Jillian Schwelder, "Islamists in Power? Inclusion, Moderation, and the Arab Spring," translated by Sabine Tawjian and Manal Khader. Kalamon Magazine, Issue 8, Fall 2013, <http://www.kalamon.org/articles-details-180>.

strives to define religious practice as a public matter that falls within the scope of its responsibilities and jurisdiction. The suspicious state is not satisfied with control over religious activity alone, it must also exercise authority over political activity, but denies it authorization. In its despotic authoritarian behavior, the suspicious state is based on two arguments, according to Abdurrahman. One is that contrarian competition leads to extremist attitudes and denial of dissent, where dialogue management is needed to mediate opinions and moderate points of view. The other is that if the existence of "democracy" in society enables the establishment of mechanisms to manage political conflict, the existence of "fundamentalism" in it prevents the establishment of mechanisms to manage religious dispute. The first argument is called "the argument of religious extremism," and the second is "the argument of incompatibility between fundamentalism and democracy."⁵⁶

The issue surrounding the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the nation-state is not confined to the state's dispute over its political legitimacy, but rather to its religious identity. According to Veli Nasr, "In this type of state, since the state's approach to Islam has been purely utilitarian, and even blatantly so, there tends to be a limited period of time during which the state has been able to control Islamic politics. Since the state does not undergo a cultural transformation, it cannot speak for Islam, and has to rely on Islamist forces and other ideology to provide it with support. The inherent secularism of the state, and limited mandate for its Islam policy, means that ultimately any alliance between the state and Islamist forces will end. In the process, however, Islamist forces get a foothold in the political arena, and the state does develop certain degree of Islamic consciousness and legitimacy...The state's Islam policy has been a policy of policing and controlling the public square."⁵⁷

The new problem in the relationship between the Brotherhood and regimes was born out of the changing of subjective and objective positions during the post-Arab Spring era. In the group's activities, the Muslim Brotherhood engaged in further politicization and demanded an active political role as a partner in governance, undermining the inclusion-moderation approach that was based on participation in semi-authoritarian systems. This is because the historical roles that governed the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government have changed forever. Historically, the government has treated the Brotherhood as a firewall protecting the regime from leftist communist and nationalist challenges and threats during the Cold War, and later from radical Islam and jihadism with the advent of globalization. After the September 11th attacks and the growth of global jihadism, the firewall hypothesis flourished according to Eric Trager, who writes, "in the decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western analysts' search for a "moderate Islamist" alternative to Al-Qaeda often brought them to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose rhetorical rejection of terrorism and embrace of electoral politics was seductive."⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Taha Abderrahman, "ruh ad-din: min dayq al-'ilmaniyya ila sa'at al-itimaniyya " "The Spirit of Religion: From the Constraints of Secularism to the Breadth of Trust", Arab Cultural Center, Beirut, 2nd Edition, 2012, pp. 328-330.

⁵⁷ Veli Reza Nasr, "Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power", translated by Khaled Bin Mehdi, Nama Center, Beirut, Riyadh, First Edition, 2016, pp. 45-46

⁵⁸ See: Eric Trager, "The Muslim brotherhood: From Opposition to Power", Washington Institute, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/the-muslim-brotherhood-from-opposition-to-power>

After the Arab Spring revolutions, many of the Brotherhood's convictions changed. The Brotherhood itself became a threat to the regime and its foundations. "This has important implications for long-existing theories about the Brotherhood and about Islamists more broadly," writes Mark Lynch. "Researchers should therefore admit to greater uncertainty about the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, organization and strategy than ever before. Arguments that held up well five years ago no longer necessarily apply. The competing view held that the Brotherhood was a facilitator of violent extremism, serving not as barrier but as a step along the path toward radicalization. This "conveyor belt" theory suggests that even if the Brotherhood itself did not sanction violence, it set individuals on the path toward extremism and thus increased the net volume of potential terrorists. They pointed to inconsistencies in the Brotherhood's rejection of violence, such as the continuing place of jihadist thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb, in their literature or their support for violence in arenas such as Palestine or Iraq."⁵⁹

One of the main problems that emerged following the Arab Spring which plagues the Muslim Brotherhood is the ambiguity, confusion, and duality of its ideological reference authority, and the rigid structure of the organization. Held captive by its conciliatory treatises, the Brotherhood is still wavering between a traditionalist and modernist structure. It puts forth ideas and public perceptions of "post-Islamism," but its leaders insist on staying within the scope of "political Islam." Its ideological choices must be decided in the direction of post-Islamism just as the Turkish Justice and Development Party, its Moroccan counterpart, and the Tunisian Ennahda party have all done.

The post-Islamist approach does not seem possible without an open political environment, an effective democratic system, and strong civil society organizations. The success of democracy requires firm commitments and sincere intentions from both Islamist movements and semi-authoritarian regimes to the need for change and transformation and to building confidence in a better future for society. Despite the emergence of the concept of "post-Islamism" more than two and a half decades ago, it remains widely controversial with regard to its definition, application, and validity because of its limited explanatory power, weak predictive effects, and modest intellectual impact at home in the Arab and Islamic world. The scholarly efforts put forth to develop the theoretical framework for post-Islamism as an effective and useful analytic tool in terms of social and political terminology has been overtaken by the Arab spring revolutions of 2011. The Arab revolutions challenged the theoretical basis on which post-Islamist discourse was solidly based, which argued with inevitable certainty the hypothesis of the decline of Islamism as a viable political alternative by the processes of globalization and the fragmentation of the sacred, and which transformed the field of individual experience of Islam on the basis of a new global system based on the defense of civil rights, and the separation of political and religious spheres.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ See: Mark Lynch, "Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization or Firewall Against Extremism?" translated by Alaa Addine Abu Zeina, Al Ghad, <http://bit.ly/2GLp34G>

⁶⁰ Although they differ in their goals and views, Olivier Roy first coined the term 'post-Islamism' alongside Olivier Carré in 1991. Many subsequent studies, like those of Gilles Kepel, followed in the footsteps of Roy and Carré, however, Asef Bayat was one of the first to adopt 'post-Islamism' as an analytical tool. In his book, "Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn" "2007", Bayat expands the the definition of post-Islamism as a "project" rather

Despite clear differences between advocates of the post-Islamist and post-orientalist approach to Islam, it is not free from the impact of orientalism. Although criticism was not interrupted by new orientalism, it is full of the essence of the old orientalist establishment. Academics with old liberal views who totally deny the existence of post-Islamist movements, like Bassam Tibi, favor a moral understanding rather than a practical understanding of the post-Islamist transformation. According to Tibi, the Justice and Development Party has simply postponed its goal of establishing its Islamic agenda, but has not abandoned the goal altogether. It is merely a matter of tactics and rhetorical circumvention that does not imply a sincere embrace of democratic pluralism.⁶¹

5. Between Reform and Radicalism

Despite exposure to oppression and persecution, the Muslim Brotherhood has progressed through many stages and maintained its Islamist reformist approach. It has evolved in its political and social approaches to seemingly settle on the options of democracy, pluralism, and citizenship. Through the reform initiative launched by the group in March 2004, it was clear the Brotherhood was pre-occupied with internal affairs, but by moving from a traditional perception of the state to a modern civil perception that transcends the doctrines of the official religious establishment to questions of democracy, citizenship and pluralism,⁶² the Muslim Brotherhood has come a long way. Nevertheless, these options were not fully ingrained in the ideological structure of the group, and for that reason, it remained in conflict with its wings and branches, waiting for the initiatives of the authoritarian regime.

Despite the evolution of the Brotherhood's ideological authority, the lines between the group's radical and reformist tendencies remain unclear.⁶³ In her book, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power*, Alison Pargeter, weighs the Brotherhood's lofty assertions against its aggressive actions. Through her examination of the Brotherhood's early history in Egypt and subsequent spread throughout the Middle East and Europe, Pargeter depicts an organization that faces the constant dilemma of either widening its base through pragmatic outreach or solidifying its base through a more hardline approach. And, as Pargeter tells it, the Brotherhood has almost always embraced the latter, favoring its "conservative" tendencies over its more "reformist" ones. Even so, these distinctions are often blurry because, at their core, "reformers" and "conservatives" differ only in

than a "case" based on a conscious attempt to develop a vision and strategy for the logic and methods of overcoming Islamism in the social, political and intellectual spheres. According to Bayat, post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic or secular, but an attempt to integrate religion, rights, and freedom, it is an attempt to transform and invert the basic principles of Islam by emphasizing rights and pluralism instead of duties within the domain of a individual authoritarian voice, historicity instead of any set of holy scriptures, and the future instead of the past.

⁶¹ For more on post-Islamism, see: Luz Gomez Garcia, "Post-Islamism, the Failure of an Idea: Regards on Islam and Nationalism from Khomeini's Death to the Arab Revolts," translated by Ayman Suweid, Research Services Group, Rabat, <http://www.rsgleb.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=460>

⁶² See: Hassan Abu Hanieh, "misr...khaibat rihanat 'unf al-islam as-siyasi" "Egypt: The Dissapointment of Political Islam's Violence", Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/issues/2013/10/201310110842438504.html>

⁶³ For more detail about the overlap, ambiguity, conflict between the radical and reformist current after the Arab Spring and the coup against the Brotherhood in Egypt, see: Eric Trager and Marina Shalabi, "The Brotherhood Breaks Down," Washington Institute, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/the-brotherhood-breaks-down>

tactics.

Indeed, in Pargeter's narrative, the "reformists" seek immediate political participation and desire engagement with non-Islamists to broaden their appeal; 'conservatives,' by contrast, fear that this approach will water down the Brotherhood's Islamist authenticity and thus undermine organizational integrity. Yet both trends ultimately subscribe to the same ideological vision: they seek to Islamize society as a first step towards establishing an "Islamic state."⁶⁴

The problem of overlap and ambiguity between the radical and reformist currents of the Muslim Brotherhood would be revealed with the Arab world's entry into a new era through uprisings and revolutions against authoritarian regimes. In this era, the Muslim Brotherhood posed a fundamental challenge to authoritarian regimes as it delivered impressive electoral results that enabled the group to govern briefly in Egypt and Tunisia.⁶⁵

The crackdown which followed the Brotherhood's ouster from power in Egypt led to a rise in jihadist movements and the return of the debate between the radicalist and reformist currents of the Brotherhood. While it dominated Islamism under different circumstance in the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Brotherhood is just one of many players under the thumb of Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. Today, the Islamist scene in Egypt is open to a bevy of competitors, even if the group's old guard living abroad remain committed to a peaceful approach; the younger leadership on the ground still has to implement it. This long debate has been swirling within the Muslim Brotherhood for two years and has led to the emergence of two opposing currents: one which is adopting violent, revolutionary, and confrontational tactics, and one which is betting on the principle of non-violence.

With growing frustration and despondency with change, the repression and victimization of Islamist movements in Egypt forging ahead, and questions of the Brotherhood's youth moving towards more revolutionary approaches that are no longer just imaginary, creating a popular environment more accepting of violence and jihadist ideology, the retaliation against the regime that took place after the coup took on crude organizational structures through groups like the Molotov and Wala "Arabic for "set fire"" Movements, Anonymous, the Execution Movement and the Helwan Brigades. These movements had no tangible effect other than to cause chaos and exact revenge on the police and baltagiya "hired thugs operating outside the law" with activities like setting fire to police cars. Revolutionary Islamism also took a path towards more stable and clear organizational structures. The Revolutionary Punishment group, which announced its existence in January 2015 to coincide with the fourth anniversary of the January 2011 revolution in an attempt to present itself as a legitimate extension of the revolution, is an example from a professional perspective. Since its inception, the group has managed to carry out 170 attacks across sixteen governorates. The "Popular Resistance" movement also emerged around the same time. In fact, the nature of the tapes and anthems accompanying the statements and discourse of the Revolutionary Punishment group are similar to those of the Izz ad-Dine al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas.

⁶⁴ See: Eric Trager, "The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power"

⁶⁵ See: Georges Fahmi, *op. cit.*

Transformations towards radicalism are not limited to young Brotherhood members, Salafist revolutionary movements, such as the Ahrar Movement, which emerged in 2012, also showed up during this period.⁶⁶ Similarly, other movements like Harakat Sawaed Masr "Hasm" and Liwa al-Thawra emerged later.

Under pressure from the Islamic State and repression from the national state, the options for the new generation of youth within the Muslim Brotherhood became more radical. In their discourse, the statements issued by youth on the internet became more violent and in 2015, the youth spokesman appointed by the group, issued a statement using inflammatory language and calling for "a revolution that chops the heads off rotten bodies" "in reference to regime officials", under the pseudonym, Mohammad Montasair. Statements to resistance the regime by all means were also made by a group of sharia scholars with close Brotherhood ties. In a statement signed by 159 religious scholars, entitled "Nidaa al-Kinana" "Egypt's Call", they concluded that it is a Muslim's religious duty to resist the current regime, which it called an enemy of Islam, and to work to "eliminate it by all legitimate means." For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood endorsed the statement, and in the same context presented a collection of books and legal studies in support of violent action against the regime, namely a book entitled, *The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup*, published by a Brotherhood-aligned Sharia Committee in early 2015 and endorsed by the group's revolutionary faction.⁶⁷

The radical revolutionary tendencies of the Muslim Brotherhood are growing in the midst of jihadist organizations' emergence. In the context of competition and struggle between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State over representation of jihadism, a handful of Egyptian jihadist movements that conform to the ideology of Al-Qaeda have emerged. Jama'at al-Mourabitoun, which first appeared after similar groups which failed to establish an Al-Qaeda branch in Egypt fell apart and disintegrated after a series of security strikes, is the latest of these, but, Ajnad Misr "AM" is perhaps the most noteworthy. AM appeared publically for the first time on January 24, 2014, issuing several statements in which it took credit for a series of military operations. Yet, ever since its leader and founder, Majduddin Hamam Atiyyah, was killed by security forces, the group was weakened and dispersed. After eulogizing its slain leader on April 9, 2015, AM appointed Ezzedine al-Masri as Atiyyah's successor and carried out a few attacks but it remains a shadow of what it once was.

In this context, Islamic State has had an uncanny ability to attract and recruit. In Egypt, it managed to secure the loyalty of Ansar Beit al-Maqdas "ABS", a global jihadist organization which has carried out several attacks against Egypt and Israel after making itself known to the public on February 5, 2011. Following the military coup in Egypt, ABS' ideology gradually changed from one prioritizing confrontation with the far enemy, represented by Israel, to one prioritizing the fight against the near enemy represented by the Egyptian Army and security apparatus, expanding its targets to include Egypt's

⁶⁶ See: Hassan Abu Hanieh, "al-khawf min yana'ir wa ihya' al-jihadiyya al-masriyya" "January Fears and the Revival of Egyptian Jihadism", *Arabi* 21, <http://bit.ly/2EB0lgZ>

⁶⁷ See: Mokhtar Awad & Mostafa Hashem, "Egypt's Escalating Islamist insurgency" Carnegie Middle East Center, <http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=61778>

Coptic Christians. On November 20, 2014 ABS pledged allegiance to Islamic State and its Emir, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and began working under the name Wilayat Sinai.⁶⁸

6. Conclusion

Thus, political Islam, and its foremost representative, the Muslim Brotherhood, are suffering from internal divisions from reformist and radical currents. The problem of the parent group in Egypt has been characterized by the very nature and problems of its many branches in the Arab and Islamic worlds, particularly as the legacy of the mother group has always been a point of reference for its branches.

It is still too early to make any judgements about the future of political Islam, but, in the short run, jihadist Islam, represented by the Islamic State, has greatly profited from the coup against the outcomes of the Arab Spring and the return of oppressive authoritarian regimes. Given the fact that the forces of the military coup continue to impose scenarios of the "war on terror" and are determined to consolidate their assault on power and rebuild the military police state, the proliferation of jihadist movements and the increasing appeal of their rhetoric is indisputable. This is not, however, a guiding model for the region in the long term. The thematic alliance between the forces of violence represented by the repressive state and radical jihadist movements may start to break-up and recede, opening the door for the return of the movements, players, and forces of the democratic revolution. We may even witness the revival of the theory of inclusion and integration of political Islamist movements rooted in society, a peaceful approach, and democratic practices, but, that does not seem possible as violence prevails in the near term.

⁶⁸ See: Hassan Abu Hanieh, "al-khawf min yana'ir wa ihya' al-jihadiyya al-masriyya" "January Fears and the Revival of Egyptian Jihadism", op. cit.

Chapter Two

Islamists in the Experience of Power and Governance

Introduction

With the collapse of both the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes in the face of popular demonstrations that swept both countries in 2011, the wall that separated Islamists and power was broken. Arab regimes would not allow Islamists to obtain power – not even partially, through democratic means such as elections and political action.

Amid the collapse of the wall and the failure of the rest of the Arab regimes, the Islamists and their supporters – across the Arab world— thought that their dream was about to come to fruition at that moment of popular resistance for change. They thought they were on the verge of moving from opposition seats, prisons, and detention centers to positions of power and influence – through the ballot box and their popularity in the Arab world. This was not to be the case. Actually, they obtained clear majorities in Egypt and Tunisia by popular uprising, and in Morocco, the Makhzen allowed them to win a parliamentary majority and participate in the formation of the government. Their joy culminated in June 2012 with the election of Mohamed Morsi as President of Egypt through democratic elections not marred by any irregularities.

However, their joy was sullied as Islamists became involved in the new phase of transition from rhetoric and ideal theoretical models to political realism. They faced problems, crises and challenges that they had not faced for decades. Instead of building the ideal political edifice they dreamed of "the Islamists' utopia", they found themselves facing the problems of unemployment, poverty, national unity, great fears for public freedoms and human rights, and a confrontation with the political and ideological currents they had allied with over the past decades, not to mention the internal differences and conflicting positions between the Islamic leaders in how to deal with power and governance, etc.⁶⁹

The Brotherhood could not endure the new revolutionary democratic experiment – or the experiment could not endure the Brotherhood. They became entangled in a trap or their misreading of the situation, regardless of what happened. It finished in late June / early July 2013 with the ousting of Mohamed Morsi by the army followed by an assault on the gatherings and sit-ins of the Muslim Brotherhood in Rabaa Al-Adawiya – an end to the group's dream of an awakening, which did not last long. It brought them back to the prisons and state of repression, pushing them to an unprecedented historical stage of confrontation and clashes with the authorities, which cost them tens of thousands of detainees and unknown numbers of dead and missing.

The situation did not stop at the Egyptian border. A regional Arab alliance was

⁶⁹ See "Brotherhood's promised paradise in the garbage bin," *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 9-11-2012.

launched against the Brotherhood. It supported the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and sponsored efforts to counter the Brotherhood. This was a camp consisting mainly of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. Successive decisions of Arab governments within this camp declared the group a terrorist organization, and put everything associated with the party on blacklists.

The Islamists in North Africa survived the experience of those to the East and did not fall into the trap of power. They avoided minefields in Tunisia and Morocco and succeeded in forming governments of consensus with other parties and accepted part of the pie so as to not lose the whole thing, as the Brotherhood did in Egypt. Nevertheless, many of the problems and crises facing the Islamists remained, such as identifying partners in power and new questions imposed on them, as well as a wide gap between their supporters' expectations on the one hand, and realistic constraints on the other. The outcome of democratic transformation in these two states is still unclear as to whether we are on the path to democracy or new detours.

In this chapter, three studies will discuss the experiences of Islamists in power beginning with the Tunisia and the role of Ennahda Party in the transitional phase after the Tunisian revolution, as well as the political and ideological changes that took place within Ennahda. The second study will discuss the Moroccan Justice and Development party and its experiences in governance from Abdelilah Benkirane to Saadeddine Othmani, as well as the party's acclamation to the political game and prospects on the horizon. The third study will explore the Egyptian experience of the Brotherhood in power and its overthrow, as well as implications for the future of the movement, its internal structure and ideological vision.

Study 1

Tunisia: The Impact of Democratic Transition on the Ennahda Party

Dr. Abdul Latif al-Hanashi

Introduction

In 2011, Tunisia witnessed a popular uprising that broke out from within the country. A series of social and economic demands \developed rapidly towards new horizons in terms of their geographic scope and social basis. Ultimately, these demands led to the flight of the head of the former regime and the country's entry onto a new path through the democratic transition process, to which different parties and civil society organizations contributed. Ennahda Party, with its Islamic authority, is considered one of the most prominent factions to have contributed to this transformation.

What has been achieved in the process of democratic transition in Tunisia more than six years after the fall of the old regime? What role did Ennahda Party play in this process? What are the most prominent transformations that this party witnessed during this period? What factors helped the party decide to separate proselytization from politics?

1. Merits of Democratic Transition Six Years Later

Phase 1/Consensus: This stage of democratic transition was marked by the continuity of the state apparatus and the general consensus that characterized the relationship of the elite and made them meet the basic principles of joint action. It was also marked by the resurgence of the first institutions that outlined the features of the transitional period. After the departure of the Tunisian President, the "old" ruling elite managed to secure the transition of power and fill the vacuum quickly, relying upon the provisions of the constitution concerning the presidency.⁷⁰ This allowed the various organs of the state to continue to perform their normal daily role. The judiciary ruled to dissolve the Democratic Constitutional Assembly "RCD", which ruled prior to the revolution, while the interim government issued an order dissolving Parliament and the Chamber of Advisors.

This period was also marked by consensus on the establishment of political

⁷⁰Article 57 was adopted in lieu of Article 56, which allows the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies to assume the presidency where the departure of the President represents a definitive and not just a temporary vacancy. Ben Ali did not delegate his functions to the Prime Minister before fleeing...Fuad al-Mebazaa, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Ghannouchi was named head of the interim government.

transition mechanisms, including the formation of the Independent High Authority for Elections "Decree No. 27 of 2011 of 18 April 2011..."⁷¹ which organized the first free, fair and transparent elections in the history of Tunisia to elect the members of the National Constituent Assembly "23 October 2011", who would draft a new constitution and assume the functions of the legislative branch.

The National Constituent Assembly elections produced a new political scene that "surprised" many observers at home and abroad.⁷² Amid the backdrop of the election results, a coalition government was formed, which included three parties "together they occupied about two-thirds of the seats" with different ideological and political orientations: Ennahda, with an Islamic frame of reference "Head of the Government", Congress for the Republic, of secular orientation, "Head of State" and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties "Head of the Constituent Assembly".

Stage Two/ Tension in the ideological and political background: However, this consensus gradually faded away during the first⁷³ and second⁷⁴ Troika government. Shortly after the formation of the first Troika government, Ennahda Party became engaged in sharp disputes with most of the opposition's members whether or not electoral legitimacy continued after 23 October 2012, the maximum time limit for the finalization of the constitution.⁷⁵ This escalated after the assassination of left-wing activist Shukri Belaid in the first government. The Troika governments experienced several crises – both amongst themselves and within the parties formed by them – especially the Congress for the Republic and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties, which have witnessed wide splits. Within Ennahda, the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister decided to form a new government on a nonpartisan basis, in clear contradiction to the party's orientation and the decision of its executive institutions.⁷⁶

The relationship between the political opposition and the Tunisian General Labor

⁷¹ A revolutionary semi-legislative body was established "15 - 03 - 2011" weeks after the Tunisian revolution, after the merger of the Revolutionary Protection Committee "a group with revolutionary legitimacy" and the Higher Political Reform Commission "one of three committees appointed by the Tunisian government" Their objective is to oversee the course of democratic transition in Tunisia and the political and constitutional reforms in the country. Ayad Ben Ashour was appointed president, and the committee ratified several laws, the most important of which was the Elections Law and the formation of the Independent Electoral Commission. The Commission completed its work on 13-10-2011, days before the elections "23-10-2011". These were the first free elections in the history of the country, which gave rise to the National Constituent Assembly, the newly elected Legislative Council.

⁷² Ennahdha movement won 89 seats, the Congress Party for the Republic with 30 seats, the Popular Petition for Freedom and Justice with 26 seats and the Labor and Freedoms bloc with 21 seats.

⁷³ Chaired by Mr. Hamadi Jabali "24-12-2011 to 13-31-2013"

⁷⁴ Chaired by Mr. Ali Al-Arid "29-03-2013 to 29-01-2014".

⁷⁵ The Republican decree, which called for the election of the Constituent Assembly, defined the term of office of the Council by one year. Most of the parties had agreed before the 2011 elections that the Council's term of office should not exceed one year, with the exception of the President's "Congress for the Republic" party, which did not sign the agreement. The opposition stressed the importance of bypassing the constituent legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly for the consensus legitimacy imposed by the nature of the transitional period, demanding a ministerial reshuffle and the formation of a government of "mini-competencies" not based on quotas or partisan loyalties. They also demanded the neutralization of the sovereign ministries, especially the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Foreign, "all under Ennahda's leadership" months before the presidential and parliamentary elections in Tunisia, while Ennahda opposed any changes to the ministries.

⁷⁶ "Tunisia: The Troika Crisis and the Controversy of the Opposition", <http://bit.ly/2F2iTwP>

Union on the one hand and the Government of the Second Troika on the other worsened to the extent that the workers' organization threatened to launch a general strike following the attack by the "Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution" – affiliated with Ennahda and its allies – on the trade unionists and the storming of the central headquarters of the UGTT. However, reaching a political settlement at the last minute prevented the exacerbation of conflict between these parties.

The overthrow of Egyptian President-elect Mohamed Morsi "at the end of June 2013" encouraged the Tunisian opposition. Some activists formed the "Tunisian Resistance" movement, similar to the "Egyptian Resistance" movement, in an attempt to force the Second Troika government to leave power.⁷⁷ Taking advantage of this opportunity, leaders of the most prominent Tunisian opposition party, Nidaa Tounes,⁷⁸ issued a statement calling for the dissolution of the Constituent National Assembly and the replacement of the Troika government with a government of technocrats. The assassination of nationalist left-wing activist Mohammed al-Brahmi "25 July 2013" pushed the opposition to action.⁷⁹ Most of the opposition MPs withdrew from the Constituent Assembly and its chairman was suspended temporarily, which plunged the country into an open crisis, pushing Ennahda's leadership, headed by Rached Ghannouchi, to radically change the party's strategy and participate in the national dialogue. This happened following the "secret" meeting attended by Ghannouchi and Essebsi "Nidaa Tounes Party" in a hotel in Paris "on 15 August 2013", which resulted in the crystallization of a unified ground between the two parties to get the country out of crisis. At this meeting, the reasons for national dialogue and the need for consensus on the future of the political process were agreed upon.⁸⁰

Stage Three/National dialogue an introduction to consensus; The national dialogue⁸¹ resulted in the formation of a government of non-political competencies "technocrats" headed by Mehdi Juma in January 2014. The Constituent Assembly adopted two mechanisms for conciliation,⁸² which led to the drafting of a new constitution for the country. Ennahda's party bloc in the Constituent Assembly did not employ the law of political exclusion against the factions of the old regime, thus preventing political

⁷⁷ The term of the second Troika government, headed by the prime minister for 10 months and born on 13 March 2013 after the assassination of left-wing activist Shukri Belaid, also ended a stormy political crisis which started after the second assassination targeting the martyr Mohammed al-Brahmi on Republic Day: "The real impact of Egypt's coup on the Islamists of Tunisia", [http://www.noonpost.net/18 March 2015](http://www.noonpost.net/18-March-2015)

⁷⁸ Nidaa Tounes: A Tunisian political party whose ideology is secular and liberal. It was founded by Al-Baji Qa'id As-Sibsi in 2012. The first order of business in the first legislative elections after writing ratifying the Constitution "2014" was the election of President Baji Qa'id As-Sibsi of the Republic of Tunisia in the first presidential elections after the revolution.

⁷⁹ Taking decisive positions during the month of August 2013, tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered in front of the headquarters of the National Constituent Assembly to demand the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the resignation of the Troika government.

⁸⁰ See: "A meeting between Ghannouchi and As-Sibsi in Paris puts the two parties in an embarrassing position," Morocco Today, 18-8-2013.

⁸¹ Al-Hanachi "Abdel Latif": "National Dialogue in Tunisia: Mechanisms and Consequences", <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/26-03-2014>. The dialogue was initiated by the Tunisian General Labor Union on 18-01-2012

⁸² The Committee of Consensus, established by the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, had a broad representation of the political and party map. These advanced and effective mechanisms greatly contributed to bridging the gap and differences of views among the parties on many substantive issues.

violence.

The country thereby went through a new phase of democratic transition with the legislative elections, which resulted in the decline of Ennahda to second place. Nidaa Tounes ranked first, despite its modern configuration. Ennahda's leadership opted to remain neutral in the presidential elections and did not support either of the candidates, Moncef Marzouki and Beji Caid Essebsi. Essebsi won in the second round of the elections with 55.68% of the vote. The principle of peaceful transition of presidential power was respected. A new government was formed by an independent figure.⁸³ Ennahda took part in the new government alongside Nidaa Tounes and a number of ministers.

2. Developments of Ennahda: From clandestine to public, and proselytization to politics

Throughout Habib Bourguiba's presidency, Tunisia did not have any party with an Islamic or Brotherhood frame of reference during the national liberation stage, despite the emergence of religious parties along the model of the Muslim Brotherhood since 1928, in Egypt and other Arab countries "Syria 1936 - 1937, Iraq in 1949 and Libya...", which came as a response to the challenge posed by the foreign colonization of Arab states. However, Tunisia was "prepared" since the mid-seventies with the emergence of the "phenomenon of political Islam" due to the complex economic, social, political and cultural crisis in the Tunisian political system.⁸⁴ The lack of cultural intellectuals⁸⁵ and significant challenges posed by operating as an "Islamic Party"⁸⁶ contributed to these conditions. Ennahda held the first Constituent Conference in the summer of 1979, where Sheikh Ghannouchi was elected the emir of the Islamic organization. An executive bureau was formed along with a Shura, or consultative Council, and the workers of the regions were appointed.

Following Operation Gafsa in 1980,⁸⁷ Mohammed Mazali assumed the role of Prime Minister⁸⁸ and declared the adoption of "disciplined" political pluralism. The movement took advantage of this,⁸⁹ and the leadership of the "al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya"

⁸³ Mr. Habib Said Mahsoob, of the previous regime, announced on 2 February 2015.

⁸⁴ Hermassi "Abdellatif": *The Islamic Movement in Tunisia: Socialist Left, Islam, and the Islamic Movement*, Dar Perm Publishing Tunis 1985, p. 234

- Collective preparation: in order to correct self-consciousness, Al-Jadid Publications, Tunis 1985, p. 48

⁸⁵ Some were graduates of the University of Damascus "Rached Ghannouchi and Ahmeta Al-Nefir" and some of them were from the Tunisian University "Abdel Fattah Moro..." and Zeitounin.

⁸⁶ This was related to the traditional religious proposal, and shows that the adoption of the Brotherhood's proposal intellectually and organizationally, was the founders' escape from the Brothers' accusations, especially after the bloody experience which took place between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasser regime. See Khaddamah "Farid": "The Islamic Movement in Tunisia from the Call to Migration," Aqlam Online No. 9 Second year / October 2003

⁸⁷ An armed operation by a group of Tunisian youth belonging to the nationalist movement close to the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya...they crossed the Algerian border with the support of the Libyan regime and tried to control Gafsa "south-west" but were unable to do so. This operation shook the regime and prompted it to reconsider many political calculations.

⁸⁸ He assumed the role of Prime Minister from 23-4-1980 to 8-7-1986.

⁸⁹ Security managed to stop a group leader and found the organization's archive in his possession.

rushed to convene a extraordinary conference in the Spring of 1981. They announced at the conclusion the party's dissolution and the establishment of a new movement: the "Islamic Tendency Movement." They appealed to the Ministry of the Interior for a legal permit but received no response.⁹⁰

Since the beginning of 1987, the movement's relationship with the regime deteriorated, especially after the arrest of its main leaders. The "Security-Military" group⁹¹ moved to prepare for a military coup on 8 November 1987. However, then Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali⁹² was faster than the group, and the so-called "medical coup" was completed on the morning of November 7, relying upon provisions of the Constitution.⁹³

During the presidency of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the relationship between the movement and the regime passed through two stages. The first phase was marked by a breakthrough and cautious confidence by the two parties. A set of measures gained power for the Islamic Tendency Movement⁹⁴ and in return, it changed its name to the "Ennahda Movement." They signed the "National Charter"⁹⁵ and widely participated in the legislative elections of 1989. This panicked the regime and civil society as well as the leftist and liberal elites, as a result of the movement circulating a speech described as "a traditional threat to the gains of the Republic."⁹⁶ This marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Ennahdha movement with the regime, which was quick to carry out large-scale arrests and mock trials for thousands "members of the movement". Anyone who was able to leave the country secretly tried to form a circle around Rached Ghannouchi, reassemble the organization and preserve what remained of it.

Then with the Tunisian Revolution "January 2011" and the fleeing of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Ennahda received legal recognition as a civil political party in March during the days of Mohamed Ghannouchi's interim government. In its founding statement, Ennahda defined itself as a "party working within the framework of law and the republican system" and emphasized the work needed to achieve several economic, political, social, cultural, scientific and human rights related goals.⁹⁷

After twenty years of forced disappearance from political life, the movement managed to dispatch its central, regional, local and sectoral regulatory structures at record

⁹⁰ This movement was officially announced on 06-06-1981.

⁹¹ Called by some members of the movement the "National Salvation Group," the political leadership did not recognize it before or after the revolution.

⁹² After assuming the role of Minister of the Interior for a brief period, he also occupied the role of Prime Minister 2-10-1987 to 7-11-1987.

⁹³ According to one of the provisions of the Constitution, which states that if the Head of State is unable to continue his functions for health reasons, it is the Prime Minister who assumes power. It is not yet clear whether Ben Ali and the Tunisian intelligence services, both civilian and military, knew what the military security group was planning or not.

⁹⁴ Among these was the regime's initiative to release the movement's leaders from prison and to pardon their fugitives. The President received Mr. Ghannouchi, who enjoyed the "trend" of freedom of movement without formal recognition. The movement was also involved in several initiatives and institutions such as calling for the signing of the National Charter "1988" and formal representation in the Supreme Islamic Council "1989". It also established a student organization.

⁹⁵ The charter was signed by the civil society and political components of the Carthage Palace on 7th November 1988

⁹⁶ Journal of the Arab Maghreb No. 145 dated 31-3-1989 "Disclosure of evidence of the project of Islam."

⁹⁷ See: The Ennahda Website <http://www.ennahdha.tn>

speed. Ennahda Party became one of the most prominent political forces in the Tunisian political scene after coming in first in the National Constituent Assembly elections "23 October 2011", obtaining 89 seats out of 217, but losing 400,000 votes out of a total of 1.4 million between the 2011 and 2014 elections.

After the revolution, the Ennahda party held two public conferences. The first – the Ninth Congress – took place in Tunisia "between 12 and 15 July 2012". They held a second conference in preparation for legislative elections. The movement's Tenth Congress "held in late May 2016" marked a qualitative turning point in its intellectual and political path. They agreed to separate the political work of the party from the proselytization activities. Additionally, with the opposition represented by about one-fifth of the delegates, the party remained cohesive at the organizational level.⁹⁸

3. Development of Ennahda's intellectual vision

The al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya "prior to becoming Ennahda Movement" depended on a framework of three axes in their pre-revolution activities and proselytization: ideological and moral-social, cultural, and intellectual.⁹⁹ The group worked to spread Islamic culture as envisaged and to emphasize the basic concepts of their legitimacy: "Islam is a religion and a state. Islam is a doctrine and a law, in addition to its attention to moral dimensions, spiritual education and proper behavior..."¹⁰⁰

Since the late seventies of the last century, the group interacted with the events and transformations that the country experienced. These interactions were positive and contributed to the development of the group's visions, ideas and political behavior in general. Among these positive interactions, however, existed conflicts between the Tunisian General Union of Labor and the Tunisian government in January 1978 over social and economic issues. This turned the attention of the movement towards social issues and the importance of the Union's struggle.¹⁰¹

The friction and conflict between the Islamist current and the leftist current within the walls of the community led to the Islamic current absorbing many of the left's arguments, especially about the nature of the conflict in the world and in the country.¹⁰² Moreover, the movement was influenced by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and adopted

⁹⁸ There has also been a broad and sometimes heated discussion of amendments to the party's by-laws. A large segment of the delegates called for the Executive Council to be elected by the Shura Council in the future. The Shura Council is the highest elected decision-making body in the party, after its appointment by the party chairman or Ghannouchi. In the end, the party maintained a resolution that gives the movement's president the privilege of forming the executive office. "The vote was recounted and the alternative received only 58% of the vote..."

⁹⁹ Abdel Latif Hermassi, *The Islamic Movement in Tunisia, Socialist Left Islam and the Islamic Movement*, Perm Publishing, Tunis 1985, p. 52

¹⁰⁰ Al-Sahbi Ateeq, "The Evolution of the Intellectual Track of Ennahda Movement," *Al-Fajr Newspaper: The Voice of the Ennahda Party*, No. 10, dated 10 June 2011

¹⁰¹ Rashid Ghannouchi, *From the Experience of the Islamic Movement*, Dar Al-Mujtahad for Publishing and Distribution, Tunis edition 2011, pp. 50-51.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* pp. 53

some of its positions, ideas and methods of action.¹⁰³ Finally, the movement adopted some of Hassan Al-Turabi's theses and called for the participation of Muslim women in national affairs.¹⁰⁴

The movement "in 2005" was one of the main parties to the October 18 Commission for Rights and Freedoms,¹⁰⁵ affirming in one of its documents the pursuit of the establishment of a civil state based on the principles of the Republic and human rights, which derives its legitimacy from the will of the people, and under these principles elects institutions of governance periodically and with accountability. They affirmed that these institutions would be based on the principles of citizenship, equality, freedom of belief and thought and the resistance to all forms of discrimination among citizens on the basis of belief, opinion, sex, social, political or regional affiliation – thus guaranteeing citizens all the fundamental freedoms and rights that form the basis of the democratic system.¹⁰⁶

Those values contained in the documents of 18 October were confirmed by the party literature issued before the revolution.¹⁰⁷

4. Political behavior of the party and democratic transition

The process of drafting the Tunisian constitution was not easy, as frequent disagreements characterized most of the meetings between Ennahda and the Constituent Assembly and some of its allies on the one hand, and the democratic forces opposed to the currents of Ennahda and its allies on the other. They disagreed on fundamental issues such as the nature and identity of the Tunisian state,¹⁰⁸ the question of referencing Shari'a as a source of the Constitution, the position of women and freedom of conscience.¹⁰⁹

The debate and dialogue moved to the street and the popular gatherings of the two parties continued intermittently for more than three months. The movement tried to draft

¹⁰³ Ibid. pp. 55-58

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. pp. 52

¹⁰⁵ Ahmed Najib Al-Shabi, "The Relationship Between Islamists and Secularists: The Experience of 18 October in Tunisia", al-Adab No. 11-12/2010. A political alliance that emerged in 2005, including parties and individuals from the intellectual, secular and Islamic trends, in order to defend public freedoms and seek out prospects for the transition to democracy in Tunisia... One of the most prominent struggles fought by the Commission was the hunger strike launched by eight civil and political activists over 30 days in conjunction with the World Summit on the Information Society. The strikers demanded freedom of expression and press, freedom of party and collective organization, the release of political prisoners and the enactment of the amnesty law."

¹⁰⁶ Documents of the October 18 Authority for Rights and Freedoms in Tunisia, [http://www.artisansnumeriques.tn/nachaz/en/ Document 4/10 December 2009](http://www.artisansnumeriques.tn/nachaz/en/Document%204/10%20December%202009)

¹⁰⁷ See: "The Fifteenth Anniversary Statement: The Lessons of the Past, the Problems of the Present and the Emergences of the Future" London, June 06, 1996 "Ennahda Movement "2010" Intellectual Land, Labor Theory and Project Profiles", Qatouf Al-Nahda Series.

¹⁰⁸ The first chapter of Part One is defined as follows: "Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign State. Islam is its religion. Arabic is its language"

¹⁰⁹ It reads as follows: "The State is a sponsor of religion, a guarantor of the freedom of belief, conscience and the exercise of religious rites, protector of sanctities, guarantor of neutrality in mosques and places of worship in terms of party recruitment. The state denies incitement to violence. It guarantees freedom of conscience, including the freedom to change religion and the freedom to disbelieve in religions, as well as the freedom to proclaim and advocate these philosophical views."

a constitution "the First Constitution", which some legal experts considered contrary to the principles of freedom and values of human rights, as well as a first step toward "constitutionalizing" theocracy.¹¹⁰

As a result of the widening dispute between Ennahda and its opponents as well as the acute tension that prevailed across the country, Rached Ghannouchi responded to the invitation of the Quartet parties calling for a national dialogue¹¹¹ between the political forces in order to find a basis for consensus on the future of the political process. Ennahda renounced power with this agreement. A technocrat government was formed, which voted for the content of the new Tunisian constitution without reservation on any of its 149 articles. Ennahda also adopted the model of a democratic civil state, including Chapter I and Chapter VI, which provides for freedom of conscience.¹¹² In terms of rhetoric, after the revolution the party underwent radical transformations, especially in the statements of the party's founder and president, as well as in the by-laws of the Tenth Congress. The most prominent transformations include:

- Transformation in the party's nature: The revised by-laws defines Ennahda party as, "A national political party with an Islamic frame of reference operating under the Constitution "and in accordance with the provisions of Decree No. 87 as of 24 September 2011 related to political parties" and within the framework of the republican system to contribute to the building of modern Tunisia – a democracy that is prosperous, interdependent, proud of its religion and identity and seeks to establish the values of citizenship, freedom, responsibility and social justice. The party relies on responsibility and democracy in making decisions, assigning responsibilities, and formulating visions and programs."¹¹³
- Ennahda's relationship with political Islam: "The party no longer considers itself covered by the term 'political Islam.'¹¹⁴ Rather, it is a 'democratic Muslims' party, as a political party interested in establishing democracy."¹¹⁵

Ghannouchi considers political Islam to be a loose term that is closely related to groups that initiate violence and speak in the name of Islam. Ghannouchi said that Ennahda party is "a democratic party that not only believes there exists no conflict between Islam and democracy, but sees the truth of Islam as a catalyst for tolerance, public

¹¹⁰ "Readings on the Gura Jun 2013 Various Evaluations", <http://hour-news.net/07-06-2013> Ayad Ibn Ashour: "Transitional provisions require abstaining from ratifying the Constitution," "<http://bit.ly/2C2h2Jv> Constitutional expert Ayad Ben Ashour comments on Tunisian constitution draft" <http://www.africanmanager.com/>, 26-4-2013

¹¹¹ The Quartet for Dialogue: the Tunisian General Labor Union, the Union of Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts, the National Lawyers' Association and the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights

¹¹² It reads as follows: "The State is a sponsor of religion, a guarantor of the freedom of belief, conscience and the exercise of religious rites, a protector of the sanctities, guarantor of neutrality in mosques and places of worship in terms of party recruitment. The state denies incitement to violence. It guarantees freedom of conscience, including the freedom to change religions and the freedom to disbelieve in religions, as well as the freedom to proclaim and advocate these philosophical views.

¹¹³ See: Statute "after revision from the Tenth Congress", <http://bit.ly/2HgheEj>

¹¹⁴ Final Declaration of Ennahda's 10th Congress, <http://bit.ly/2nAvUWA>

¹¹⁵ Ennahda President Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi address to the Italian Parliament <http://www.ennahdha.tn> 21-10-2016/

service and the values of pluralism, democracy and human rights."¹¹⁶ The final statement of the Tenth Congress also stressed that Ennahda Party "had effectively bypassed all the justifications that cause some to consider it associated with so-called political Islam" and that this widespread designation does not reflect the party's current identity, nor does it reflect the content of its future project.¹¹⁷

The party also stressed "the complete abandonment of non-political work, leaving the matter of social, cultural, and religious "proselytization" activities to civil society organizations independent of the party." The conference considered the transition to a national democratic party with an Islamic frame of reference a strategic and profound historical shift.¹¹⁸

- Compatibility between Islam and Democracy: "Democracy in our region can be founded on the values of Islam in freedom, justice, tolerance and the right to disagree,"¹¹⁹ Ghannouchi said. He indicated that Ennahda, "will remain a civil party that derives its authority from a view which considers Islam and democracy compatible..." He claimed that the party is classified as "within the stream of democratic Islam, not heresy in the democratic world, where there are democratic parties that derive their inspiration and reference from their religion. There are democratic Christians and other parties that combine religious authority and commitment to democracy."¹²⁰
- The position of secularism: Ghannouchi believes that secularism is a very controversial term and there is no uniform definition of the term, as it is applied very differently throughout the world.¹²¹ He also stressed that the goal is not to move from an Islamist party to a secular party, but towards the dedication to political work: "We were a comprehensive party, just as the state was comprehensive. It generated parties, some Islamist and some leftist. The values we will rely upon throughout our political work are the same as they were in the constitution, which was based on Islamic and modernist points of reference. The Tunisian Constitution is not a secular constitution— rather, in its first article it stipulates that the state is Islamic."¹²²
- Muslims in the context of democratic governance: Ghannouchi believes that Islamists tend to be, in a democratic framework, more realistic and rational in their political behavior and way of thinking. Thus, they become more interested in real policies than in ideology.¹²³ In a democratic framework, it is possible to spread and establish what we call in Ennahda "democratic Islam" or "democratic Muslims."¹²⁴

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Final Declaration of the 10th Congress, Ibid

¹¹⁸ Political Regulations of the Tenth Congress, <http://bit.ly/2BUnaP6>

¹¹⁹ "Ennahda President Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi address to the Italian Parliament," see previous

¹²⁰ "If I were in Morsi's place...Ghannouchi talks about the challenges of "Ennahda and internal and external clashes," <http://www.huffpostarabi.com/02-04-2016/>

¹²¹ A speech at the Mediterranean Dialogues 2016 Rome Seminar entitled "Democracy and Policies: What Role for Islam?" <http://www.alhiwar.net/08-12-2016/>

¹²² "If I were in Morsi's place..." op. cit.

¹²³ A speech at the Mediterranean Dialogues...see previous

¹²⁴ A speech at the Mediterranean Dialogues 2016 Rome Seminar entitled "Democracy and Policies: What Role for Islam?"

5. Reasons for the Transformation's Success

Some objective characteristics of the Tunisian state and some subjective, particular factors contributed to the transformation of Ennahda party into a civil party.

A. Objective Factors: the accumulation of historical and cultural gains:

- The legacy of the Tunisian state of civil and constitutional character "the semi-civil state of Husaina, founded in 1704; the 1857 Covenant on the Rights of Minorities; and the 1861 Constitution".
- Plurality of parties and trade unions "French and Tunisian", and the emergence of civil society organizations during the colonial period and post-independence.
- Harmony between the various parties, trade unions and collective groups which emerged during the colonial period politically and culturally "the al-Khaldunia Society of 1896, the Sadiki College Alumni Association 1905, the Tunisian Youth Group 1907-1912, the National Front 1945, and the Independence Conference".
- Ethnic, religious, sectarian and linguistic homogeneity "The Tunisians are mostly Arab with few Berbers and 99% of Tunisians are Muslims. Tunisians are Sunnis of the Maliki school of law."
- Non-complex geographical situation: Expansive and open to the sea on both sides.
- Non-violence: The history of the national movement against colonialism was a peaceful, nonviolent struggle in most periods, and the violence of the authorities against their opponents after independence was lower than that of other Arab countries.
- The impartiality of the military establishment and its lack of interest in political affairs at almost every stage, and its commitment to be a guarantor of the revolution and its principles since the outbreak of the revolution.
- Experienced civil society: Tunisian General Labor Union, Federation of Industry and Commerce, Federation of Agriculturists, Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, etc., in addition to women's organizations.
- Progressive gains made by the elite that emerged after independence: the Personal Status Code "Women's Code" and the establishment of modern education.
- The nature of the intellectual and religious environment belonging to the Maghreb school of thought in general, and Tunisian in particular "the harmony of the Maliki school of law and the Ash'arite school of theology", as well as gains in the humanities and social sciences.¹²⁵

<http://www.alhiwar.net08-12-2016/>

¹²⁵ Sheikh al-Za'im Abdelaziz Thaalbi "1944" in the *The Spirit of Liberation in the Qur'an*, Mohamed Eltaher Ibn Ashour "1973", Interpretation of liberation and enlightenment by Tahir Haddad "1953" In the book *Our women in the law and society*.

B. Subjective factors in Ennahda Movement:

- Continuous intellectual development of the movement and its adoption of new concepts regarding women, democracy and the rotation of power.
- Experience of immigrants: Many members of Ennahda, who had long ago migrated and settled in Europe, benefited from the political and partisan experience of those countries. They benefited from their exposure to Cartesian philosophy and achievements in the humanities and social sciences in the West.¹²⁶
- The party agenda announced in 1996, which included their perceptions on the objectives to be achieved after the overthrow of the Ben Ali. These objectives included emphasis on the nature of the civil political movement and its rejection of any double strategy or discourse, as well as the adoption of a peaceful approach to change, its rejection of the use of violence as a way to resolve political and intellectual conflicts, and its belief that "national dialogue is the only guarantor of the rules of democratic political action."¹²⁷
- The movement's involvement in the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms, which approved the movement's agenda without reservation.
- The movement's interaction with the transformations experienced by the region after the Arab revolutions, especially in Egypt and the resulting failures and disappointments.
- A wide range of party elites believed in the need to adapt to Tunisian reality in all its dimensions.
- The party's response to the new equilibrium based on the principles of freedom, democracy and balance between the state and society, as well as the principles and obligations established by the Constitution to promote true citizenship, the identity of the Arab-Islamic countries, and the protection of holy sites so as to be able to promote the new tasks required to meet challenges.¹²⁸
- The experience of Ennahda in government, which required national, regional and international commitments and more moderate, rational and pragmatic rhetoric.¹²⁹
- The intellectual contributions of its president, Sheikh Rached Al-Ghannouchi, and his distinguished writings, especially on democracy, the civil state, political freedoms, women's rights, the concept of citizenship and the rights of non-Muslims since the late 1970s.

¹²⁶ Tamimi "Azzam", "Separation of politics from proselytization; or, disavowal of the Brotherhood," <http://arabi21.com/story, 23-05-2016>, the book says: "I asked a member of the Ennahdha movement during my recent short visit about the source of the idea of separating politics from proselytization. He said: "To be honest, it is the idea of those who were in exile and returned to the country after the revolution."

¹²⁷ "The Fifteenth Anniversary Statement: Lessons of the Past, the Problems of the Present and the Breakthroughs of the Future, London, June 6, 1996"

¹²⁸ Ennahda Movement, Congress Regulations, see previous

¹²⁹ Ibid.

6. Between doubt and cautious acceptance

The statements of Rached Ghannouchi, as well as the final statement of Ennahda's 10th Congress, motivated the separation between the movement's political work and proselytization activities – a wide debate among Tunisian, Arab and even Western political circles. Opinions on this shift clashed among the skeptic, the supporter, and other cautious positions based on various justifications.

Some politicians and intellectuals think the decision was simply an attempt to "change its spots" or "put on a new outfit" – an action not unknown to the Muslim Brotherhood, more-so than other political Islamists and their factions. Others see this initiative as an emergency "adaptation" to the realities of the region, especially in the aftermath of the military coup in Egypt and the overthrow of the Islamists. Others question the party's credibility and see the move as mere ink on paper or a way to distance the party from proselytization in general. This presents a challenge for Ennahda and for all Islamist movements, as they are based primarily on "ideological mobilization."¹³⁰

Some also believe that the "consensus constitution" was not Ennahda's choice in reality and that it was not the result of a participatory vision Ennahda had since the beginning, insofar as it was, "the result of the balance of power changing in favor of the democratic opposition and the forces of civil society." Some also suggest that Ennahda's leadership accepted the incorporation of freedom of conscience in the Tunisian constitution, but avoided detailing this freedom along the lines of the international definition, as most of these freedoms are contrary to the Brotherhood's understanding and its system of values.¹³¹

There is still a barrier of distrust among a large sector of the political, intellectual, cultural and community elite in terms of the party's intentions and in their rhetorical double standards pre and post revolution¹³² – a notion not denied by the party itself.¹³³

Some wonder why the party did not more clearly delineate the boundaries between Islam and democracy and whether or not the party is cramming the issue of individual rights into democracy. Some also wonder if the party will make a distinction between individual rights that are in harmony with Islam and individual rights that are contrary to morality or identity.

¹³⁰ In the largest "ceremony of beauty" and under the sponsorship of the presidency: Islamists change ... and do not change"!! <http://www.essahafa.tn>

¹³¹ Al-Hashemi Al-Taroudi, "Four Mistakes Challenging the Credibility of the Unitarian and Harmonic Discourse of the Ennahda Movement: From Duality of Discourse to Dual Practice," <http://www.lemaghreb.tn>, Tunisia 06 October 2014.

¹³² The content of the tape, which was leaked to social sites and contains part of a special session that brought together the head of the Ennahdha movement and some of the Salafis, Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi tried to convince them of the necessity of patience and non-violence, telling them that Ennahda - despite its presence in power - does not control the institutions of the state. Secularists still believe that they control the army, security, administration and media. Regardless of the circumstances of this tape, he opened the door to saying that Ennahda - or at least an important part of its leadership - is working to "Islamize" the state by handing over its key positions to members of the movement or Islamists who document their ideological and organizational loyalty. This was the most problematic issue in the Islamic agenda and its retreat from what was agreed upon in the October 18 on women and freedom of conscience during the writing of the Constitution ...

¹³³ Ennahda Movement, Congress Regulations, op. cit.

7. Conclusion

In any case, it seems that Ennahda's choice of separation between the religious "proselytization" and the political was a gradual, tactical choice to please internally, externally, or both. Ennahda's Tenth Congress stressed that "the transition to a national democratic party with an Islamic frame of reference is a strategic and historical turning point."¹³⁴ Therefore, we believe that this shift was based on the conviction and outcome derived from the political experiences of the party since its emergence in the post-revolutionary phase within the framework of a new democratic experiment and a geographically influential space both regionally and internationally.

However, there is a lack of substantial writings about Ennahda's position on the nature of the idea and the reasons for its transformation and justifications, in addition to the initiative's connection with Rached Ghannouchi – without other leaders of the party on the one hand and the lack of positive treatment by the Tunisian "modernist" elite on the other. This may be – in our view – one of the most important obstacles in the development of this initiative inside and outside the party.

The passing of the initiative at the Tenth Congress by a vote of 80.8% does not indicate acceptance, understanding, comprehension and defense of the proposal, even from some of the central leaders. Thus, we see that the consolidation of this idea requires time and great effort by Ennahda's leadership.¹³⁵ This requires the awareness of the various democratic forces in Tunisia, neighboring countries and the European Union of the long term importance of the initiative and their support, as the transformation can turn into a model which may be followed by other Islamic groups in the Arab world.

¹³⁴ Ennahda Movement, Congress Regulations, see previous

¹³⁵ In our question about the success of this experiment, Professor Abdelhamid Jlassi, a leader of Ennahda, wrote to us: "I have no doubt that the experiment will succeed, so this question becomes another question: How long will this take? We are talking here about a journey and not about a starting point or an end point. The human sphere, as well as the efforts of renewal accumulated in our civilizational context, opens up new horizons for reflection and success. Thus, the distinction between proselytization and political activities is not only regulated by the Constitution and the laws; it is a consolidation of the status quo and a liberalization of some areas of subordination to politics rather than vice versa. 06-05-2017

Study 2

Morocco's Islamists: Action outside Religion

Dr. Idriss al-Kanbouri

Despite the fact that Islamist movements draw from common sources and announce their aspiration to common goals throughout the Arab-Islamic world, they remain within the scope of detail subject to the political, cultural and social contexts in which they arise and are influenced by the internal environment in which they act and which determines their approach. Accordingly, they take into account the nature of the existing state, the political conditions, culture and the political environment represented by existing political parties. The Islamist Movement in each country, in this sense, is an attempt at a local translation of the global dimension that characterizes the general current of political Islam.¹³⁶

The Moroccan Islamist Movement emerged in an internal context, characterized by the overwhelming presence of Islam in the official state discourse and among the population of Fez – the main player in the monopoly on religious legitimacy – before the movement gradually assimilated throughout the protectorate era through so-called reforms, then in the national movement that tried to exploit religious authority in its struggle against the colonizer. This was demonstrated by the Istiqlal Party, which combined conservatism and contemporaneity and played an active role in the Islamization of partisan discourse in the post-independence phase.

The Islamist Movement therefore emerged in Morocco fully cognizant of this historical and religious background, considering itself a continuation of the national movement's legacy and a semi-parallel instrument of the state against the radical left – formerly the Islamic Youth Movement. This was the first Islamist Movement to emerge towards the end of the sixties, considered the principal enemy and what made the movement intersect with the objectives of the state. Over the past decades, the Moroccan Islamist Movement has developed in a different national context, giving political norms more value than ideology. The religious discourse is shared with many of the political factions recognized by Islam, with differences of vision. This has reduced the confrontation between secularists and Islamists, which has happened in other Arab countries. The state's monopoly on religion and the strengthening of the religious character of the monarch as Commander of the Faithful circumscribed the Islamists' scope of action within limits they cannot exceed, based on the formula "an Islamic state and secular Islamists," as the regime linked religion and politics at the level of the state, and succeeded in separating them at the level of the Islamist Movement.

¹³⁶ Mohammed El Ayadi: *The Two Faces of the King: the Monarch and the Commander of the Faithful*. Casablanca, La Croisée des chemins, 2005.p117.

1. The problematic relationship between religion and state in Morocco

Since independence, the Moroccan state has determined the relationship between religion and politics. The legitimacy of the ruling regime was linked to Islam and was given the status of Commander of the Faithful, which was enshrined in the country's first constitution in 1962. The king has the *de facto* authority to speak in the name of religion and its representation at the level of government and society. That status gave the king an exclusive monopoly on religion and made him the main player in the religious field around which other players orbit without being able to contest his religious legitimacy.

Unlike other Arab regimes, which either gave religion a margin in its political strategy of governance or declared themselves to be secular, the Moroccan monarchy established an early public policy in the religious sphere. It also imbued the regime with a religious identity. This was represented by the reform of al-Qarawiyyin Mosque "which was the center of religious scholars in the past and had great authority to remove those in power" in such a way as to empty it out of its content and attach it to the state. In 1962, the League of Moroccan Ulema was established as a forum for religious scholars under the eyes of the state. It founded Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania to carry out the same task as the Al-Qarawiyyin Mosque had in the past – to produce scholars. This policy continued during the 1980s after the Iranian revolution, through the establishment of the High Council of Ulema. This council, headed by the king as Commander of the Faithful, passed a law making mosques subordinate to the State, thus depriving the Islamists of the possibility of using mosques against the regime.

This religious policy initiated by the Moroccan regime led to the "nationalization" of religion, such that the state replaced religious scholars in the roles that were entrusted to them in the past. We have a historical text that will become the general framework governing state policy towards religion in Morocco over the past decades. In 1966, on the occasion of the "Hassania Ramadan Lessons," which King Hassan II held during the month of Ramadan, he personally gave a lesson to religious scholars and attendees on Moroccan television, explaining the Hadith of the Prophet and its text: "Whosoever of you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then "let him change it" with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart — and that is the weakest of faith." Herein, the king definitively established a kind of functional distinction between the state and the institution of scholars, emphasizing that the only party that has the right to change evil with the hand is the state, but the role of religious scholars is to change it by the tongue. This meant that religious scholars could "inform" the authorities concerned with what they found to be contrary to the law and the state has the right to intervene.¹³⁷

King Mohammed VI's rule since 1999 was a qualitative shift in the relationship between the religious and the political in the country. At that time, Moroccan Islamists had made some progress at the political level, with the Justice and Development Party joining Parliament for the first time in 1997 and becoming a part of the Moroccan political

¹³⁷ Speeches and symposia of His Majesty King Hassan II. Publication of the Ministry of Information, Rabat. Volume III. Second Edition, 1993.

landscape. The banned al Adl wal Ihsane "Justice and Spirituality" Party escalated its demands in order to put pressure on the new regime – Abdesslam Yassine sent a strong message to the king under the title "a message to whom it may concern," calling him to approach policy differently than his father and give up part of his wealth for the benefit of the people. With that, signs of conflict between the regime and the Islamists began to show.¹³⁸

However, the bombings of May 16, 2003 in Casablanca and the emergence of the Salafist Jihadist movement behind these events gave the state greater opportunities to intervene in the religious sphere in order to consolidate and strengthen its previous gains, thus reducing the influence of the Islamic current and shaping the rules of the political game amid the decline in popularity witnessed by various political parties – leftist and socialist in particular – making Islamists appear to be the only alternative.

This period witnessed a new round of reforms in the religious sphere, such as the so-called "restructuring of the religious field." The mosque law was changed and ulema councils that covered the various regions of the Kingdom were established. This occurred along with the amendment of laws regarding religious education and the emergence of mentors whose role it was to fill the vacuum vis-à-vis the Islamic current. Then came the establishment of the advisory body of the High Council of Ulema – headed by the king – pulling the rug from under the feet of the Islamic current in the field of fatwa.

The aim of these reforms was to assert state control over the religious realm and cut off the Salafist and Islamists so as to create lack of competition with the state in the use of religious discourse in the public sphere. In 2004, the King delivered a powerful speech on Throne Day, in which he said: "Politics and religion, in the Moroccan constitutional monarchy, do not meet except for in the King, Commander of the Faithful."¹³⁹ This was a clear reference to the need to distinguish between proselytization in the Islamist Movement and politics – as it was no longer its duty to carry out proselytization, now an area of state control. But rather, its duty was to work in the political sphere with the logic of politics and not with the logic of religion.

This general framework for controlling the relationship between religion and state has been in place since independence and became more prominent in the following decades through religious and institutional reforms. These reforms put the royal institution at the center of religion and politics and made the Moroccan Islamist Movement aware from the beginning of the limits of what religion can accomplish and that a religious push would certainly cause clashes with the royal establishment.

2. Islamists and the system of governance

The Moroccan monarchy benefited from the experience of the Islamic Youth Movement, founded in the late 1960s as a cultural association for Islamic proselytization

¹³⁸ See the text of the letter on the website of "School of Imam al-Majadad Abdessalam Yassine," link below: <https://www.yassine.net>

¹³⁹ The website of the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs. <http://www.habous.gov.ma>

and led by Sheikh Abdul Karim Mutee as a legal association. At that point, the aim of the regime was to limit the influence of the leftist movement. Marxism led to the establishment of the Islamic Youth Movement as a tool to confront the left in universities and trade unions and a means to encourage associations with Salafi orientation during the 1970s and 1980s. This policy came within the framework of the support provided by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Salafist organizations in various Arab and Islamic countries to confront the nationalist trend on the one hand and the communist movement on the other.

However, the state collided with these two currents "Islamic and Salafi", in the mid-1970s. The Islamic Youth Movement moved from confronting the left to confronting the state, and absorbed the extremist Brotherhood ideology of Sayyid Qutb and began calling for the overthrow of the regime. In 1975, the regime accused the movement of assassinating the leftist union leader Omar Benjelloun, for which Abdel Karim Mutee was sentenced to life in prison. This drove him and a number of others in the movement to flee Morocco, which led to the movement's disintegration. Islamic associations were formed by members of parties to which they belonged, which drew closer to the regime and criticized the Islamic Youth Movement.

As for the Salafi current, a jihadist movement emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and Al-Qaeda loyalists carried out terrorist attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, which prompted the state to reconsider the overall religious policy that was used in the past. The leftist movement no longer had a significant presence in the political scene, thus rendering the policy of the former regime to confront it no longer useful. It was now up to the regime to search for new arrangements that lead to "defanging" the Islamic and Salafist currents in the light of regional and international transformations that demonstrated steady growth of these two currents.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the leftist movement sought to fight the civil aspect of the monarchy, so it was not interested in religion except as an extension of the regime's civil aspect, since religion was seen as a mechanism of consolidating power. Fighting the monarchy's religious front was the goal of the Islamic current, as it was not concerned with the civil aspect except as an extension of the religious façade as a mechanism of allegiance. The Islamic current thought that power should be derived from religion. Constitutional allegiance to the system of government was therefore questioned on the grounds that it was against the Sharia.

The positions of the Moroccan Islamists on the system of government varied. At a time when al-Adl wal Ihsane declared that the regime and the institution of Commander of the Faithful lacked legitimacy – leaving it outside the political scene without formal recognition – Al-Tawhid wa'l-Islah, the proselytization wing of the Justice and Development Party, declared that Morocco is a Muslim country and that, "the office of Commander of the Faithful as a cornerstone of the Moroccan state is a symbol of this reality and a guarantee for its preservation and continuity."¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ al-Tawhid wal Islah movement: Trends and Choices. Web site:
<http://www.alislah.ma>

The al-Adl wal Ihsane party stopped opposing the government's religious aspect and did not resort to violence or call for the overthrow of the regime, maintaining the peaceful nature of the opposition. This was due to three factors: The first factor is the Sufi roots of the party's founder, Sheikh Yassine. He rejected violence and invested in education and proselytization to prepare what we can call the "infrastructure of change" by educating a future generation that can make peaceful change possible without shedding blood. The second factor was the Moroccan roots of the royal institution and a state of consensus around the office of Commander of the Faithful. This made the community aware of the difficulty of calling for revolution or overthrowing the regime because such a slogan would isolate it. The third factor was that the state succeeded in co-opting the establishment of religious scholars and the centers for producing religious elites, so that it was not possible for the Islamist Movement to attract the ulema and win it to its side so as to achieve some kind of religious legitimacy.

Take the Justice and Development Party – the model the state provided to the rest of the Islamists – as a party that grasped the characteristics of the country and made radical changes to its political lexicon early on. Indeed, the Moroccan state has been taming the Islamists of the al-Tawhid wal-Islah Movement since the first half of the 1980s, when they withdrew from the Islamic Youth Movement and established the al-Jama'a al-Islamiya. The movement opened a dialogue with them since the end of the eighties with the participation of scholars under the name of "Islamic Awakening University," which was intended to bring Islamists closer to the religious scholars, not vice versa. Although the state refused to grant permission to the movement to establish a party on religious grounds, it opened the option of joining an existing recognized party, the People's Democratic Constitutional Movement Party in 1996. This was done under certain conditions, first and foremost the recognition of the institution of the faithful, the monarchy and the neutralization of Islam as a political dimension of the party's rhetoric. Another condition was to limit the moral dimension, which succeeded in creating a model for the integration of Islamists. The only option for other Islamic currents is to imitate it.

3. The Moroccan model and the experiment of the Arab Spring

The previous data shows us the political path, which witnessed a "Moroccan model" of integrating Islamists into political action. It can be said that Algeria's experience with the Islamists in the early 1990s constituted the mirror through which the Moroccan system looked at the Islamic situation. Morocco had to sculpt its own model, based on two pillars: separating the royal institution from the political scramble and making it an institution above the currents and parties; and gradually allowing the Islamists to work politically according to certain regulations.

This affected the way in which the events of the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in 2011 were handled. The Islamists did not raise slogans against the regime, nor did they call for its overthrow like in other Arab countries. Rather, they limited themselves to slogans of a social and economic nature – most importantly in regards to combating corruption, reforming the judiciary and the equitable distribution of wealth. Contrary to

what was expected of the al-Adl wal Ihsane Party – which had a tough rhetoric towards the state – the party sought to limitedly demonstrate in the street alongside the February 20 movement. The group voiced its traditional slogans calling to fight corruption and amend the Constitution, which did not distinguish the movement much from other political organizations. It also refrained from calling for the overthrow of the regime and did not call for civil disobedience to achieve "progress." Moreover, it allied itself with a small Marxist party with no presence on the street – the "democratic approach." However, the group remained isolated among the various parties and bodies that descended upon the street, including the Islamic Justice and Development Party, which did not react favorably to the party's discourse. When the party joined the government after the 2011 elections and the amendment of the constitution, the first thing Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane announced was the need to settle the legal status of the party in exchange for recognizing the legitimacy of the monarchy and the office of Commander of the Faithful.

The Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory in November 2011 with 125 seats in parliament – an unprecedented achievement. In the past, the party limited its participation in elections and refrained from covering all electoral districts, due to an agreement with the Ministry of the Interior or pressure exerted indirectly by traditional parties, which were afraid of the Islamists sweeping their areas of influence. However, it is noteworthy that in the 2011 elections, the state distanced itself from the game of tug-of-war with the Islamists and allowed them to win as broadly as they did, the purpose of which was to show the success of the Moroccan model of dealing with the Islamists. This model became a source of confidence in the state – although limited – and is no longer a source of concern, especially in light of the rise of Islamists in more than one Arab country that organized elections.

The electoral system in Morocco is based on a logic that does not allow any political party to win a majority of the seats in the parliament, forcing the winning party to enter a coalition government. Accordingly, the Justice and Development Party formed a coalition government consisting of four political parties from the right, center and left and declared a bilateral alliance with the left-wing party, Progress and Socialism, formerly called the Communist Party – a sign that the party viewed alliances pragmatically rather than ideologically.

The party defines itself as one with an Islamic frame of reference shared by different political parties with various ideological orientations that have proclaimed belief in the sanctities and fundamentals in the country that form the general framework governing political action, which consists of the Islamic religion, the royal institution and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom. This means that Islamic representation remains the monopoly of the Commander of the Faithful, which is personally represented by the King – an authority no other organization can possess.

In this sense, Abdelilah Benkirane "former Prime Minister and leader of the Justice and Development Party" has often stated that his party has nothing to do with the experience of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In one interview, he stated, "The Muslim Brotherhood sent a delegation to establish a branch in Morocco, but they failed

to do so. Rather, their slogan 'Islam is the solution' was criticized."¹⁴¹ Ahmad al-Risouni, a prominent member of the al-Tawhid wal Islah Movement and its former president, attacked the Egyptian group and expressed satisfaction at the removal of Mohamed Morsi from power in 2013, stressing that his movement has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁴² Movement and party officials are keen to distinguish between the Moroccan experience and other Arab experiences, emphasizing the unique and localized character of the Islamic current in Morocco.

In the past five years, the Justice and Development Party has demonstrated that it is a political party and not a religious party. Nor does it have direct authority over the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, in which the king is always the highest authority. Benkirane, stated that Morocco "is a state governed by the constitution, the head of state is His Majesty the King, and his powers do not interfere with the military or religion."¹⁴³

The "action outside religion" strategy has been adopted as a political behavior by the Justice and Development Party to distance its religious lexicon from its daily political discourse. Throughout the opposition stage, the party rejected some artistic or social activities; however, it became somewhat silent about the activities of the government, such as the annual Mawazine Festival, in which millions of dollars are spent. The party has become more pragmatic in its handling of public affairs, conscious of the distinction between state and government.

However, this pragmatism does not mean that the Moroccan government is more confident in Islamic actors now than in the past, and we also see a rejection of the Islamists in the political work of other parties still suspicious of the Islamic trend. The truth is that the former clash between the state and the Islamists turned into a clash between the Islamists and the political class – at a time when Islamists are raising the banner of fighting corruption and creating political action, the political class is looking at those slogans as if they were targeting them. Over the past five years, the Justice and Development Party-led political battles have been mainly directed at the political class, especially the "Authenticity and Modernity" Party founded in 2008 by Fouad Ali El Himma, who from the beginning adopted the slogan of fighting Islamists.

Islamists understand that the state continues to fight them in an oblique manner through other political parties, which leads to a continuous misunderstanding between them and the state. The dismissal of Abdelilah Benkirane from the post of prime minister after the October 2016 elections after failing to negotiate with the political parties led the Justice and Development Party to feel that the state was considering overtaking it after it survived the Arab Spring. The party also felt that the state only accepted it because of exceptional circumstances, such as the desire to send a negative message to other Islamists like the al-Adl wal Ihsane Party, which has long criticized the Justice and Development

¹⁴¹ "Benkirane: Our movement grew up in the Muslim Brotherhood school and our party has nothing to do with them." Lakom news site. 12 June 2016.

¹⁴² "Interview with Ahmed Al-Risouni." al-Ayam Moroccan Weekly. 27/11/2016

¹⁴³ Abdelilah Benkirane in an interview with the daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, London. 8 February 2012

party and described it as a mere tool to cover up the negative reality.

The successful integration of Islamists in Morocco is linked to the expansion of the political possibilities available and the activation of democracy in the first place. Otherwise, the chances of reverting to the past will continue to exist, especially in light of the ramifications witnessed by the religious arena and the emergence of Salafist actors, who is questioning the entire political game and working to revive the radical Islamic discourse – a discourse that the Islamist Movement has demanded to do away with for decades.

The process of political transition in Morocco went smoothly during the Arab spring. However, this gain could falter in the absence of political realism by both the state and the Islamists. The Islamic current is not homogenous and there are differences in discourse and political behavior, and success with one component of the current does not guarantee that obstacles with other components will be overcome.

Study 3

Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power and Back Again, A Study in the Dynamics of their Rise and Fall

Dr. Khalil Anani

Introduction

Eighty years ago, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and its first Imam, Imam Hassan al-Banna, established three important phases to achieve the objectives of the group: phase one, disseminating the idea; phase two, the formation and selection of supporters and members; and phase three, implementation of work.¹⁴⁴ Over the past three decades, the group has clearly succeeded in completing the first two phases. Banna and his group have spread beyond the borders of Egypt. The membership of the group and its branches has exceeded hundreds of thousands in the Arab and Islamic worlds as well as Europe and America. The third phase, however, began and ended quickly with President Mohamed Morsi assuming power in June 2013 before being ousted in the 3 July 2013 coup. Ideology was strongly present in the first two phases. It was supposed to decrease its presence during the third phase of work and implementation, but the opposite occurred, as the Brotherhood when it was in power was haunted by its performance and activity from when it was in opposition.

Before the revolution on 25 January 2011, the Brotherhood was the only organized and influential opposition force in Egypt – many other political forces, both leftist and liberal, were suffering from extreme weakness. After the revolution, the party remained hesitant about obtaining power until it decided to put forward a candidate to compete for the seat of President of the Republic. This came amid a sharp split within the group's "General Shura Council," but the move was approved by 56 members with 52 objections. Regardless of the circumstances that shaped this decision, it came as a surprise decision for many, especially after the group pledged in February 2011 to refrain from competing in the presidential elections. This decision also contradicted many of the group's rules which had to be accepted in order to preserve the unity and cohesion of the group amid polarization and a sharp disagreement with the military junta that was running the country at the time.¹⁴⁵

On 30 June 2012, the Brotherhood moved from the opposition seat to the seat of power for the first time since the Brotherhood's establishment in 1928 after President Mohamed Morsi won the presidential election against the former regime's candidate, Ahmed Shafik. Morsi's victory was an exceptional moment in the history of the party,

¹⁴⁴ Hassan Al Banna, "Message of the Fifth Congress," Collection of Letters, "Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi' wal Nashr", 2011, p. 66.

¹⁴⁵ "How the Muslim Brotherhood lost Egypt," Reuters 25/7/2013. <http://reut.rs/VTkPQj>

not only because it was the first time that it reached power, but because of the nature of the party's achievements. The most important of these achievements was the transition from thinking as an opposition movement to a ruling party – which unfortunately did not happen for the Brotherhood in terms of policies and tactics adopted by the group throughout its year in power. At the organizational level, the group's thinking nor the balance of power changed within the decision-making institutions of the party, especially not within the predominantly conservative Shura Council. In addition to the overlap and inconsistencies in the statements between the Brotherhood and the President, which greatly damaged Morsi and made him a mere member of the party – in a country where the presidency has been historically revered – the party committed many political and strategic mistakes that contributed to its swift end.

1. The Muslim Brotherhood...Contexts of the Rise

The issue of the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt raises many questions regarding the success or failure of the party to govern, especially since it was in power for only one year, making it difficult to extract the reasons that led to its exit – or exile. However, we can strive to identify the reasons that may have contributed to the party's fate and led to the incomplete experience of power.

The Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power in Egypt was not merely a "stroke of luck" or a mere coincidence. The group enjoyed considerable social and political influence prior to the 25 January revolution as a result of a long history of social work and political-electoral practice.¹⁴⁶ The party succeeded in investing this influence effectively after the revolution to win a majority of seats in the parliament in the first post revolution elections in late 2011 and 2012. The movement was also instrumental in shaping the political scene after the revolution, not only as the most powerful and organized force, but also because of the vacuum created by the fall of Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood was the only party with the capacity to fill this vacuum.¹⁴⁷

Contrary to common practice, the Brotherhood did not have a specific plan prepared in advance to jump to power, as it sought to prove itself as an authentic party in the political game and tried not to repeat the experience of exclusion which was the case during the Mubarak era. In addition to the party declaring during the revolution that it would not compete for the presidency nor seek power,¹⁴⁸ the decision to run in the presidential elections came under the pressure of the political context and conflicts of power with the military on the one hand, and the internal strife within the party on the other hand. In other words, the issue of reaching the top of Egypt's power pyramid was not on the party's table – at least at that stage. Rather, it was part of the reactions to the

¹⁴⁶ The Brotherhood participated in the political process after their return to life in the mid-1970s. The group has become an important figure in the political equation since the beginning of the eighties, where it participated in all the electoral activities except for the 1990 elections boycotted by the group. It also managed to control the boards of some professional associations of doctors, engineers, lawyers, etc., universities and clubs of faculty members. See: Carrie Wickham Rosefsky, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*, "Columbia University Press, 2002".

¹⁴⁷ Jennifer Ludden, "Political Vacuum Seen as Egypt's Regime Pressure," NPR, January 31, 2011, <http://n.pr/29Eakuv>

¹⁴⁸ "Muslim Brotherhood: 'We are not seeking power'," CNN, February 10, 2011, <http://cnn.it/29qfZjZ>

political moment and the dynamics at the time, regardless of whether it was the right step or not.

In detail, the deep disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military junta that ran the country at the time – which increased during the second quarter of 2012, especially after the parties failed to put forth a "consensus candidate" for the presidency – were a major reason that pushed the Brotherhood to think about running for the presidency. It was also ironic that the military council ignored any role of the Muslim Brotherhood in forming the government after the 2011/2012 elections, even insisting on the survival of Dr. Kamal Ganzouri's government despite its failure to deal with the country's security and economy.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, Dr. Saad al-Katatni, the then speaker of the People's Assembly, accused Ganzouri of calling for the dissolution of the parliament unless the Brotherhood stopped demanding a change of government.¹⁵⁰ The group read this climate as a prelude to its exclusion from political life, or at least an attempt to curtail its future role despite its parliamentary, political and societal weight, causing the Brotherhood to re-calculate and re-interpret the political scene. It did not prevent the group from claiming that the change in its position on the presidential election was to "protect the revolution from the dangers and threats it faces."¹⁵¹

Internally, the issue of access to power has taken its share of debate and discussion within the group's higher institutions, especially the Shura Council. The decision of the group to run in the presidential elections came amid a state of division on the effectiveness and necessity of the decision. Some felt that this was contrary to the party's previous decision not to participate and that it would negatively affect the credibility of the group and its image in public opinion. Others felt that it was important, especially amid growing fears of the return of Mubarak to power through other candidates such as former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq and former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman. Thus, an emergency Shura Council meeting was called in order to resolve the issue.

The vote "behind the scenes of the group" on the issue of nominating a candidate for the presidency took place over three rounds. In the first two rounds, the percentage of votes rejecting a candidate for the group in the presidential elections was greater than that of the supporters. In the third round, the percentage of supporters rose above the percentage of no votes following pressure exerted on members to modify their positions.¹⁵² More than that, however, there was an internal "pressure" to push for a presidential candidate. For example, Gehad El-Haddad, the former spokesman of the Brotherhood, pointed out that the Shura Council was against the decision to run for president, but under the pressure of some of the leaders and youth of the group, the members of the Shura

¹⁴⁹ "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Military Council: The Deal and the Clash," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 18 April 2012, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/positionestimate/2012/04/2012417104949318130.htm>

¹⁵⁰ Al-Katatni's Testimony on al-Da'iq 33 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWoLUaV3fRs>

¹⁵¹ Kristen Chick, "In major reversal, Muslim Brotherhood will vie for Egypt's presidency," Christian Science Monitor, April 1, 2012, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0401/In-major-reversal-Muslim-Brotherhood-will-vie-for-Egypt-s-presidency>

¹⁵² The Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood consists of 108 members "90 elected by the provincial councils and the rest by appointment". In the final round of voting on the issue of a presidential candidate, 56 voted in favor, 52 were opposed.

Council were pressed to vote in favor of the resolution. El-Haddad added that the party's youth pressed for engineer Khairat al-Shater to be the party's candidate in the presidential elections.¹⁵³

The leaders tried to justify the position on the presidential elections, so as not to affect internal cohesion and the party's external image. They launched an "internal" campaign to explain and clarify the matter to the rest of the members. The justification for this was the change in political circumstances, which required a change in strategy. "The decision to run for president is due to changing political conditions, and all members must abide by it,"¹⁵⁴ said Ahmed Shehata, a representative of the Freedom and Justice party in Zagazig.

The Brotherhood ran in the presidential elections in 2012 with an alternative candidate, Mohamed Morsi, as head of the "Freedom and Justice"¹⁵⁵ Party following the rejection of the nomination of Khairat al-Shater on legal grounds.¹⁵⁶ Morsi came to power by a slim majority after fierce competition with Ahmed Shafiq, the representative of the old regime. Morsi won the support of the revolutionary and secular forces, the vote he considered to be the lesser of two evils and one that he was not necessarily happy with.

Morsi's arrival to power was a turning point in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, not only because it was the first time that the group had moved from the "shadow" stage – in which it had lived for some eight decades – to the stage of "power" and the challenges and questions it posed. It was also a turning point as a result of the historical circumstance in which the group reached power: the "revolutionary" circumstance with all its benefits and complexities. The urgent question was: Will Morsi act as an elected president or as a representative of his party in the presidential palace? The question posed by the revolutionary and secular forces reflected some historical concerns and doubts, some of which were new, but in essence reflected the degree of trust between Morsi, the Brotherhood and the rest of the political factions. This was a question whose answer will be clear by tracking the relationship between the parties until 3 July, 2013.

2. The Brotherhood's political performance in power:

Despite the fact that the Brotherhood spent less than a year in office, their political performance reflected a clear degree of imprudence, blunder and misjudgment. Although Morsi initiated a step that appeared to be "revolutionary" when he referred both the Minister of Defense, Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, and Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant

¹⁵³ Edmund Blair, Paul Taylor and Tom Perry, "How the Muslim Brotherhood Lost Egypt," Reuters, July 25, 2013, <http://reut.rs/VTkPQj>

¹⁵⁴ Interview with researcher Ahmed Shehata, Zagazig, April 5, 2012.

¹⁵⁵ Some suggest that the choice of Morsi was not made through an internal vote, but made only because he was president of the Freedom and Justice party.

¹⁵⁶ The application submitted by Khairat Al-Shater for the presidential elections was rejected despite obtaining the necessary signatures to run as an independent. This happened against the background of a legal ruling that had been issued against him and his failure to take the legal period to rehabilitate and exercise his political rights. For more information, see: <http://bbc.in/2HfPuPS>

General Sami Annan, to retire¹⁵⁷ – amid the first massacre of Rafah, which killed 16 Egyptian officers and soldiers on August 6¹⁵⁸ – he did not take any other "revolutionary" steps to dismantle corrupt Mubarak's system and purge state institutions in a way that reflects the revolutionary situation that existed at the time. On the contrary, some accused Morsi of providing a "safe exit" for the military from political life without trial for their mistakes and massacres during the transitional period.¹⁵⁹ The Brotherhood also tried to contain the rest of the "deep state" institutions such as the interior, the judiciary, the media and the bureaucracy, but the relationship with these parties soon became strained.

While relations between the Brotherhood and the military became more intertwined, the gap between the group and the revolutionary forces widened and became tense. The Constitutional Declaration of 21 November 2012 was the proverbially "straw that broke the camel's back." Morsi was trying to undo the shackles imposed by the military council before leaving power in late June 2012, when the People's Assembly was dissolved and a supplementary constitutional declaration was issued limiting the powers of the president.¹⁶⁰ In his constitutional declaration, Morsi was aiming to take some measures to consolidate his rule. The constitutional declaration issued by Morsi gave him wide powers and insulated his decrees against any judicial challenge. The Constituent Assembly of the Constitution and the Shura Council were also protected from dissolution.¹⁶¹

The political and revolutionary forces rejected Morsi's declaration as the beginning of a new authoritarianism and called for demonstrations aimed at overthrowing his constitutional declaration. This forced Morsi to issue a new constitutional declaration after a dialogue with some representatives of the political forces. He withdrew his declaration but kept the date for the referendum on the new constitution, which was in dispute with political forces.¹⁶² The military tried to fish in the murky waters between the Muslim Brotherhood and the political forces. As such, they invited Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who was then the defense minister, to a political dialogue between the two parties in the framework of what the military called "the reunification of the Egyptian family."¹⁶³ The Brotherhood and Morsi rejected the invitation, considering it a trap aimed at returning the military to the political scene after they left power.

On the other hand, the Brotherhood bet on the alliance with the religious right

¹⁵⁷ Morsi refers Marshal Tantawi and Annan's team to retirement:
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/12/231883.html>

¹⁵⁸ 16 Egyptian soldiers killed in Rafah attack http://archive.arabic.cnn.com/2012/middle_east/8/6/Egypt-Violence/

¹⁵⁹ Abigail Hauslohner, "Has Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood staged a coup against the military?" Time, August 12, 2012, <http://world.time.com/2012/08/12/has-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-staged-a-coup-against-the-military/>

¹⁶⁰ The Constitutional Declaration of 17 June 2012
<http://www.aswatmasriya.com/voters/view.aspx?id=25c52700-ec25-478a-82fa-e4a47a0967ab>

¹⁶¹ "Egypt: a sudden constitutional declaration that fortifies the constitution and restores Mubarak's officials"
http://www.bbc.com/middleeast/2012/11/121122_egypt_morsi.shtml

¹⁶² "Morsi cancels constitutional declaration":
<http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/12/8/>

¹⁶³ The army calls for a national dialogue in the presence of the president under the slogan "reunion," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 12 December 2012:
<http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12433&article=708331#.Vk0ijnarRdg>

wing, especially Salafists and former jihadists, in order to balance with the civil forces that succeeded in uniting under the umbrella of what was called the "National Salvation Front" formed by a group of civil parties. These included the Egyptian Democratic Party and others, in addition to some public figures such as Amr Moussa, Hamdi Sabahi, El Baradei and Osama El-Ghazali Harb.¹⁶⁴ Due to the demonstrations called for by the "Salvation Front" to oppose Morsi's decisions and policies, the Brotherhood organized parallel demonstrations with allies, leading to increased polarization and division. The crisis between the Muslim Brotherhood and the political forces reached its peak after the bloody clashes that took place in front of the Republican Palace, which became known as the "Ittihadiyya events," killing two people and injuring dozens.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, angry demonstrators attacked the "Freedom and Justice" headquarters in a number of provinces as well as the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁶⁶

During the first half of 2013, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and other political forces, including the Salafist Al-Nour Party, grew tense amid accusations and political machinations against the Brotherhood, under the pretext that they were seeking to tighten their control over the state and "Brotherhoodize" its institutions.¹⁶⁷ Suddenly, the "Tamarod Movement" came out into the open, and began to exploit the political crisis and the growing economic and social tension in order to call for the elimination of Morsi. Indeed, the movement began in what it said was the campaign to collect signatures to undermine confidence in Morsi, and then called for mass demonstrations on 30 June 2013,¹⁶⁸ which paved the way for the removal of Morsi through the coup of 3 July 2013.

3. Contexts and determinants of the Brotherhood's fall

The Brotherhood's fall was part of a general context that imposed itself on Egypt throughout the turbulent transition period after the 25 January revolution. The situation of polarization and division between the Muslim Brotherhood and the political forces provided an important entry point for the military to jump to power under the pretext of stopping the "civil war" and ending the division.¹⁶⁹ It is the same argument used by all authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Africa or Asia, and recently in Thailand. In general, however, it is possible to refer to several factors that contributed to the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its exile from power, some of them related to the group and its mistakes, and others in the context in which it operated. The factors related to the group are as follows: the conservative ideology of the group, rigid organization and leadership,

¹⁶⁴ "Salvation Front: The Egyptian Opposition Coalition," Al Jazeera Net, 18 December 2012: <http://bit.ly/29scpWl>

¹⁶⁵ "Clashes between supporters and opponents of Morsi," Al Jazeera Net, 5 December 2012: <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/12/5>

¹⁶⁶ "Egypt: The split prevails in the atmosphere after Morsi's announcement," the CNN Arab site, on the following link: <http://cnn.it/2s5rbRh>

¹⁶⁷ Al Watan Egyptian Newspaper, February 28, 2013.

¹⁶⁸ Al-Shorouk al-Jadeed Newspaper, 1 May 2013.

¹⁶⁹ General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi does not stop repeating this argument in order to justify his military coup against the elected authority.

and lack of experience in governance and administration.

A. The conservative ideology of the Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most important conservative social movements not only in Egypt but also in the Arab world. There are many reasons to explain this conservatism, not least the motives behind the emergence of the movement about a century ago, the nature of its mission and goals, and ideological statements – not to mention the social and political context in which the group operates. This conservatism has been one of the Brotherhood's advantages over a period of time, and has played an important role in attracting many social segments that believe in progressive reform over long periods of time and fear revolutionary or radical change.

Therefore, it was not surprising that the Brotherhood did not adopt a revolutionary agenda while in power for many reasons, most notably conservative ideology. The Brotherhood by definition is a conservative group that adopts a gradual reformist approach to change. This is confirmed by the writings of the founder of the group, Sheikh Hassan al-Banna, as well as their political and social behavior over the last four decades.¹⁷⁰ The group also believes that reform must begin with the individual, then the family and then the society until it reaches the stage of government and the Muslim state before entering the stage of "the professorship of the world," according to the community's literature. With the approach of gradual reform, the group succeeded in attracting important sectors of the middle and lower classes through recruitment and mobilization processes that take place over long periods of time. It also enabled the group to build a strong social network that matches the needs and demands of these groups, which provided the community with a large social capital employed politically and as activists.

After the January Revolution, the Brotherhood could not make a change in their ideology or speech to cope with the volume of changes and aspirations that came with the revolution. The Brotherhood's strategy was largely conservative with narrow calculations that never went outside of the box. When Morsi came to power, he did not follow a revolutionary approach, whether in purging corrupt state institutions or in dealing with the major figures and remnants of the old regime. He also failed to respond to the calls of many revolutionary forces to adopt revolutionary policies that could translate the demands of the revolution into reality.

Not only did the Brotherhood's conservative ideology not keep pace with the revolutionary movement, but rather proved to be an obstacle to achieving the objectives of the revolution and building a new political order. As a conservative group, the Brotherhood sought to absorb and dissolve this movement through its strategy of containment, which they followed with the deep state institutions on the one hand, and the claim to represent

¹⁷⁰ One of the famous expressions in the letter of the fifth congress of the group, which was held in 1939, is the words of Hassan al-Banna when he said: "As for the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood does not think about it, nor relies on it. The Brotherhood does not believe in its usefulness and results. If it continues along this line, it will inevitably lead to a revolution that is not the work of the Muslim Brotherhood or their preaching. "Message of the Fifth Congress, Collection of Messages of Imam Hassan Al Banna, "Cairo: Dar Al Dawa for Publishing and Distribution, 2002".

the revolution and express its demands on the other. After Morsi came to power, the Brotherhood's discourse shifted towards the ideological divide between the liberal and secular forces, as well as the move towards the more conservative and radical forces such as former Salafis and Jihadists. This shift was evident in the deliberations around the 2012 Constitution, which gave broad powers to the military and granted the Salafis a greater focus on aspects of identity at the expense of individual and personal freedoms. Even more so, however, the Brotherhood's conservative ideology, which emerged prominently while Morsi was in power, prompted some to question the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to democracy.

B. Organizational and leadership rigidity in the Brotherhood

The January Revolution took place at a time when the Brotherhood was under the control of a small group of leaders belonging to the so-called conservative wing. The situation began a decade or so before the revolution, when the conservative wing succeeded in controlling the key positions of the group and restructuring the organization in a way that guarantees its influence and the last word at the expense of what was known as the reformist wing or the reformist figures that were more open and flexible. When the revolution did not spark any internal change, the party could have strengthened its reform wing, especially among youth who had to leave the group "either separating or withdrawing from the organization" due to its lack of interest in them or their demands.

In fact, the big question the group has tried to avoid over the last three years has been the question of reform. Reform, in this case, is the ability of the group to transform itself from a large, closed-off group surrounded by its ideological walls within its own world to a normal and open movement based on the foundations of frankness, openness and interaction with its external environment as a normal political entity. The group was supposed to undertake a process similar to internal perestroika, which means organizational restructuring and the building of the main internal institutions of the group – such as the Shura Council, the administrative offices and the provincial Shura Councils – in a way that would first allow for the re-formulation of the organizational and social balances within the group and encourage the intellectual, ideological and geographical diversity within the Brotherhood. The re-formulation of the relationship between decision-making institutions within the group as well as a measure of balance between those institutions was also expected.

It was also the absence of internal education programs inspired by the values of participation, freedom and democracy that rendered the Brotherhood unable to absorb what was sought after by the revolution and its living forces. It can be said that the ruling values of the party – obedience, loyalty, allegiance and belonging – stand in contrast to the values advocated by the revolution – a factor which contributed to the party's isolation and separation from the revolutionary forces.¹⁷¹

The conservatives had a great impact not only on the policies and decisions made

¹⁷¹ For more on the Brotherhood's education programs, see Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* "Oxford University Press, 2016"

by the party while in power but also on the absence of any critical views within the group. This was in light of the marginalization of the reformist movement and the departure of members from the group after the revolution, such as Dr. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Haytham Abu Khalil, Hamid Al-Dafrawi, etc., as well as many youth who played an important role in the revolution. Moreover, the leaders of this movement did not have sufficient capacity to survey the extent of tension and conspiracy against the Brotherhood throughout the period preceding 30 June. Over the weeks leading up to the fall of Morsi, there was a disdain for the amount of tension and congestion in the Egyptian streets and there seemed to be a real problem in the perception of these leaders, which ultimately led to their crashing fall.

C. The Brotherhood's weak administrative and governance experience

One of the striking paradoxes of the Brotherhood's experience in power is that although the group has the largest number of skilled professionals in various fields, such as engineering, medicine, and law, it failed in administration and governance. This may be due to several reasons, the most important of which is the group's marginalization during the rule of Mubarak, which barred the Brotherhood and its cadres from holding government or administrative positions at the higher levels within the bureaucratic state. Needless to say, Mubarak's regime treated Brotherhood members as second-class citizens who did not enjoy the same rights as others. As a result of the dominance of the security apparatus over the government sector, the process of appointing and granting government positions was carried out by the security apparatus with disregard for efficiency and skill. In other words, the leadership, cadres and members of the Brotherhood, despite their abilities and scholarly qualifications, had no chance of influence or obtaining higher level government positions as a result of the discrimination against them. The logical consequence was that many of them were denied access to administrative and technocratic experience that would enable them to manage the affairs of state and government, which was evident when they were in power.

Thus, the party had no administrative experience at the provincial or local level as a result of the previous national party's control over it. Career promotion under Mubarak took place through personal relations amid the culture of patronage that dominated the performance of public institutions. These entities barred not only the Brotherhood, but any person belonging to the political and ideological currents, from promotion or gaining any experience in the art of government and power.

It is true that the Brotherhood, after Morsi took over, tried to utilize some expertise from outside its cadres, but they did not have sufficient power to make structural or radical changes to deal with the many problems left over from the Mubarak era. Moreover, Morsi and the Brotherhood faced a kind of bureaucratic rebellion, wherein government leaders refused to cooperate with them due to fear of being overthrown or for their initial refusal to cooperate with the Brotherhood for historical and ideological reasons.

In other words, a state of mistrust dominated the Brotherhood's relationship with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, which contributed to exaggerating what was

said about the Brotherhood: that they were attempting to "Brotherhoodize" the state institutions. This may explain, in part, the state of rejection and protest against the Brotherhood on 30 June by some members of government sectors such as the police, the judiciary and others who saw the Brotherhood as an existential threat to their privileges and their material and social interests.

D. Regional context and its impact on the Brotherhood

The fall of Arab authoritarianism in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen was a great shock to the other authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, which relied on these regimes politically and strategically. The collapse of a man like Mubarak hit some of his regional allies with a shock that led them to adopt a negative attitude towards the Egyptian revolution since its inception – that was before they worked to topple the revolution and the coalition of regimes was formed in the framework of what we can call the "regional counter-revolution." The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood and their rise to power was a turning point for these regimes and their strategy towards the Arab Spring. The regional counter-revolutionary forces took advantage of the mistakes of the Brotherhood in power, as well as the statements of some of their unofficial leaders, in order to attack them and the revolution.

The negative regional view of the Egyptian revolution was not just a concern or an attempt to stop the revolution from spreading outside Egypt's borders. Rather, other regimes tried to thwart the revolution by supporting the remnants of the old regime in Egypt and trying to indirectly disrupt the political process by influencing some Egyptian politicians and buying loyalty. This was exemplified by the case of Ahmed Shafiq, former presidential candidate who was sponsored and protected by the United Arab Emirates. After Morsi came to power, the relationship between the remnants of the Mubarak regime and the host countries of the counter-revolutionary forces strengthened – they appeared to share a common goal of overthrowing the Brotherhood at any cost. So when Morsi fell, the "counter-revolutionary alliance" sponsored the regime that came after the coup and supported it financially and politically, which will be mentioned later.

4. The Muslim Brotherhood after the coup

The Muslim Brotherhood found itself in an unprecedented state of distress after Mohammed Morsi was ousted on 3 July 2013; the end of Morsi's rule was a major surprise for the group's leaders, who later realized that the circumstances had turned completely against them and events had moved beyond their control. On the other hand, the absence of the party's strategy and vision emerged largely after the loss of power; its inability to re-organize was exacerbated by the post-coup regime's use of violence.

At first, the Brotherhood failed to deal with the political crisis that raged throughout the country in the weeks leading up to the 3 July coup. It seems that the majority of the leaders of the movement had full faith in the army, especially its leader Abdel Fattah el-

Sisi, who was previously selected by the Brotherhood to be defense minister.¹⁷² According to Qutb al-Arabi, a middle-class member of the Muslim Brotherhood, el-Sisi manipulated Morsi and the Brotherhood. In an interview with CNN, al-Arabi stressed that el-Sisi had deceived the group with his behavior and appearance.¹⁷³ The Brotherhood naively believed that the army was neutralized and its political ambitions were curtailed after it was given broad powers in the 2012 Constitution.¹⁷⁴

Moreover, the Brotherhood was recklessly dealing with growing popular resentment against Morsi's rule – party leaders misjudged the facts that preceded the mass protests of 30 June 2013 and underestimate the ability of political opponents to overthrow Morsi from power. In an interview two weeks before the protests began, Mahmoud Hussein, Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood, criticized the opposition as ineffectual and fragile and stressed the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to counter the protests. "Most of those who advocate for these demonstrations will fail to mobilize the street because they do not have a real popular base." When asked what the group would do if the demonstrators attacked their headquarters, he responded confidently: "Do not worry, people will protect us."¹⁷⁵ Hussein's assertions emphasized the arrogance of the Brotherhood and its detachment from the crisis. It seems that the Brotherhood's sense of confidence overshadowed their usual pragmatism and influenced their political calculations during the short period they were in power. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to deal poorly with the crisis after Morsi's removal. They did not acknowledge they party's mistakes or even re-think its strategies; rather, it depended on adhering to the long-standing complaint of oppression in order to maintain the cohesion of its members and to avoid internal schisms. In this context, the group urged its members and sympathizers to protest daily to challenge the post-coup government.

Since Morsi was deposed and power was taken over, the post-coup regime adopted a repressive policy towards the Brotherhood; Hundreds of its members were brutally

¹⁷² Ernesto Londoño, "Egypt's Morsi Replaces Military Chiefs in Bid to Consolidate Power," *The Washington Post*, August 12, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-morsi-orders-retirement-of-defense-minister-chief-of-staff-names-vp/2012/08/12/a5b26402-e497-11e1-8f62-58260e3940a0_story.html.

¹⁷³ A leader in the Brotherhood in Qatar: Sisi deceived us with his religiosity and the end is dark... The position of the Saudis is different than their government, "CNN Arabic "10/3/2014", at the link: <http://www.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/03/10/qout-alarabi-interview>

¹⁷⁴ Editorial Board, "Egypt's Latest Constitution," *The New York Times*, December 4, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/opinion/egypts-latest-constitution.html.

¹⁷⁵ Author interview with Mahmoud Hussein, June 13, 2013, Cairo.

murdered in July¹⁷⁶ and August 2013,¹⁷⁷ thousands of others were arrested,¹⁷⁸ and political, economic, social and religious measures were carried out with the aim of eliminating the group's activity.¹⁷⁹ In October, for example, the government confiscated the movement's financial assets,¹⁸⁰ but the government's December 25 decision to declare the group a terrorist organization was the turning point.¹⁸¹ In addition, many members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled the country and are now refugees in countries such as Qatar, Turkey and the United Kingdom.¹⁸² The post-coup system took advantage of popular anger and disappointment in the Brotherhood to liquidate their presence, exploiting the media in the process.

On the other hand, the post-coup regime benefited from unlimited regional support from the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, exploiting it in the continued repression of the Muslim Brotherhood. It should be noted that the governments of the UAE and Saudi Arabia considered the Arab Spring and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood a threat to their regimes and thought they needed to stop this wave.¹⁸³ After the coup, both countries rewarded el-Sisi, which stopped the Muslim Brotherhood's expansion of power after the Arab Spring by pumping billions of dollars into the Egyptian economy.¹⁸⁴ Since taking office in June 2014, el-Sisi has relied on financial flows from the Gulf to ease the economic and social problems of Egyptian society. The financial inflow was a major blow to the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁶ On July 8, 2013, about 51 Muslim Brotherhood supporters were killed and hundreds wounded in front of the Republican Guard headquarters. See: Patrick Kingsley, "Killing in Cairo: The Full Story of the Republican Guards' Club Shootings," *The Guardian*, July 18, 2013, <http://bit.ly/2EB8qdo>

¹⁷⁷ There are no agreed figures for the number of political prisoners and detainees since the coup d'état of July 1952, but various sources put the figure at between 16,000 and 41,000, mostly supporters of deposed President Mohamed Morsi. For example, unnamed government officials told reporters in March 2014 that security forces arrested at least 16,000 people, including about 3,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood from the upper and middle levels. Hamza Hendawi, "Egypt Crackdown Brings Most Arrests in Decades," *The Associated Press*, March 16, 2014, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/egypt-crackdown-brings-most-arrests-decades> The number reached 41,000, according to the Wiki Revolution, an initiative adopted by the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights. "Confinement of the arrested and prosecuted during the era of Sisi / Adly Mansour, updated until 15 May 2014," Wiki revolution "9/1/2014", <http://bit.ly/2aSqHJQ>

¹⁷⁸ On August 14, 2013, Egyptian security forces, backed by the army, killed more than 800 members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters who were in Rabaa al-Adawiya and Ennahda. According to a Human Rights Watch report, these massacres are "the most serious mass killings in recent Egyptian history." See: According to Plan: The Raba'a Massacre and Mass Killing of Protesters in Egypt" Human Rights Watch "August 2014", <http://bit.ly/2qvwIa2>

¹⁷⁹ Louisa Loveluck, "Egypt Court Bans Muslim Brotherhood, Eliminating Its Critical Social Services," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 23, 2013, <http://bit.ly/2o7Ozbf>

¹⁸⁰ Egypt to Take Over Banned Muslim Brotherhood Assets," *BBC News*, October 3, 2013, <http://bbc.in/2C1fu2r>

¹⁸¹ Erin Cunningham, Egypt's Military-Backed Government Declares the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization," *The Washington Post*, December 25, 2013, <http://wapo.st/2nZqgN8>

¹⁸² Many senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders fled to Qatar after the coup. However, some of them had to leave Doha after intense pressure from other Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Black, "Qatar-Gulf Deal Forces Expulsion of Muslim Brotherhood Leaders," *The Guardian*, September 16, 2014, <http://bit.ly/2EXFMko>

¹⁸³ Stéphane Lacroix, "Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood Predicament," *The Washington Post*, March 20, 2014, <http://wapo.st/1f0sj6x>

¹⁸⁴ Michael Peel, Camilla Hall, and Heba Saleh, "Saudi Arabia and UAE Prop up Egypt Regime with Offer of \$8bn," *The Financial Times*, July 10, 2013, <http://on.ft.com/2HdP7ps>

¹⁸⁵ Andrew Critchlow, "Saudi and UAE Ready \$20bn Boost for Egypt's El-Sisi," *The Telegraph "London"*, June 1, 2014, <http://bit.ly/2Et7d8N>

Since the overthrow of President Morsi in 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood has been in a state of confusion and panic. The group faced two challenges: the first was to survive, and the second was to topple the post-coup regime. However, they failed to accomplish either of these and fell into a sorry state both politically and organizationally because they lacked the clear vision and strategy for gains on both fronts. The ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize public support and rebuild its public image has largely declined, and in some cases, has been counterproductive.

5. Summary

The Brotherhood faces a fateful battle, not only because of the unprecedented repression it is subjected to, but also because of the many divisions and schisms it faces over how to deal with the status quo. There are repeated accusations that some of its youth are sliding towards violence in the absence of a genuine leadership of the group that can fix what has been broken, especially in light of the state of oppression and persecution pursued by the current regime. Although the leadership and main body of the group still clings to the peaceful option in the face of the unprecedented repression of the regime, the group has lost much of its momentum and influence in society.

The group appears to be free falling since the coup d'état and its subsequent losses, including the arrest of most of the leaders and the departure of some of them from Egypt. A group of middle generation members and youth managed the party's affairs, especially in terms of caring for the families of the Brotherhood's dead and detained. The group's elders and hawks did not like this and saw it as an attempt to marginalize and exclude them from the leadership of the group. They tried to return to control the organization and act as if nothing happened. For the first time in its history, the group has two leaders who are wrangling over leadership and legitimacy. The division moved from head to body, with sectors and administrative offices aligned with one side or the other. There seems to be two organizational structures, two media offices, two forms of leadership and two strategies – all of which oppose one another. The conflict between the two sides came at a time when many party members are paying a heavy price in their lives and freedom in order to preserve the group in the face of the wave of eradication it faces.

Over the past decade, the Muslim Brotherhood has become a large, inflated bureaucratic entity that cannot move without a central leadership that directs and manages its movement. So, when the leadership failed, the group entered a great cycle of conflict, division and strife. With the hawks refusing to give the new generation and leadership a chance, these members must undertake something like a soft internal "coup" in order to gain influence within the organization.

In spite of the above, it is a reduction and simplification to deal with the current crisis of the group as an "organizational" or "administrative" crisis. Rather, it is an intellectual and ideological crisis that the group will not be able to overcome with its generations and its leaders, except by reconsidering many of its great narratives. Until the Brotherhood "ideology" decays and becomes a thing of the past, the group will continue to free fall.

Chapter Three

Islamists within the Dynamics of Civil War

Introduction

The first wave of Arab revolutions "in Egypt and Tunisia" succeeded in overthrowing the regimes in a civilized, peaceful manner that did not involve reciprocal violence, although in Egypt there were some "conventional" attempts to suppress the demonstrations before the balance of power shifted in favor of the revolutionaries. However, this was not the case in the second wave of attempts at peaceful popular revolutions. The regimes in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and even Iraq confronted the revolutionary or reformist demands with a significant degree of violence, which led to the "militarization of the revolutions," and opened the door to the emergence of "armed Islam." This "armed Islam" rose in importance, taking advantage of the opportune climate and conditions, which included bloody internal fighting, the rising prominence of sub-identities, and sectarian, religious, and ethnic conflicts.

In the first wave of Arab popular revolutions, the jihadist movements, particularly Al-Qaeda, felt that the path of history had moved beyond them, with the success of peaceful popular movements, the move towards demanding democracy, and the retreat of the great powers that supported these movements. However, the conditions underwent a complete 180-degree change with the end of 2011, which saw the militarization of the Syrian revolution and the rise of the Al-Nusra Front, followed by the Islamic State "ISIS", and its expansion in the region. Peaceful political Islam became besieged, weak, and ineffective in these countries and others, while there were huge increases in the size of the armed movement and in its capabilities in terms of its preparation, recruitment, and media propaganda. This was very apparent in the spread and propagation of ISIS's ideology in several Arab communities.¹⁸⁶

There are many important factors that contributed directly to this shift to favor armed Islam, and its ideology and political agenda, which is more extreme and severe than electoral political Islam "particularly in its stance toward democratic governance, elections, civil society, minority rights, and other fundamental issues". At the forefront of these factors is what Arab researchers and experts call "the counter-revolution," which is related to the regional Arab agenda that is opposed to the Arab Spring and fearful of the rise of political Islam through the democratic process.

The situations in Syria and Iraq, and, to some extent, the protests in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 2011, and the Houthi movement "Ansar Allah"'s taking control of Sana'a in Yemen in 2015, brought the question of Iranian influence, which is tied to the issue of sectarianism, to the forefront of the Arab events. Sectarian, religious, and ethnic identities became an essential aspect of the situation, and cross-border militias were formed on sectarian and ethnic bases. At the same time, the ideologies of political Islam, on both

¹⁸⁶ Abu Rumman, Mohammad. "Al-Qaeda's Ideology and the Attempt to 'Acclimate' to the Arab Revolutions." *Foreign Policy Journal*, no. 185, July 2011.

the Sunni and Shia sides, merged with sectarianism, and it became difficult to distinguish between the two.

The papers in this chapter will focus on some of the elements of the events, developments, and dynamics in the Arab "civil war societies" through the examples of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Through these studies, two major factors will become apparent:

- A clearer and more apparent role for the regional powers and factors in influencing the course of events and the demarcation of the role of political Islam, especially in the rise of armed movements, through the funding, patronage, and attempts to sow chaos that flooded these countries.
- The retreat of political Islam and the rise of armed and jihadist Islam, alongside feelings of hopelessness towards the results the Arab Spring, the launch of the counter-revolutions, and the spread of sectarian and identity-based conflicts in the region. At the same time in which the armed movements flourished among internal wars, chaos, and crises, as is the case with Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Al-Nusra Front, "political Islam" experienced a true impasse and notable confusion.

In the case of both Syria and Iraq, light is shed on the rise of armed Islam, whether ISIS in Iraq or Al-Nusra Front in Syria. In the case of Yemen, the researcher sheds light on the Al-Islah party in Yemen, and the dilemma that it faced in dealing with the regional agendas and internal war, and, prior to that, with the dynamics of the Arab Spring, and its transformation from reformism to revolution.

Study 1

Transformations of Political Islam and "Salafist Jihadism" in Syria "2011-2017"

Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Haj

Introduction

During the more than six years since the start of the Syrian revolution, significant changes have occurred in the different ideological trends, and changes are still taking place. However, the clearest and most influential changes have taken place in political Islam and Salafist jihadism. Most studies have focused on limited phenomena to understand these changes through the lens of the security situation and, in a few cases, from a more intellectual viewpoint, the goal of which is understanding what is happening. However, there are still many issues that need to be studied and explained. ISIS and Al-Nusra have monopolized most of the focus, but what is occurring is much larger than this. It is a restructuring of the experience of a nation within the Syrian geography, with all that implies in terms of a great restructuring of the relationship of religion to politics and the state.

Because the issue of "political Islam" is tied to "Salafist jihadism," as Salafist jihadism is seen as a form of political Islam, it has become essential that we provide definitions that permit us a more precise understanding of the Syrian situation.

Political Islam was formed under the influence of the fall of the "Ottoman" Islamic Caliphate, and the effects of the emergence of the "secular" nation state. The fall of the Islamic Caliphate and the emergence of the secular nation state created a general climate in which it appeared as though religion itself had fallen, and that religion could be brought back through the return of the caliphate or through politics. The obsession with the Islamic character of the state became the focus of the organizations and political movements that formed at that time. These movements would, after several decades, become known as political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood built the pillars of political Islam, as is well-known now. "Identity" is the central focus and work of political Islam organizations. These organizations do not fight to overthrow the concept of the state, but to Islamicize it. This means that they are political movements that work within the framework of the global order, and do not rebel against it. This is despite their dubious view of national borders, and the fact that they consider them to be temporary. While these groups talk about states, the shadow of the caliphate remains present, and the religious state is always in competition with the nationalist state.¹⁸⁷

Jihadist Salafism emerged in the 1970's, under the shadow of the Cold War, when the political horizons in Arab and Islamic states were blocked. It emerged under the retrenchment of dictatorships, when organized violence was used by nation states to kill

¹⁸⁷ See: Al-Haj, Abdulrahman. "The Image of the State and the Shadow of the Caliphate." *The Dilemma of the State: Between Islamists and Secularists*, edited by Mu'taz Al-Khatib. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Joussour, 2016, pp. 212.

any uprising in its infancy, and to control societies in a manner close to subjugation, at the same time that development policies were failing. Jihadist Salafism emerged as a violent protest movement against the oppressive political regime itself, silent and closed-off, not just against the political elite. With the passage of time, and the influence of the experience of the jihad in Afghanistan "which was also a part of the Cold War", it began to oppose the global order in its entirety. With the events in Iraq, the rise of the role of Iran, and the sectarian war that led to demographic change in Iraq, new changes appeared in jihadist Salafi political thought, as sectarianism became a new aspect of the "ideology." In Syria, other changes occurred, such as the spread of the Salafist jihadism that was formed in Iraq. In this way, Salafist jihadism was formed as a movement of protest and comprehensive, fundamental opposition to the national political regime and the global political order, in which the issue of identity was marginal in the framework of other concerns. It was an objection that invoked religious language to express itself. This language was well-suited for this purpose, considering that the language of religion is more relevant culturally, better able to support radical thinking, and possesses what is needed to elevate a spirit of sacrifice to the greatest heights possible.

In this situation, it is natural for Salafist jihadism to view political Islam organizations as errant, secular organizations, since they work within the framework of the political regime and do not radically oppose it, and to view democracy "which is the highest model of political regime for the nation state" as blasphemy. We can say that jihadist Salafism looks like a response to the failure of political Islam. The harsh ends of identity thinking could lead to dissociation, and the feeling that "walking the straight path requires opposing those destined for hellfire" in a more comprehensive and radical manner, with the frustrations of the political and economic reality, the mixing of religion and politics, and the blurring of the lines between the two. While politics is the foundation of political Islam organizations, armed violence is the foundation of jihadist Salafism, and this violence develops, increases, and grows with the increase in counter-violence and the narrowing of opportunities for change.

On the other hand, it is difficult to talk about political Islam in the Syrian situation, where armed revolution has been going on for years, without talking about military organizations. Avoiding a simplistic treatment of the issues requires differentiating between military organizations that were formed as arms of political organizations, and military organizations that adopted the ideas of political Islam.

1. Political Islam in Syria

Hafez Al-Assad ended the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria after the Hama Massacre "February 1982". In order to do this, he used the emergency courts, and Law 49 of 1980, which was passed by his People's Council. This law sentences to death any member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hafez Al-Assad did everything that could be called "rule by tyranny," which, as described by Michel Seurat, the author of *The Savage State*, is worse than what is called "state terrorism," to choke any movement that opposed his rule or regime in any way.¹⁸⁸

In 1999, as part of the preparation for his son's succession, the security forces

¹⁸⁸ See: Seurat, Michel. *The Savage State*. Translated by The Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 1st ed., 2017, pp. 58.

arrested the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a party that had avoided conflict with the regime, and had actually cooperated with the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980's. It was infiltrated by the security forces, and all of its members were arrested in only two days. In this way, Hafez Al-Assad's son succeeded him without the presence of any organization – of any size – that could pose any danger to his rule.

Under Bashar Al-Assad, religious groups worked to fill the vacuum. The Muslim Brotherhood began to form secret cells starting in 2003, under the leadership of Farouk Tayfour, the strong man in the organization.¹⁸⁹ At the same time, Al-Assad's tumultuous policies towards the Islamists, jihadist Salafism, and Sunni religious organizations, in light of troubling regional and international events "September 2011, the occupation of Iraq, the assassination of Hariri", created a foundation for the growth of religious groups' political aspirations. Al-Assad linked his internal policies with the needs of unstable foreign policy.¹⁹⁰

1. He controlled the passage of jihadist Salafism towards Iraq, and formed an intelligence incubator for it.
2. He opened Syria to Shia proselytizing.
3. He pursued harsh policies against Sunnis in particular, and pursued oppressive and extreme policies against Salafis, both jihadist and non-jihadist "this includes arrest and imprisonment for long periods, with sentences reaching 20 years in the emergency courts".
4. He permitted social religious groups and Sufi movements to act in the open and, at the same time, used them as boogymen to protect his regime from external pressures, especially after the assassination of Hariri.

Bashar Al-Assad's policies, and the terrible oppression imposed by his father, formed a foundation for the Syrian revolution of 15 March 2011, whose spark was lit by Tunisia's revolution. During the period from 1982 through 2011, three major changes occurred:

1. Political Islam in Syria was confined to the Muslim Brotherhood "as Hizb ut-Tahrir had been eradicated".
2. The Muslim Brotherhood was located entirely outside of Syria "its secret presence inside the country was extremely weak".
3. The Muslim Brotherhood lost influential and important leaders who had been able to control the group, and the group was badly damaged by the regional conflict.

It is well-known that, at the outset of the revolution, the Syrians inside the country did not have political Islamic frameworks that could form the basis for political Islam.¹⁹¹ On the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood had only a secret, weak organization, and on the other, they were reluctant to get directly involved in a revolution that they had no role in starting. They were afraid of repeating the experience of the 1980's, for which they bore the main responsibility, second only to the regime. However, they did devote all of

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Farouk Tayfour, Istanbul. September 2016.

¹⁹⁰ See: Al-Haj, Abdulrahman. *The Political Aspirations of Religious Groups in Syria "2000-2011"*. Centre for Communication, London, 2011.

¹⁹¹ See: Abu Rumman, Mohammad. *The Islamists, Religion, and the Revolution in Syria*. Freidrich Elbert Foundation, Amman, 1st ed., 2013, pp. 12.

their capabilities to helping the revolution unofficially.¹⁹² In this way, the group protected its role, and was able to preserve a path for retreat if the revolution failed.

Afterwards, with the militarization of the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood formed a military organization in Homs under the name the "Civilian Protection Authority." Then, they formed military organizations, called "Shields," which they funded directly and which were under the direct military control of the group. Later, at the end of 2014, all of the organizations mentioned above were merged under the umbrella of the Sham Legion. The Legion did not become a significant military power, rather, it remained among the average powers, and was a military arm of the group. The Legion is the only military faction that is affiliated with a political organization and that has civilian political leadership.

No military organizations that adopted the ideology of political Islam were formed during the war, except for a few small organizations like Harakat Fajr Al-Islamiya and Kataib Al-Talia Al-Muqatila "its founders were from Al-Talia Al-Muqatila". These groups were quickly absorbed into larger organizations, in which they had no influence. This made the military organizations weak in thought, open to influence, and transforming rapidly as a result of events "as is the case with Harakat Ahrar Al-Sham Al-Islamiya in Idlib, Jaysh Al-Islam in Eastern Ghouta in Damascus, the Farouq Brigades in Homs, and the Levant Front in Aleppo". This granted Salafist jihadism ideological and organizational superiority over all the Islamic military organizations in Syria. None of these military organizations possessed a clear political vision, nor did they have a cohesive ideology. They were closer to national liberation organizations "this is how Ratney described Harakat Ahrar Al-Sham in his statement at the beginning of this year". The only clear thing about them is their goal to overthrow the regime and establish a just political system, which, at least, must not be in conflict with Sharia.

The ideological looseness of the revolutionary military organizations made them easy prey, and they were fought over by Salafist jihadi organizations, which benefited from the founders of several of these groups, who were in some sort of communication with the jihadis through Sednaya prison. With the clear escalation of violence, especially after the chemical weapons massacre in Eastern Ghouta in August 2013, and the Obama administration's frustrating position on this massacre, Salafist jihadi ideologies began to creep into these Islamic organizations. A type of deceptive intransigence appeared in their discourse, and factions of the Free Army itself began to adopt this orientation. The situation reached its peak at the end of November 2013, when Islamic factions under the umbrella of the "Islamic Front" attacked the Free Army at the Bab Alhawa Border Crossing, ending the Free Army's presence there and taking over its weapons.

However, the rise of Salafist jihadi ideologies was not stable. When jihadist Salafism reached a point at which it began to threaten everyone, a counter-attack against ISIS was quickly launched by a broad alliance at the beginning of 2014. This alliance included factions of the Free Army and moderate Islamic military organizations. This helped to usher in the return of some of the Free Army factions, the retreat of Salafist jihadi ideologies, and a clear return to local Islamism that was not international and did not cross-borders. There were also renunciations of extreme positions and an adoption of the revolution's banner, with all that signifies in terms of the importance of nationalism. This is still the situation at this time.

¹⁹² Interview with Farouk Tayfour. Ibid.

In the civilian political framework of the opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood was the main, and practically the sole, organization that represented political Islam, since they are older, larger, more cohesive, and more experienced than the other political organizations in the Syrian opposition. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood exerted outsized influence in the opposition. Despite the fact that it was part of the National Council, the National Coalition, and then the High Negotiations Committee, it still dealt with these bodies as though it were the face of political and organizational work. In other words, it did not work towards the political success of these organizations. Rather, the Muslim Brotherhood treated them as weak organizations, and worked independently in its civil and humanitarian activities. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood did not lead any political discussions for the opposition, despite the myriad and imposing challenges that the revolution faced at every stage.

Later, in 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the National Party for Justice and the Constitution "Waed", which defines itself as a "nationalist party with moderate Islamic bases." The party, which included members from religious minorities, remained on the margins of the opposition, and did not have any political influence.

Despite the fact that small Islamic organizations were established in the competition for control of the opposition "for example: the National Islamic Trend, which had 30 members, and the National Work Group, which had only seven members!", they remained marginalized and ineffective. Their effects did not last, because they were top-down organizations that did not enjoy any popular support and, most importantly, because they were functional organizations that did not possess any cohesive political vision. Their only goal was to gain control over the opposition, and nothing more.

The history of political Islam in Syria is contrary to the history of political Islam in other countries, particularly Arab countries. Here, political Islam developed in the shadow of the emerging democracy of the nationalist state after the French Mandate, a democracy in which it participated in an active way. It moved from democracy to violence under the Assad regime, and from violence to liberation during the revolution. If the dust of the war clears, it is likely that there would be multiple organizations linked to political Islam, especially if one takes into account the effects of years of war and the Sunni-Shia conflict on Syrians.

2. Jihadist Salafism

Due to geographic proximity, Iraqi Salafi jihadists infiltrated Syrian territory to monitor the revolution's developments, and to see if it would be possible to expand their organization into Syria and find a foothold there, which would give it a chance for a new start after its decline in Iraq. At the same time, the Assad regime set hundreds of Salafi jihadists free from Sednaya prison to encourage the emergence of jihadist Salafi organizations, which would confirm Assad's claims about the Syrian revolution and force the West to choose between him and the jihadists. Additionally, the Iranian interference, through their support of Hezbollah and its militias, gave jihadists throughout the world strong motivation to come to Syria to confront the sectarian militias.

The details of the formation of the Al-Nusra Front, and how it divided and formed

into ISIS, are well-known.¹⁹³ However, there are still many issues that require further study. While Salafist jihadism had a firm, cohesive ideology, the other Syrian Islamic organizations lacked such cohesion. Salafist jihadism was formed in a framework of "barbarity and chaos," while the Syrian organizations lacked the experience and doctrines necessary to face the naked violence and increasing barbarity that the regime perpetrated against the liberated areas and civilians.

Therefore, the climate was extremely favorable for the rise of Salafi jihadist influence, but the obstacle to this was the fact that the reason for the presence of the organizations was related to a local issue and to a peaceful revolution that went on for several months, seeking political change to the regime, and "freedom and dignity." These solid roots, which appeared to decay with the militarization of the revolution, had a significant influence, especially since most of the fighters were civilians, and did not have any experience with political organizations and doctrines. They were closer to the understanding of the civil revolution's demands "as most of them were a part of that revolution" than they were to Salafist jihadism. In reality, the memory of the first days of the revolution formed a protective barrier whose influence quickly became apparent.

Jihadist Salafism adopted a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, they labeled all of the opposition political groups "the National Council and the Alliance" infidels, calling them secularists whose goal was to establish an un-Islamic regime, and agents of the West, which had proclaimed them the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people in international forums. On the other hand, the Salafi jihadist organizations pursued a policy of chipping away at weak points. They expanded geographically at the expense of small groups "Islamic and un-Islamic", and also weakened their likely enemies. Their strategy was to remain as the only force opposing the regime, a goal which required them to gradually eliminate the Free Army and the other Islamic factions, without exception. As this was something that could not be accomplished in one fell swoop, they worked towards this slowly and methodically "for example, the Al-Nusra Front was able to eliminate at least 15 military factions in two years".

With the reemergence of the Free Army as a significant force starting at the end of September 2015 "following what is known as the "tank massacre" in Al-Ghab Plain in Hama", and the start of the Russian military intervention, the jihadist Salafi discourse began to retreat and recede and, in time, the Al-Nusra Front "which changed its name twice" was forced to change its discourse and dilute its use of radical religious Salafi jihadist language.

With the fall of Aleppo, for which the Al-Nusra Front bore the main responsibility, signs emerged of a Turkish-Russian alliance, which would quickly topple Al-Nusra Front and eradicate the factions in the north, particularly those that came from Aleppo and represented a direct threat to it, and worked to weaken the Ahrar Al-Sham movement. However, what is more important than the eradication of the different factions is the experience of Syrians living under the authority of the Al-Nusra Front or ISIS, or under a different local group, to differing degrees. In all cases, life was hell, with bombs coming at them from above, and the security forces controlling them from below, taking their lives and property. All of this created an extremely negative picture of life under the control

¹⁹³ Many studies have been written on this topic. For example, see: Mustafa, Hamza. "The Al-Nusra Front: From Foundation to Division." Arab Politics Magazine. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, no. 5, November 2013, pp. 63-75.

of the Salafi jihadist groups, which would surely have effects on the future of the country.

3. Conclusion

The terrorism that was committed by jihadist Salafism against the Syrians and the local communities under their control in the name of their religion, and the bitter experience of these communities, led to the weakening of political Islam, and pushed towards a wide and increasing acceptance of the separation of religion and the state, and religion and politics. At the same time, the role played by the revolutionary military organizations that embraced the ideology of political Islam led to a greater understanding of the relationship of Syrians to Islam and their positive engagement with it, especially among the liberal and leftist political and cultural elites. In the face of this, new questions have emerged. The events and developments of the Syrian revolution have pushed three main issues to the forefront of the conversation about the future of Syria in any political transition:

First: The protection of minorities, including existential protection from any revenge operations or attempts to turn them into second-class citizens. Most religious minorities aligned with the Assad regime for a variety of reasons,¹⁹⁴ the most important of which are the regime's control over their religious institutions and minorities' fear of an unknown future if they joined the revolution in confronting a harsh regime that did not have any mercy towards its enemies.

The Alawite sect aligned with the regime to protect its gains, and also because of its fear of reprisals due to its role in the regime's oppression during the 1980's. It drowned in the mire of the war. The regime purposefully sought to implicate the Alawites in brutal sectarian massacres, like the Hula massacre on 25 May 2012 and the Al-Qubeir massacre on 6 June 2012,¹⁹⁵ so that they would have no choice but to defend the regime and seek its protection. The reality is, with the exception of the Alawites, the opposition does not pose a danger to the minorities. The true dangers are only faced by the Alawites. It is likely that they will face widespread popular vengeance. In a case like this, the only way to curb the desire for vengeance is through comprehensive transitional justice.

Second: Ensuring the neutrality of the state towards all of its citizens, regardless of their religion. This includes ensuring the participation of the minorities in the government, and ensuring their ability to hold any position in the government without any discrimination. This also includes ensuring that the majority's religion and religious beliefs are not imposed on religious minorities, even by parliamentary and legislative bodies. The emergence and spread of the Islamic movements, and the ascent of the religious discourse during the revolution, which encouraged sacrifice and resistance in the face of the regime's violence, raised the question of imposing the enforcement of Islamic Sharia, and its relation to the rights of religious minorities in the future.

¹⁹⁴ Dissidents from all of the minorities, particularly the Isma'ilis, the Christians, and the Druze, were a part of the revolution. However, they were the minority in their sects. What is discussed above does not detract from the value of their participation, which was very important in confirming the revolution's nationalist character. Rather, it describes the general reality.

¹⁹⁵ See: "By the Knife: The Massacres Carried Out by the Assad Regime with Melee Weapons." Report No. 39, The National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, 2013.

Third: Religious freedoms and the right of religious minorities to the frank and open expression of their beliefs, and to the practice of their religious rituals without restrictions. The manifestations of Islamization, and the fact that Sunni Arabs were left to struggle and suffer practically alone in their confrontation with the boundless violence of the Assad regime, could motivate a response consisting of an excessive and unhealthy expression of identity, in a way that transforms into discrimination that could lead to indirect intimidation of religious minorities, preventing them from expressing themselves.

These are questions that political Islam will have the primary responsibility for answering.

Study 2

The Islah Party: Its Role in the Yemen Spring and Beyond

Dr. Ahmed Mohammad Al-Daghshi

Summary

This paper seeks to discuss the role of the Islamic-oriented, peaceful-civilian Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah party", the most important political group in Yemen during the Yemen Spring revolution, or what was known internally as the 11 February 2011 revolution. It will examine the party's position towards the revolution in the framework of the party's size, influence, and relationships to the individual and collective components of the revolution, including Operation Decisive Storm, which began on 26 March 2015. This operation is the most prominent transformational factor witnessed by the country in its recent history. This paper will also examine the central role played by the party in this, based on this background, and the effect of this on the Islamic situation in Yemen. The paper will begin with discussing Al-Islah's formation and roots, its background and founders, and its current situation, and then go on to discuss these issues.

1. The Beginnings

It seems that it is not possible to provide a precise date for the moment in which the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah" first began, such as deep roots in the organic relationship with the practical roots of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its center in Egypt. However, several pieces of evidence come together to confirm that practical, functional formation of this party occurred during the 1950's. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had a central role in its beginnings, especially through the Muslim Brotherhood's delegate, Mr. Fodil Al-Ouartilani, who came to Yemen as a businessman in 1947. Then, this orientation crystallized further, as shown by the most prominent practical piece of evidence, which is the direct coordination between the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and some of the Yemeni students who were studying there. This occurred in 1963, according to some researchers.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Hassan, Abdulqawi. "The Islamic Movement in Yemen "A Study in Thought and Practice": The Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah" as an Example," "Book Summary". Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi Journal. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, September 2014. Year 37, no. 427, pp. 45.

Here, the context requires that we mention the names of some of the first pioneers of this period, the most prominent of whom are: Abu Al-Ahrar, Judge Mohammad Mahmoud Al-Zabiri "d. 1965 A.D.", the most prominent ideological, combat, and cultural icon of the Yemeni revolution in the revolutions of 1948 and 1962; Mr. Abdu Mohammed Al-Mekhlafi "d. 1969 A.D.", the first general supervisor of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen; and Sheik Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani, one of the most prominent founders of the Islamic movement and one of its first pioneers, along with others. See: Al-Shami, Ahmad Mohammad. *Winds of Change in Yemen*, 1984, Vol. D, Arabic ed.; Shahra, Hamid. *The Death of the Smile: The Fall of the Project of the Islamic State in Yemen: 1938-1948*. Sana'a: The Yemeni Center for Strategic Studies, 2000; The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Al-Islah: *The Origin and The Path*. Sana'a: Khalid Ibn Al-Walid Bookstore, 2002; Al-Tawil, Nasser Mohammad. *The Relationship between the Political Regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen: A Study of the Internal and External Constraints*. Faculty of Business, Department of Political Science and Public Administration,

The movement remained in a state of secrecy, working underground, like all political parties and entities whose open existence was criminalized according to the permanent constitution of the Yemeni Republic, which was enacted in 1970 and remained in effect until the announcement of the Yemeni unification between the north and south portions of the country on 22 May 1990. The movement did not announce itself under the name "The Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah"" until 13 September 1990, when all the practical requirements for such an announcement had been met. Perhaps the most important of these is the fact that the new Yemeni constitution, in Article 58, permitted citizens the right to organize themselves "politically, professionally, and in unions..." This was reflected in the list of the 60 founders of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah", which included names from the different regions of Yemen, north, south, east, west, and central.¹⁹⁷

The Al-Islah Party was formed from several components, the most prominent of which was the group that was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that had the strongest influence, along with other sub-components that represented secondary organizations. They were represented by a number of societal personalities, cultured people, prominent tribal figures, and some businessmen. Here, it is important to note that some of these icons, including the late sheikh Abdullah ibn Husayn Al-Ahmar, sheikh of the Hashid tribal federation, head of the Supreme Commission of Reform, and speaker of the House of Representatives, who died in 2007, maintained a positive bilateral relationship with the General People's Congress. The General People's Congress was headed by the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who later became the movement's most prominent enemy, especially after the start of the Yemeni Spring in 2011.

Today, the movement includes a wide range of members: cultured civilians, soldiers, and individuals from the different segments of society. As a significant number of these members do not form a functional membership, but are rather a mass that can rally when circumstances require, they are actually more like supporters, especially since, according to observers, they do not have influence on the path of party, or its decisions, positions, or orientations, in normal circumstances. Similarly, their voice in support of the party is only heard in heated times, such as during parliamentary, presidential or local elections, for example, or during important crises, the most prominent of which is the outbreak of the young people's popular revolution, which began on 11 February 2011.¹⁹⁸ This crowd also appeared in opposition to what was known internationally, regionally, and in Yemen as the Houthi coup "referring to the Houthi movement formed by the late Hussein Bardreiddin Al-Houthi" and Salehi coup "referring to the forces loyal to the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh", which together overran Sana'a on 21 September 2014, although the Houthi forces remained at the forefront.

Assiut University, 2008 "MA thesis that was later published"; Hassan, Abdulqawi. *The Islamic Movement in Yemen "A Study in Thought and Practice": The Yemeni Congregation for Reform as an Example*. 1st ed., the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 2014; a team of researchers, *Studies in the Journey of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform*. Sana'a: The Yemeni Center for Strategic Studies, 2012.

¹⁹⁷ The Presidency of the Yemeni Republic, National Center for Information. *The Constitution of the Yemeni Republic*, 1991. Part Two "The Political Rights and Obligations of Citizens", Article 58.

¹⁹⁸ Al-Dagshi, Ahmed Mohammad. "The Reformists between Yesterday's Aspirations and Today's Challenges: An Educational Approach in Light of the Revolution." *Al-Jumhuryah Newspaper "Yemeni"*. Five parts, nos. 15426-15432, 3-7 March 2012.

2. Al-Islah and the Yemen Spring

All the evidence confirms that Al-Islah was able to handle the process of participation in the Yemen Spring revolution, or what is known internally as the 11 February 2011 revolution, with remarkable ability. While all of the observers realized that the party's base of young people formed the foundation of the movement and represented most of the young people in the squares all over the country, Al-Islah remained "with the rest of the active opposition political forces and parties¹⁹⁹" committed to calling for political reform. It did not express its position on the revolution frankly on its own, rather, it did so in a group setting, in the context of the Joint Meeting Parties' call for all societal and party affiliates to go out to the street and support the protesters calling for the removal of President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power. This occurred on 20 February 2011, after the first young revolutionary fell, hit by a bullet from the security forces loyal to former president Saleh, and after these parties reached a state of despair towards all the reformist efforts that they had exerted. These efforts were made under the leadership of the general secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party at that time, Dr. Yasin Said Numan, who was also the periodic head of the Joint Meeting Parties, in an attempt to extract real guarantees from former president Ali Abdullah Saleh that he would not run in the next election, that his son would not succeed him, and that there would be a reform of the governing apparatus.

There was an increase in the young revolutionary spirit, which was "particularly" angry at the political organizations and parties, especially Al-Islah, for their reluctance and for the fact that they spent a period of time begging - in their view - and trying to convince the ruling class to accept political reforms, rather than officially and openly participating with the revolutionaries in the streets and the squares. Despite this, the political authority, with notable cunning, through tools such as the security forces, news outlets, and new media, and through meetings and what are known in Yemen as qat sessions, was able to push a large percentage of the people, outside of the groups working for change and even within them, and even within the parties themselves, to paint the parties as the sources of corruption, and the heart of the problem. Therefore, it was argued, the parties should not be permitted to participate in the revolution, or they could corrupt it. Then, the ruling authority, with even more cunning, was able, through the media and through all the platforms, to reduce the term "parties" to a shorthand for the Al-Islah party, focusing on consistently calling the party the Muslim Brotherhood. The former president Ali Abdullah Saleh intentionally focused on mentioning Al-Islah during this period and, immediately after the name of the party, saying "the Muslim Brotherhood," confirming that the party represented this international terrorist organization and that, in Yemen, they tried to call themselves Al-Islah to trick people. He continued to incite the people against them, even calling for the eradication of the party, down to the last member. He did this with a view to influencing the regional climate, and to court the sympathies of the international powers that put the Muslim Brotherhood on the top of their list of groups that must be combated by any means.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ What are known in Yemen as the Joint Meeting Parties, which were formed in February 2003 and at that time included, along with Al-Islah, five other parties, three of which were leftist. They are the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Nasserist Unionist People's Organization, and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party "Syria Wing". The JMP also included two traditional doctrinal parties, the Popular Forces Union Party and the Al-Haqq Party. During the confrontations between the Houthis and Saleh on one side, and the legitimate government on the other, these two parties changed sides to support the Houthis and Saleh.

²⁰⁰ "7" Review "for example": Saleh, Ali Abdullah. Consultation Meeting of the Conference Leaders in the Sana'a governorate.

As part of this goal, the authorities decided to start with an armed attack on the Al-Hasba neighborhood, first attacking the home of Sadiq Al-Ahmar, then attacking the Al-Hasba neighborhood and surrounding areas. They then moved to some of the districts in the Sana'a Governorate, like Arhab, Nihm, and Al-Haymah, not including the city of Taiz. The fight was between the army forces loyal to former president Saleh and some of the tribal elements that supported the revolution "particularly from the Al-Ahmar tribe". The authorities used all the instruments of war, except planes, to project the image that the revolution was not peaceful, and that "peaceful" was just an empty slogan. This is despite the fact that observers, including the Mediation Committee, which included members from the former president's party, among them the head of the committee, held Saleh responsible for starting the shelling of the home of Sheikh Sadiq Al-Ahmar "the son of the late Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar" and of the Al-Hasba neighborhood. The committee also held former president Saleh responsible for the continuation of the shelling while the renowned tribal reconciliation committee was present.⁸ This was before the home was hit with rockets during the meeting of the Mediation Committee on 24/5/2011. The committee was headed by General Ghalib Al-Qamash, who was injured during the meeting. It appears that the committee meeting was shelled due to its stance condemning President Saleh.

Despite this, it was noted that the protesters in the squares and streets in all of the governorates remained generally committed to the model of peaceful protest. This is despite the violence directed at them from the governing authorities, especially when they held marches or planned events. Despite the diffusion of weapons, and in a country best known for the fact that its citizens carried weapons, the revolution in Yemen remained committed to peaceful protest, in the opinion of all the observers.

Any observer of the multi-faceted conflict between Al-Islah and the authorities during the revolution must recognize that the authorities were able, in the context of their intentional war against Al-Islah, to influence a large number of its members and supporters, at all different levels, when it promoted the slogan "No parties, and no party affiliation. Our revolution belongs to the young people." They pushed this slogan inside the squares of the revolution and at the sit-ins, especially in the largest center of the protests, Tagheer Square in the capital Sana'a. Rather than discuss this slogan logically, the revolutionaries, including the young people who belonged to Al-Islah, repeated it like all the others. The echo of this thunderous chant was often heard, and their goal was sometimes to confirm that the parties, particularly Al-Islah, had no relationship to the revolution, and that the leaders of the parties had not influenced the revolution in any way. While this is true, it is important to note that the issue was not limited to the issue of independence in decision-making related to the revolution, its activities, and its directions. Rather, it went beyond that to the point of almost complete denial of any relationship between the parties and the revolution!²⁰¹ However, everyone who followed

See the clip from the Yemen Today channel from 2/3/2017: <https://youtu.be/cw7byHGqYzQ>. Accessed on 3/3/2017. See also the text of his speech in an emergency meeting of the members of the General Committee and the Democratic National Alliance parties on 27/2/2017: <https://www.facebook.com/Afash.Yemen/posts/1450215808363055:0>. Accessed on 19/3/2017.

²⁰¹ It is a paradox that the revolutionaries, particularly the young people who were members of Al-Islah, did not ask themselves whether this "accusation" was true, before denying it in this way. If they had, perhaps they would have recalled the saying, "an accusation we deny, and an honor that we do not claim." In other words, seeking to conceal an affiliation with a party in order to prove one's innocence and purity amounts to an acknowledgement that such an affiliation is "national treason" or "an atrocity from the devil that must be avoided!"

the young people's popular revolution in Yemen knows that the parties, and Al-Islah in particular, had a significant effect on the path of this revolution, although this was not stated publicly because of the presence of this sensitivity, which was cultivated by the authorities through their news and intelligence outlets. It can be said, from the point of view of observers not affiliated with any party, that it was impossible to imagine a revolution in which Al-Islah did not participate, given the number of its members, the broadness of its base, the valor of its sacrifice, and the depth of its influence, to say nothing of its material, technical, and administrative capabilities.

Perhaps the most important of the strong pieces of evidence that can be presented to prove the influential, practical involvement of parties, whether the parties affiliated with the authorities or those that supported the revolution, and particularly Al-Islah as it is the focus of this paper, is that they were the ones that formed the government, as a group. While the People's Congress and its allies held half of the portfolios, the Joint Meeting Parties and their partners represented the revolution and the revolutionaries in the other half of the portfolios. This group, along with the People's Congress and its partners, signed the Gulf Initiative and its implementation mechanisms in Riyadh "on 23/11/2011" in the context of searching for an exit to the crisis that had rocked the country. Then, all of them took the reigns of power, and took over the ministerial portfolios in the temporary government. For the Joint Meeting Parties, this was a basic outcome of the struggle of its young people and its members in the different forums and squares of change in all of the country's governorates. Al-Islah's share was five portfolios out of the 18 ministries allotted for the Joint Meeting Parties and their partners. This is in accordance with the text of the Gulf Initiative, which allotted the Joint Meet Parties and their partners 50% of all the ministerial portfolios, which numbered 36 in total. This is further evidence of the pivotal role played by Al-Islah in leading the revolution and its young people.

It is well-known that the young people in the streets had an unfavorable position towards this Gulf Initiative, because it granted the former president and everyone who worked with him, from the start of his rule to the point at which the agreement was signed, complete immunity from prosecution or legal pursuit for any of the accusations of corruption or violations that they faced.²⁰² The position of the young people was contrary to the position of the parties' leadership, which announced its agreement to the initiative as the least costly outcome. Then, the leadership of the parties signed the agreement as one of its main participants. If the parties, and in particular the Al-Islah party, were not the ones that led the revolution, then why did the young people in the streets and squares surrender to the pressure, especially after the parties had signed the agreement? It is well-known that the young people, with the young people of Al-Islah at their forefront, were not incapable of declaring a new revolution against the new government, if it did not truly represent at least the majority of them. This majority looked to the national reconciliation government and the consensus presidential candidate, Field Marshal Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. This same majority encouraged its young people to vote for his election on 21 February 2012.

According to the Abaad Center for Research and Studies, while some of the surveys expected the percentage of young people who supported participation in the

²⁰² See: Article 9 of the implementation mechanism for the Gulf Initiative, Al-Arabi website "Yemeni", 15 March 2016, <http://bit.ly/2EsGSne>

presidential elections to be 80%, their percentage was even greater than that in reality. It is unimaginable that there could be a revolution, regardless of its success, in a situation like the current situation of Yemeni society without the participation of the parties, and the Al-Islah party in particular.

If the parties had adopted the revolution as a shield for the consequences that they could have faced if they had allowed themselves to be swept along into provoking the regime, and those known as "thugs," and had followed the young people in their traditional enthusiasm, regardless of the stage or the position, we might have witnessed another Syria. This is especially true if the parties had done this after commitment to the concept of "revolutionary determination" had intensified. This was a phrase in which the possible mixed with the impossible. It later became clear "although perhaps it was clear to some from the outset" that the term carried some ambiguity even in the most charitable of understandings and, in the most cynical, some malice. Its simple, direct meaning is rushing towards a mass suicide at the hands of a thoughtless regime, that was addicted to criminality and would not hesitate to kill any number of people by any means.

Perhaps Al-Islah, and the other political parties along with it, realized that one of the reasons that authority was "distributed" to the parties was the fact that none of them, including Al-Islah, had done anything at any point in their histories to help the people – all of the people, not just their party members alone – to obtain their practical rights as citizens, with all that implies, the most important of which for the individual citizen is guaranteeing a reasonably dignified life. Nor did these parties help the people to gain their other civil political rights to a reasonable degree, which would have distinguished them from the existing political authorities at that time that caused the people to suffer and were accused of monopolizing power, money, and work, and of tyranny and unlawful actions. However, the reality is that Al-Islah and the rest of the political parties did not speak out against the political authorities before the revolution, except to gain power and win in the parliamentary elections, followed by the presidential elections, according to the logic of the "popular uprising" announced by the members of the Joint Meeting Parties and the National Dialogue Conference in 2010. At that time, the National Dialogue Conference was led by Sheikh Hamid Al-Ahmar. This was a response to the "fabrications" of the ruling General People's Congress party, which intended to proceed with holding parliamentary elections unilaterally. They also provoked everyone by proposing the abolishment of presidential term limits in a statement made by Sultan Al-Barkani, the head of the General People's Congress parliamentary bloc at that time. The party also imposed a model of succession for Saleh's eldest son Ahmed. They claimed that the move to hold unilateral elections was in accordance with the date set for the parliamentary elections, which was April 2011, and which had been set since 2009.

3. Decisive Storm: The Most Prominent Transformation

The National Dialogue Conference, which lasted from 13 March 2013 until 25 January 2014, had barely come out with its decisions and recommendations, including the recommendation that a committee be formed to draft a new constitution, when an armed Houthi group succeeded in taking control of the town of Dammaj in the Sa'dah governorate, the Houthis' starting point and stronghold. At the start of 2014, the people and students living in Dammaj were displaced after a siege that lasted over two months. This was followed by the fall of the Hashid region in the Amran governorate, where the

Houthis displaced prominent members of the Al-Ahmar tribe, whose hometown is Hashid. The Houthis destroyed their homes and looted their belongings. Then, they took over the rest of the districts of Amran, and the city itself, before finally reaching the capital Sana'a on 21/9/2014. From the capital, they went out to the rest of the governorates, including Aden and some of the southern governorates. This forced the president of the republic, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, to seek help from the Saudi Arabian leadership, after he was able to escape Houthi-imposed house arrest in Sana'a and travel to Aden. Before he reached Saudi Arabia, he, and the prime minister Khaled Bahah, were forced to resign, on 22/1/2015. Moreover, they were pursued to Aden, causing Saudi Arabia and its allies to comply with the president's request and announce Operation Decisive Storm, which began the morning of 26/3/2015.

The war had barely begun when the Houthis, and their ally Saleh, began a wide campaign of kidnappings, and destroyed dozens of homes, mosques, and schools, especially schools dedicated to teaching the Holy Quran, and relief organizations that served reformist factions or were affiliated with them, in Sa'dah, Amran, and some parts of Hajjah. These attacks increased more and more following September 2014, after they took control of other governorates, to say nothing of their taking over, and looting, the headquarters of television, radio, newspaper, and electronic news outlets. Practically all of these news outlets were affiliated with Al-Islah, or supported its rejection of Houthi dominance.

All of this pushed Al-Islah to issue a statement on 3/4/2015, in which they blamed the Houthis for all of the deterioration and its consequences, as a result of their coup against legitimacy and their pursuit of the path of violence, including imposing house arrest on the president and the government, obstructing the work of the institutions, and invading the regions and governorates, even reaching Taiz, Lahij, Dhale, Abyan, Shabwah, and Aden, according to the statement. Al-Islah supported Operation Decisive Storm and those carrying it out, and thanked the ally nations, with Saudi Arabia at their forefront, for their stance.²⁰³

It was clear from the text of the statement that Al-Islah had a new policy in its manner of dealing with the Houthis, now that the situation had deteriorated to this point. Al-Islah was now ready to pay the price of taking a clear position, despite the fact that this now gave the Houthis licence to commit acts of violence against those who had not yet left the country, or escaped to Ma'rib, or returned to a governorate that had not yet been taken over by the Houthis, such as Hadhramut in the south. This was true of all Al-Islah members, whether high-level or mid-level leaders, activists, or general members. The Houthis also took over what remained of Al-Islah's headquarters, some of its institutions, and institutions affiliated with it, in much greater numbers than what occurred on 21/9/2014 and during the period that followed. Dozens of Al-Islah leaders and activists have been systematically kidnapped in the municipality of the capital since 4/4/2015. On that day, some of the members of Al-Islah's high committee, heads of chambers, parliamentarians, university professors, and leaders and activists from different levels, were kidnapped. This is to say nothing of others who were kidnapped, before that day and after, in the governorates of Al-Hudaydah, Dhmar, Ibb, and elsewhere.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ See: Text of Al-Islah's statement in support of Decisive Storm on the Yemeress website, 3/4/2015, www.yemeress.com/freedom/26092. Accessed on 27/1/2017.

²⁰⁴ According to Sana'a Rights Center, 122 party leaders were kidnapped on that day alone. These include Al-Islah party leaders and members, and activists. Additionally, 17 homes and nine Al-Islah party headquarters were broken into and

Al-Islah's statement was understood to mean that it would open a new chapter for the Houthis, and their allies, in their justification for the violent expulsion of Al-Islah, and that the Houthis would now be able to exert pressure on the alliance to stop the bombings that harmed the Houthis and their ally, Saleh. The Houthis had many cards to play, the most important of which was their decision to carry out a broad campaign of kidnappings and other violations against the most prominent supporters of Decisive Storm, with the goal of exerting pressure to stop the operation. It is notable that some of the other opposition parties expressed their support for the operation in one way or another, theoretically or practically. However, the leaders of these parties were not kidnapped or pursued. This was limited to Al-Islah alone.

In reality, the Islamic movement in Yemen, represented by the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah", had not experienced a critical turning point or a true trial in its nearly half-century history like what happened to it after Operation Decisive Storm and the period that followed. If it had not been God's will to grant them a relatively safe internal sanctuary from the start of the operation and a secure place like the city of Ma'rib, then the Houthis and their ally Saleh would have kidnapped all of the Al-Islah members, those affiliated with them, and anyone who opposed the Houthis' quest for dominance, and punished them severely.

Anyone who follows the events closely recalls that when the Ma'rib governorate, and its capital in particular, refused to submit to the threats of the Houthis and their ally Saleh, it became their primary strategic goal, and they decided to bomb it. Observers say that the morning of Decisive Storm "26/3/2015" was the day set for the bombing of Ma'rib. However, Operation Decisive Storm started 12 hours before the bombing was set to start, and paralyzed the bomber planes, rendering them completely inoperable. In addition to the importance of Ma'rib as an internal sanctuary, Saudi Arabia also opened its borders to members of Al-Islah and others so that they could escape by the tens of thousands before the start of Operation Decisive Storm and during its first days. Saudi Arabia also mobilized the forces opposed to the coup, with Al-Islah at their forefront, with material resources and military and logistical equipment, empowering them to confront the Houthis and to take their positions, along with others, in leading the fight against the Houthis and their ally, former president Saleh. If not for these steps, this could have been a devastating blow to Al-Islah and the other forces opposed to the coup.

After Decisive Storm, Al-Islah remained at the forefront of the struggle. Hundreds of its men and leaders, and young people in general, as well as others "most of whom were affiliated with Al-Islah", were killed in the fronts and squares while confronting the coup of the Houthis and their ally Saleh. Some stayed in their homes, believing the Houthis' slogans saying they would only target those who joined the fight or supported their enemies "by this, they meant the Arab alliance under Saudi leadership". Many of these people were killed directly or indirectly, or in assassination operations. Others died under torture in the militias' prisons, or were kidnapped by various means.

This suffering did not endear Al-Islah to some of the internal, regional, and

raided, and five civil society organizations and six student dormitories were looted. Kidnappings and home raids continued in the days that followed, with the number of kidnappings and violations increasing. The number of kidnapped persons, both Al-Islah members and others, was estimated to be around 6,000, and the number continued to increase as time went on.

See: Al-Falahi, Ashraf. "A Comprehensive Numerical Report on the Houthi Campaign against the Yemeni Al-Islah Party." Arabi 21 website, 6 April 2015, <http://bit.ly/2o7LpVc>

international circles. Rather, some demanded that Al-Islah do even more to prove the sincerity of its opposition. Some of the regional parties wrote and spoke critically of Al-Islah, and considered it to be conspiring with the Houthis. They and others still consider Al-Islah to be a threat. Often, some of these entities, which were supportive of legitimacy and were involved in the alliance, attributed the fact that the battle had not yet been won in some of the fronts and positions, the most prominent of which was the front in the Taiz governorate, to the fact that Al-Islah was leading the battle. In the end, this led the most prominent sheikh in the Taiz resistance, whom some called "the sheikh of the resistance" "Hamoud Saeed Al-Mikhlaifi" to leave the country.²⁰⁵

Under these circumstances, in the state of lawlessness that had overtaken the city, the head of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah" in Taiz, Abdulhafez Al-Faqih, was targeted by a failed assassination attempt on 13 February 2017. In this attempt, his driver was severely injured, and his companions were also injured. Abdulhafez Al-Faqih was taken to the intensive care unit at the hospital following this attack.

4. The Effect on the Islamic Condition

The Yemeni Al-Islah is going through a difficult phase, as are several peaceful civilian movements and groups in the region, to varying degrees. On the one hand, it is working to achieve its religious and political goals in peaceful ways, but it is turning into a direct victim of armed groups such as the Houthis in the north and center of the country, and Al-Qaeda and the separatist Southern Movement in the south. On the other hand, Al-Islah was accused by local, regional, and international actors of being one of these violent groups, or of supporting the violent groups, at a time in which it was asked, even by those who insisted upon categorizing it as a violent group, to sacrifice more and more of its members and individuals to defend itself against the enemy of its enemies, to prove the sincerity of its loyalty to its country, its nation, and its brothers. There is no doubt that these pressures, and the sense of being under attack, affected Al-Islah's ideology and its behavior, at least in this stage.

Along with the above-mentioned core observation, one can also record the following observations:

²⁰⁵ This exit was seen by those following the conflict as an intentional exile, even though it was portrayed as a temporary exit to seek help for the Taiz resistance. This hypothesis was confirmed when the sheikh remained outside the country, and outside Taiz in particular, for 10 full months after leaving on 30/3/2016. When he returned to the country on 30/1/2017, he went to the city of Ma'rib, and not to Taiz. He remained in Ma'rib, despite the popular demands from the people of Taiz that he return. For example, the popular resistance and its supporters in Taiz organized a mass rally on 29/9/2016, and called for Sheikh Al-Mikhlaifi to return quickly, to resume his leadership of the resistance in Taiz. Al-Mikhlaifi's importance, and the necessity of his return to Taiz, was further confirmed when chaos broke out among the groups affiliated with the resistance. This chaos has not subsided since the middle of January 2017. This disturbed the public, and frightened society, above and beyond the daily sufferings caused by the war, although some groups in the resistance claimed to be innocent of this chaos. Some of these groups were affiliated with Al-Mikhlaifi's family "Ghazwan and Suhayb Al-Mikhlaifi". As a result, one of the other members in the leadership of the resistance in the eastern front of Taiz, and one of the parties to the current problem, Sheikh Abu Al-Abbas Adel Fari' "who is affiliated with one of the traditional Salafist factions in the eastern front of Taiz" went from Taiz to Ma'rib on 15/2/2017 to meet with Sheikh Hamoud Al-Mikhlaifi, with the goal of containing the problem. On 19/2/2017, after he returned to Taiz, he made a statement to the public in which he praised Sheikh Al-Mikhlaifi, and some of the other Ma'rib sheikhs who welcomed him and helped him to succeed in his task. However, the situation remained as it was, in terms of the armed chaos and multiple centers of control and influence. See: "The statement of Sheikh Adel Fari' "Abu Al-Abbas", an explanatory statement to the public regarding our visit to Ma'rib with the goal of reconciliation." February 2017.

First: The retreat of the voices calling for an Islamic state or Islamic rule, represented by slogans like "Enforce Sharia" or "Rule by what God Revealed," etc. This is now confined to the "scholarly" trend, if it can be called that, or what could be called the "conservative" trend within Al-Islah. The trend to which the majority belongs, and whose voice is the loudest, is the trend that has turned towards calling for a "modern democratic civil" state, sometimes adding the phrase "with Islamic foundations." This last phrase does not necessarily have to be included, as many members of Al-Islah, at the different levels, do not feel that a modern democratic state is in opposition to the desired Islamic state, even if they do not openly or directly say this. Al-Islah's calls for a modern democratic civil state were in part because of the influence of the slogans of the peaceful revolutions that preceded the Yemeni revolution, particularly those in Tunisia and Egypt. However, it appears that this call also served as an assurance to those outside Yemen who closely monitored the revolution's developments to determine their final position towards the most influential party, and what would happen after the departure of Saleh, his family, and his regime. It was as though this assurance came in the form of the slogan "the civil state" so that those outside of Yemen would not fear the control of the largest and strongest party "Al-Islah" of the popular, young people's revolution. This is in addition to the internal assurance aimed at Al-Islah's allies, primarily those in the Joint Meeting Parties, who perhaps were concerned that their largest ally would take the lion's share of the revolution's gains. Therefore, we saw preemptive statements from Al-Islah's assistant secretary general, Dr. Mohammad Saeed Al-Saadi "the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation in the national reconciliation government and the current legitimate government" in some of his interviews. In these statements, he said that the partnership between Al-Islah and its allies would remain in effect for at least the next ten years. Likewise, the former official spokesman of the Joint Meeting Parties, and member of Al-Islah's high committee, Mohammad Qahtan "who was kidnapped by the Houthis and Saleh's group over two years ago" also confirmed this in some of his media interviews.²⁰⁶

Perhaps the most important practical evidence that Al-Islah presented to strengthen the position that it does not intend to consolidate power in the coming stage is the fact that it limited its participation in the national reconciliation government to only five portfolios, out of the 18 portfolios that represented 50% of those available - as previously mentioned. This points to the party's credibility in not wanting to monopolize power, despite its obvious presence, size and influence, as well as the sacrifices that it has made of both lives and materials.

If the preceding indicates anything, it is the uniqueness of the Yemeni political "reform" experience, and its peaceful revolution. Those who carried out the revolution were not concerned with fighting for representation in the government equal to their size and sacrifice. At the same time, their Islamic counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Kuwait, who won the majority of votes and parliamentary seats, were insistent upon heading the government in some cases, and in most cases participated in the government with significant representation. This is also the case for parliamentary leadership, as can be seen in Tunisia and Morocco, for example.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ See: Al-Dagshi, Ahmed Mohammad. "The Reformists between Yesterday's Aspirations and Today's Challenges." *Al-Jumhuryah Newspaper "Yemeni"*, 7 March 2012, pp. 2-3.

²⁰⁷ From this, one can understand Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's description of the tremendous movement in the region during the first months of the Arab Spring. He said that it represents the era of the Islamists or their governments, saying,

Second: The notable care taken by the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah" to avoid being linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, given the regional and international community's sensitivity toward the latter group. On 30/10/2013, after the revolution, the party issued a statement in which it responded directly to former president Saleh specifically. Saleh had been insistent that a link between the two groups existed. He had maintained the existence of such a link in his party and political speeches and meetings, in his news interviews, in the coverage of the news outlets affiliated with him, on social media, and in other outlets. The statement said:

While we affirm our respect for the distinguished and mature historical experience of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is based on moderation, as a model of proselytizing and of life, we also confirm that the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah" is an official political party, and we are not concerned with any other names applied to us by anyone else, whether in praise or criticism. Al-Islah is a political entity built on the principle of peacefulness in its organizational structure. Its slogan has been "Peaceful struggle is our path to gaining rights and freedoms" since its third general congress, held in December 2002. This slogan is apparent in its literature, actions, and positions.²⁰⁸

The same affirmation was found in an article published by the head of the high committee, Mr. Mohammad Abdullah Al-Yadoumi, on his Facebook wall on the 26th anniversary of the founding of the party "13 September 2016". At that time, he and several leaders of the movement, as well as some of its members, were in Saudi Arabia during the ongoing confrontation with the Houthis and Saleh's wing of the General People's Congress, and the armed groups affiliated with it.²⁰⁹

Third: The increase in external international and regional focus on the Al-Islah party, which at times amounted to unfavorable targeting of the party. For example, Al-Islah is facing a regional campaign focused on it, carried out by officials in the leadership of the United Arab Emirates in particular. From time to time, a semi-official accusation is directed at Al-Islah from the mouth or pen of people close to the decision-makers there, to indicate an official desire to damage Al-Islah, and to sow doubt towards its positions and orientations.

However, it is notable that Al-Islah's leadership did not give any formal response to these accusations, careful "it would appear" not to disrupt the path of the Emirati military role in the ongoing war against the Houthis and Saleh's forces.²¹⁰

"The liberals and the secularists have had their time. This is the time of the Islamists!" In contrast to this, the Islamists in Yemen had a different way of thinking about their relationship to others. See: Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. Al-Qaradawi's website. <http://qaradawi.net/new/Articles>. Accessed on 21/2/2017.

²⁰⁸ See: Al-Islah's statement on the Yemeres website, "In an Official Statement, Al-Islah Says It is Not Linked to the Muslim Brotherhood." Issued on 1434/12/25 A.H. or 2013/10/30 A.D. <http://bit.ly/2BZDQt3>

²⁰⁹ Al-Yadoumi, Mohammad Abdullah. Published on his Facebook wall, republished on Almasdar Online website. <http://bit.ly/2F4uv1L>

²¹⁰ In addition to the repeated statements by Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan, the former chief of the Dubai Police Force, and Anwar Gargash, the minister of state for foreign affairs, that were damaging to Al-Islah and sowed doubts around its positions and loyalties, there has been a widespread negative reaction among Al-Islah and its supporters, and those sympathetic to its positions. This is especially true at the current time, given what was published by 24 Emirati sites, saying that members of the Al-Islah leadership sold heavy weapons to the Houthis, including mid-range missiles that the Houthis used to target Saudi cities until the popular resistance forces were able to seize some of them, in a military operation carried out in the Al-Boqe'e district of the Sa'dah governorate. See, for example: "A French Newspaper: The Emirates are Fighting Al-Islah in Yemen, Not the Houthis." The Yemen website, 2017/8/7. <http://bit.ly/2EhAH8K>

Fourth: The increasing feeling among a significant number of Al-Islah's young people and members that the country's high-level leadership is weak and making missteps, especially in some important situations. This is especially true after the immense shock of the fall of Sana'a to the Houthis and their allies on 21/9/2014, when this leadership realized that there had been widespread treason from early on, on the part of the official military leadership, specifically the leadership in the Minister of Defense. Their critics felt that they should have been prepared for this, rather than appearing shocked despite all of the indications that something like this was going to happen, given the fact that the state was not able to fulfill its duty in protecting its citizens. General Mohammad Nasser Ahmed, the former Minister of Defense, stated repeatedly that the Yemeni army took a neutral stance towards what was happening, ever since the town of Dammaj in the Sa'dah governorate was threatened, and then fell into the hands of the Houthis at the end of 2013.

Fifth: The occurrence of what appeared to be confusion in the comprehensive vision of some of the members of Al-Islah, particularly mid-level members. This confusion was related to some people's understanding of general political principles, the most important of which are comprehensive political principles, such as the relationship between religion and the state, especially in light of the successive failures of some of the political models, whether in Sudan, Egypt or elsewhere. This is in addition to the contradictions in the Islamic doctrines of different groups, sects, and schools of thought and the new Islamic judgements that appear in some ways to be more fundamentally contradictory. At the same time, there was also a systematic liberal Western cultural attack. Local civil society organizations, and voices affiliated with them, began to promote a model that presents secularism as a solution to all of these problems, at a time when this model held great influence, educationally, politically, culturally, societally, etc. Whether this was a product of confusion, weak perception, or false consciousness, it left a negative effect on the conscious or subconscious of some those young people, without their realizing it.

Six: It is not possible to deny the dominance of doctrinal and sectarian sentiments among a significant number of those affiliated with the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah" in the current stage. This is a reaction to the extremism of the Houthis and their allies, who have for years been describing the members of Al-Islah, and the Salafis in all the different factions, as takfiris, ISIS, and Wahhabis. Those affiliated with Al-Islah responded to them with in-kind accusations, calling them Majus "Zoroastrians" and Rafida. There was also an increase in what is known in Yemen as "political Hashemism," which is a term used to describe the exploitation of Hashemite lineage to claim a divine right to rule, and extending this claim to anyone related to the Hashemites, even if they are in conflict with the Hashemite line or are actually one of the Hashemites' victims.

Seventh: Likewise, feelings of regional affiliation developed among some individuals in the Al-Islah party in some of the regions and governorates that had a Sunni "Shafi'i" background, after the Houthi attacks that appeared to have a Zaidiyyah Shia sectarian character, which were carried out against Sunni Shafi'i regions, the most prominent of which were Taiz, Al-Hudaydah, and the south of the country. Terms with a negative connotation then emerged, like "the northern plateau" and "the inhabitants of the northernmost region." These terms were demographic generalizations. While they could appear to be neutral geographic terms, they carried a negative connotation, implying that all, or most, of the inhabitants of the plateau and the northernmost region support the Houthis in their coup and in the invasion of the Shafi'i areas, although this is

not at all true in reality.²¹¹

5. The Outlook for the Future

It is difficult to predict the future of Al-Islah in the mid to long term. As for the near future, it depends on the outcome of the current war between the Houthis and their ally Saleh on the one hand, and the government forces and popular resistance, including Al-Islah, on the other. It could be a military or political solution, or a military solution that forces the Houthis and Saleh to submit to a peaceful political solution, one of the most important outcomes of which would be the disarming of the Houthis and those who stand with them, including forces that are not official military forces, so that everyone can enjoy peace and move towards rebuilding.

If this does not happen, Al-Islah is a part of an armed populace, and is currently at the forefront of an armed resistance, alongside the national army. Based on the progress of the events, the members and supporters of Al-Islah will not permit the Houthis to remain a continued threat to their security and society. Perhaps they will say, "Al-Islah no longer has anything to lose. Either there will be a just state to which everyone submits, or the resistance will continue until this goal is achieved, so all peaceful members of the populace can prosper, no matter how long it takes!"

In light of the almost direct regional pressures on Al-Islah, particularly the pressure from the UAE, whose agenda was openly exposed in the southern governorates, especially Aden, it is likely that the coming stage will witness increased pressures on Al-Islah. This could reduce Al-Islah's efficacy in these regions, especially after the oppression of members of Al-Islah and the arrest of 10 of their leaders in Aden, including the assistant secretary for the executive office in Aden "on 11/10/2017", a few months after the announcement of the Southern Transitional Council affiliated with the Emirates "on 7/7/2017", which grouped Al-Islah with the terrorist groups "ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Houthis".

The negative regional influence towards Al-Islah extends directly to a central hotspot in the Taiz governorate, in light of the repeated calls for help from the national army and the popular resistance there because of what they call the continued lack of support from the leadership of the Arab alliance. This is in the context of the fact that the UAE, in particular, believes that the army and the resistance in Taiz are controlled by elements of Al-Islah, meaning that these elements must either be expelled or they themselves must provide the required support.

It is difficult to say definitively whether this regional position towards Al-Islah will stay the same in the near term, especially after the most important development in the struggle between the forces of the Arab alliance, and with them the legitimate forces, on the one hand, and Saleh's forces on the other. This development occurred on 4/11/2017 when the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at Riyadh, which reached the area of King Khalid

²¹¹ According to observers, the victims of the Houthis in these regions number in the thousands, as do injured persons. Likewise, the number of displaced persons and injured persons is in the hundreds of thousands, to say nothing of the hundreds of homes, mosques, and institutions destroyed by the Houthis in these regions, starting in Sa'dah and moving to Hashid, Amran, Sana'a, and Dhamar, or a not insignificant part of Dhamar. Additionally, the greatest sacrifices were witnessed in the governorates of Sa'dah, Sana'a, and Amran, all of which are located in the northern plateau or the northernmost region. The resistance in these regions is one of the strongest and fiercest examples of the resistance. Practically all of the members of this resistance, or at least most of them, are from these regions.

International Airport. This missile carried with it the implication that the Houthis could hit Abu Dhabi with a similar missile or missiles. This pushed the Saudis and the alliance forces to describe the missile as Iranian-made, smuggled into Yemen to be used by the Houthis against Yemen's neighbors and some of the countries in the Arab alliance. This event had a positive effect, embodied in the revival of the relationship between the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah" and the leadership of the Arab alliance, represented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, a relationship that had previously been cold. After the missile was fired, on 10/11/2017, the Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman met with the head of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform "Al-Islah"'s high committee, Mr. Mohammad Al-Yadoumi and the general secretary of the party, Mr. Abdulwahhab Al-Anisi, in Riyadh where they both live. This meeting was a direct result of this development in the fight, and of the clear recognition of the strength of Al-Islah and its fighting elements in the ranks of the national army and the popular resistance, which is very difficult to define in the new chapter of this conflict. It is telling that the head of Al-Islah's high committee emerged from the meeting to state that it had been was "constructive, fruitful, and positive." It is likely that the meeting was held through coordination between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Here, the paradox comes into view, as does the backpedaling on what had appeared to be a hard and final position against the Al-Islah party in general, particularly on the part of the UAE, which had considered Al-Islah to be the long arm of the "terrorist" Muslim Brotherhood.²¹²

²¹² "Bin Salman Meets with the Leadership of the Yemeni Al-Islah Party...and 'Mujtahid' Reveals the Secret of this Meeting, the First of Its Kind." Huff Post. 2017/11/11. http://www.huffpostarabi.com/2017/11/11/story_n_18530212.htm.

Chapter Four

Islamists Out of Power

Introduction

The Arab countries, during the Arab Spring and afterwards, divided into several groups: countries that entered the phase of revolution and reform and remain there to this day, such as Tunisia and Morocco; countries whose revolutions were brief, as is the case in Egypt and Yemen; and countries that walked alongside the storm of the Arab Spring, but did not enter into it. They did not enter into its dynamics, whether in terms of overthrowing regimes, changing the rules of the political game, or even reaching the point of internal wars. This was the case in most of the Gulf countries and in Jordan, i.e. the Arab kingdoms.

Why did these countries emerge from the period of the Arab Spring without any radical changes, even in regard to the role of Islamists and their trends in the political equation? What are the changing conditions that determined these experiences? What are the benefits and costs to the Islamic movements in these countries? These are the main questions that we will discuss in this chapter.

In the coming pages, we will discuss two main examples. The first is the Algerian example, particularly the experience of the Movement for the Society of Peace, which avoided violence during the black decade in Algeria "following the 1992 parliamentary elections". The Movement for the Society of Peace participated in power in a partial manner. It experienced many splits and internal disputes, and redeveloped its ideological discourse and its relationship to authority.

The second example is the Kuwaiti model, which is set apart from the other Arab Gulf countries by its democracy, although it is restricted, and by an official party culture, political movement, regular elections, diversity and plurality in the Islamic parties, and sectarian duality "Sunni-Shia". All of this gives political Islam in Kuwait different dynamics than those of other countries.

We have postponed discussion of the Jordanian model, which is similar to the two aforementioned models, until the next chapter, with the goal of presenting a more in-depth study of it, by examining the internal opinions and positions "as we will see".

Study 1

The Peace Movement: The Dialect of Participation and Power

Dr. Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck

A History Of The Islamist Movement in Algeria

The Islamist movement in Algeria has a long history and is heterogeneous in form. It first publicly appeared in the 1940s in the Association of Ulema, a group led by Ibn Badis. Mohamed Bashir El Ibrahim and Fodhil El Wartilani introduced the Muslim Brotherhood's teachings through the group. The mid twentieth century saw several offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism taking root around the region, with a Brotherhood branch established in Algiers in 1953. Social circles, madrassas,²¹³ and mosques spread the Brotherhood's message, with religious lectures regularly given by noted sheikhs Ibrahim, Tebessi, El Madani and Sahnoun. The war of independence "1954-1962" forced the Algerian chapter of the Brotherhood to suspend its operations. Following independence, the Brotherhood resumed its activities and sheikhs Sahnoun and Arbaoui would become the leading figures of the Algerian Islamist movement.

After independence, several veterans of the Ulema Association – dissolved in 1962 – criticized the Marxist direction taken by the ruling party and a cold war broke out between Ben Bella's regime and some religious personalities after the publication of a letter addressed to Ben Bella²¹⁴.

Following this letter, Sheikh El Ibrahim was placed under house arrest. Hoping to thwart the Islamists, Algeria's ruling FLN party advocated for the concept of "Islamic socialism," which amounted to a "policy of reconciling reinterpreted Islamic principles, with the official, modernist and secular options."²¹⁵ By seeking to address both the "masses" in the language of social populism and the "community of believers" in the language of traditional Islam, President Ben Bella tried to reconcile modernity and traditionalism. Ben Bella united the figure of the Mehdi "guardian of the faith", representative of the Ummah, with that of the charismatic leader, the patron of change and society's advancement²¹⁶. Yet, the call did not convince everyone and an association called El Qiyam El Islamiya

²¹³ Notably in the Nadi el Yarak "The Circle of Progress" led by the Wahhabi Tayyeb El Okbi.

²¹⁴ It is in this atmosphere that the successor of Ibn Badis, Sheikh El Ibrahim, wrote a letter to Ben Bella explaining: "Our country is slipping more and more towards an inexplicable civil war, an unprecedented moral crisis and insurmountable economic difficulties. The rulers do not seem to realize that our people aspire above all to unity, peace, prosperity, and that the theoretical foundations of their action must be drawn not from foreign doctrines but from our Arab-Islamic roots. The time has come to revalue the so overused term "fraternity" and to return to the principle of consultation so dear to the Prophet. The time has come to call all the children of Algeria to build together a city of justice and freedom, a city where God will have his place." In : Boudjenoun Messaoud, *Les années fastes et néfastes de l'islamisme algérien*, Alger : Autoédition, 2000, 123 p

²¹⁵ Lamchichi Abderrahim, *L'islamisme en Algérie*, Paris : L'Harmattan, 1992, p. 67.

²¹⁶ Leca J., Vatin J.C, *L'Algérie politique. Institutions et régimes*, Paris : Presses de la fondation nationale de Sciences politiques, 1975, p. 313.

"Islamic Values" – was created in 1963²¹⁷, based on the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. It called for defense of the "Islamic values threatened by a century and a half of colonialism." The association published a magazine called *Majelet El Tahdib El Islami* "Islamic Education Review". It designed a series of lectures to preach "God's commandments" and organized trips to historical sites to inculcate in students the greatness of the Muslim civilization. El Qiyam El Islamiya and the regimes of Ben Bella and his successor Boumediene were able to coexist until El Qiyam's "radicalization." In 1965, the group started to argue that: "any political party or any regime that is not based on Islam, is illegal and dangerous. A communist party, a secular party, a socialist-Marxist party, a nationalist party cannot exist in the land of Islam."²¹⁸

As a result, the association was banned in 1966 after having sent a telegram to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser urging him to postpone the execution of Sayyid Qutb. El Qiyam El Islamiya was officially dissolved by prefectural decree in 1970.

It should be noted that El Qiyam El Islamiya was critically important for the emerging Islamist movement. It prepared the ground for future Islamist groups in a number of ways, including by imposing the revival of religious education in schools; maintaining the pressure for the "Arabization" of education and the administration; confronting the "Berberists;" and challenging social norms through its "Islamic Police." These tactics enabled El Qiyam to open the door for the next chapter of radical Islamism in Algeria.

The dissolution of El Qiyam allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to come to the fore. Unlike its predecessors, the Brotherhood was able to build the necessary infrastructure for the spread of its ideology. Indeed, it took advantage of the democratization of education, and therefore the policy of Arabization. It also assisted Syrian and Egyptian teachers who were brought by the Algerian government in the late 1960s and early 1970s to supposedly teach Arabic. The majority of these teachers were in fact Islamists, whom Nasser wanted to get rid of. They had neither the necessary training nor teaching skills for the schools they were brought to. As explained by Ulrich Menedoht: "It cannot be said that their teaching of the Arabic language was of a good quality. On the other hand, it should be said that they succeeded in spreading Islamist ideas through Algerian schools and universities, for they conceived their task of teaching rather as a mission of proselytism." Most Brotherhood activists and sympathizers would join the ranks of the radical Islamic Salvation Front "FIS" once legalized.

In 1974, Sheikh Abdellatif Soltani published the first manifesto of the Algerian Islamic movement *El Mazdakia Hiya El Ichtirakiyya* "Mazdakism is at the Origin of Socialism" in which he labels President Boumediene as an "impious" leader and compares him to Mazdaq, a Persian chief of a libertine sect²¹⁹. Soltani also attacked Algerian intellectuals such as Fadhila M'rabet for her work entitled *The Algerian Woman* and

²¹⁷ created by El Hachemi Tidjani, Sheikh Abdellatif Soltani, Mesbah Houidek and Mohamed Sahnoun.

²¹⁸ Leca J., Vatin J.C, *L'Algérie politique. Institutions et régimes*, Paris : Presses de la fondation nationale de Sciences politiques, 1975, p. 308.

²¹⁹ Harbi Mohammed, *L'islamisme dans tous ses états*, Paris : Arcantère, 1991, p. 135-148.

Kateb Yacine for his writings and humor. Finally, Soltani called for a clear uprising in a manifesto entitled *Siham El Islam* "The Arrows of Islam".

In the 1970s, the Islamists infiltrated the university system thanks to the advisory councils of mosque-affiliated universities and concentrated their efforts on indoctrinating students. In 1976, the conflict between Boumediene's regime and the Islamists reached its apex after the publication of an Islamist pamphlet entitled "Where are you Going Boumediene?" that opposed the 1976 constitution. Most landowners and wealthy traders were against the constitution that threatened their interests. As a result, they supported the Islamists in their fight against the regime in exchange for substantial material and financial help.

Hoping to thwart the Berber movement, the regime manipulated and used the Islamists by initiating a program of top-down Islamization. In 1979, pig breeding was prohibited for Muslims as well as the sale of alcohol. In 1980, a decree requested the Ministry of Religious Affairs to intensify its work in order to make Islam more accessible to people while also promoting the principles and benefits of the socialist regime. Religious education was introduced in secondary schools. The conflict reached its apex in 1982 during a demonstration at the University of Ben Aknoun where fights broke out between secular youth and Islamists. A young Berber activist, Kamel Amzal, was killed by an Islamist mob as a result. That same year, Abassi Madani and A. Soltani, as well as Sheikh Sahnoun, organized a meeting at the University of Algiers. Nearly 10,000 people gathered and called for the "fight against the dissolution of Islamic morals and values" and signed the "Charter of the Islamic State." As a result, the regime jailed the movement's leaders as well as hundreds of militants, while the radical wing of the movement decided to take up arms. Thus, the MIA "Armed Islamic Movement" headed by Mostapha Bouyali ²²⁰ was born.

With the help of several Algerian veterans of the Soviet Afghanistan war, Bouyali formed his first armed division. The MIA took action on the 7th and 8th of November 1982 by stealing nearly 160 kilograms of explosives in the Cap Djanet quarry. On November 17th 1982, Bouyali and his group attacked a gendarmerie checkpoint in Moncada "Ben-Aknoun" in Algiers. After the failure of a peaceful settlement to the conflict between Bouyali and the security forces, Bouyali's brother was shot during a security forces operation. The MIA intensified its large-scale operations until Bouyali's death in 1987. His deputies subsequently died or were imprisoned.

The riots of October 5th 1988 leading to a period known as *El Infitah* breathed a new life into the Islamist movement in Algeria. During this time, Algeria moved from a one-party system to a multiparty system. Various parties were created, which included the radical Islamic Salvation Front "FIS" with its leader Abassi Madani and second

²²⁰ He was a former mujahid during the war of independence against the French and a fighter in the National Liberation Front "FLN". In the late 1970s, he set up a mosque committee in the region of El Achour "southwest of Algiers". At this moment that he was approached by Doudi Mohamed, called Abdelhadi, a young imam of the mosque of El Achour and a good orator. Bouyali was attracted by the talents of the young Imam, by his Islamist theses and especially by his harsh criticisms of the regime. After the departure of Abdelhadi for France in 1980, Bouyali became the imam of the El Achour mosque and used it to spread his radical ideas.

in command, Ali Belhadj. The FIS was legalized in October 1989, and had two main promotional magazines *El Munkid* "The Savior" and *El Furkan* "The Quran".

The FIS was run by the *Madjliss El Choura* "Advisory Council". There were many factions within the *madjliss*: the main one being that of the *jihadiyounes* "partisans of immediate jihad" who further split into two groups, the *bouyalistes* "supporters of Bouyali" and the *takfiristes* "Takfir wa el hidja or excommunication and exile". The second faction was that of the *Djaz'ara* "Algerianists", and the third, that of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Ali Belhadj most clearly explained the FIS project as follows: "We will subdue them with the word of the just ... We do not underestimate the value of weapons. The unholy power and the unbelievers are not worthy to be killed by bullets, for during the war of liberation they slaughtered the traitors and did not shoot them."²²¹

Unlike the other existing parties, the FIS was capable of capturing and instrumentalizing the people's hatred and disgust for their leaders. The FIS validated the suffering and disenchantment felt by a segment of the population and there by captivated them with their bewitching "Islamic difference" and their vision of a utopian city.

Following the overwhelming victory of the radical Islamic Salvation Front in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991, the electoral process was interrupted in January 1992, and the front's extremist wing launched the first calls for jihad. In the years that followed, Algeria witnessed the birth of a plethora of jihadist groups, the most prominent being the Islamic Armed Group "GIA", which called for a fight against the "impious state" and for the establishment of an Islamic state. The civil war and its horrors, bombings, and mass killings lasted a decade. This period came to be called the "black decade," during which some 150,000 people died, 7,000 disappeared and around \$20 billion of destruction was caused.

Distance From the Violence and the Musharaka Strategy: The Case Of The MSP²²²

Since 1995, most Islamist parties have sought to distance themselves from the radical Islamist movements of the "Black decade," especially the FIS. They have since adopted a strategy of political participation. They have actively tried and succeeded in reintegrating into the political arena and have since been visible actors of the Algerian political scene.

The best example is the Movement for Society and Peace "MSP" that has since its inception in 1989 preferred rapprochement to the revolutionary approach of the FIS. The MSP abandoned both its Muslim Brotherhood etiquette and initial goal of establishing an Islamic state. The party has been advocating for a three-pronged strategy: *itidal* "moderation", *musharaka* "participation", and *marhaliya* "gradualism". When the

²²¹ Quoted by Boukra Liess, *Algérie, la terreur sacrée. Avant les 3 500 morts du 11 septembre 2001, 100 000 victimes algériennes de l'islamisme*, Paris : Favre, 2002, p. 102.

²²² This study is based on a previous study that the authors had done for Carnegie on the same topic. The article is available here: <http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/04/14/future-of-algeria-s-main-islamist-party-pub-59769>

electoral process was interrupted in 1992, the MSP continued its rapprochement with the regime and actively denounced the violence of the FIS. The MSP backed the creation of the National Transitional Council, which had legislative power in the absence of an elected parliament. The MSP paid a hefty price for this stance as several of its members "i.e. Sheikh Mohamed Bouslimani" were killed by the Armed Islamic Group "GIA", the most prominent jihadist group in Algeria, which violently opposed any negotiations with the regime.

The MSP responded to the state's call for restarting the democratic process and the party presented a candidate to the presidential elections. Nahnah finished in second place. In 1999, despite an administrative manoeuvre by the regime to dismiss Nahnah as a candidate, he decided to rally behind the consensus candidate of Abdelaziz Bouteflika regardless of criticism from his camp. In addition, the MSP backed the reconciliation policies initiated by the state that aimed to end Algeria's civil war. The MSP stood by the regime in their rejection of the Sant'Egidio process, in which opposition parties attempted to put an end to the internal infighting. As an alternative, the party supported the state and the Civil Concord Law²²³ process, which Zeroual initiated in 1995. The party also supported Bouteflika's referendum in 1999 to back that legal process. As a result of its musharaka strategy, the MSP became the main Islamist party in Algeria. It was able to join several coalition governments and obtained parliamentary seats as well as ministerial portfolios.

El Musharaka: At What Cost?

The MSP's participation in Algerian politics allowed the party to create a niche for itself as an Islamist party that takes part in the decision-making process and acts as an important player in the Algerian political scene. This strategy of participating in the political process allowed the party to attain a higher degree of professionalization. Its activists learned politics and became government officials who are now more knowledgeable about l'exercice du pouvoir and the management of the state than they were two decades ago. This participation strategy allowed also for a better socialization of its members who were able to forge new political partnerships.

Nevertheless, the MSP seems to have reached a political dead-end, with participation leading to co-optation by the regime. This started as early as 1992 when the radical FIS was banned. Aware of the importance of Islam in Algerian society, the regime needed to show them that Islamist parties still had a role to play in politics. The MSP was an ideal candidate for this as it agreed to participate in the political process while the FIS chose to work against it. In return for this participation, the regime gave the MSP ministerial positions, parliamentary seats, and the prospect of sharing in oil revenue, which brought substantial benefits and privileges, including significant monthly salaries for parliamentarians, a percentage of which go to the party.

For the MSP, this participation came to mean co-optation. While at the beginning,

²²³ This initiative allowed jihadists who were not guilty of murder or rape to avoid prosecution by turning themselves in and being reintegrated in society.

many saw the MSP as a replacement for the FIS, they ended up totally disillusioned and disappointed with the party's strategy. Today in Algeria, the MSP is seen by former FIS voters and other would-be supporters as the "regime's party," meaning a tool of the state and not a real opposition party or a serious challenger. This pragmatic political participation approach led the party to be more interested in state governance issues "i.e. economic liberalization, fighting corruption, constitutional changes, and so on" than in the everyday problems of voters. As a result, the party lost its capacity to mobilize. As explained by a former MSP sympathizer in Algiers in 2015 to the author:

They are all the same. All what they care about is their own interests and their wealth. They don't care about us, about the people, about our problems. They are as corrupted as the regime that they are supposedly fighting "... they are all the same.

Other byproducts of the MSP's political participation hindered its capacity to mobilize. These included internecine disputes and other ideological and personal disagreements²²⁴. In 2004, the MSP's then-president Aboujerra Soltani decided to back Bouteflika's candidacy. This had a terrible impact on the party. Several sympathizers and members left the party and smaller offshoot parties emerged. Another crisis would shake the MSP in 2008 when an intense dispute arose between Soltani and the party's second-in-command, Abdelmadjid Menasra. The latter accused Soltani of sidelining party members who disagreed with him and of making major concessions to the government without consulting party activists. Indeed, 40 party members who supported Menasra were expelled from the MSP that same year during the fourth party congress during which Soltani was elected to a second term. Soltani also supported the extension of Bouteflika's presidential term and a constitutional amendment lifting a two-term limit on the presidency. Consequently, Menasra left the party and formed his own party called the Movement for Preaching and Change "MPC". Several MSP members, presidents of local assemblies, delegate mayors, and members of parliament and local councils joined the MPC. As a consequence of this exodus, the MSP has been weakened and it has to fight its new opponent for popular support.

Ideological changes within the MSP have also contributed to its declining popularity. The party seems to have understood that for a variety of reasons the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria is not possible. They internalized the "political impasse."²²⁵ To justify this change, the MSP claims that Algeria itself already honors the precepts of

²²⁴ It should be noted that this is not only the case for the MSP. Several other Islamist groups have been plagued by divides, conflicts, and disputes. The Ennahda Party for instance, formed in 1989 and inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, was severely fractured in 1995 by infighting between Lahbib Adami, a party leader who called for dialogue with the government, and Abdallah Djaballah, a party founder and fervent regime opponent. Djaballah was overthrown and replaced by Adami. The latter changed the name of the party to Ennahda and the party began collaborating with the government and finally entered the corridors of power. Djaballah then created his own party called El Islah, from which, once again, he would be overthrown and replaced by Djahid Younsi. For the third time, Djaballah created another party in 2012 called the Front for Justice and Development "FJD, or El Adala", which espouses an Islamist-reformist line. Other Islamist parties were created as a result of these splits and infightings. These include the Rally of Algerian Hope "TAJ" that was created by MSP's defector and Minister of Public Works Amar Ghoul in 2012 and the National Building Movement "MEN, or El Binaa" formed by Mustapha Belmehdi, formerly a member of the MPC "renamed the Front for Change in April 2011", who split off to lead the National Building Movement in March 2013.

²²⁵ Roy. Le post-islamisme. In: *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée*, N°85-86, 1999. pp. 11-30.

Islam. As the first sentence of the preamble to the party's political platform reads: "Algeria is the land of Islam and one of the countries of the Great Arab Maghreb. It belongs to the Arab and Muslim world." Many saw this "Algerianization" and nationalization of the MSP's discourse that was supposed to be the Muslim Brotherhood's representative in Algeria as an abandonment of the central ideas set forth by Nahnah.

These factors combined to produce the setbacks the MSP suffered in the legislative elections of May 2012, in which it secured 48 seats out of 462, and in November 2012 local elections, in which the party won only ten of 1,541 municipalities. More recently, in the May 2017 legislative elections, the MSP scored poorly with 33 seats out of 462.

Towards a dead-end

The MSP seems to have reached a dead-end, becoming a tool of Algeria's hybrid regime that attempts to present itself as democratic and inclusive of Islamist parties. The party's frequent criticisms and diatribes against the government are an attempt to preserve its capacity "if any remains" to mobilize its base against the regime. The MSP is not a true challenge to the regime. Rather, by criticizing the government and demanding a change in direction – yet stopping short of calling for regime change – it provides critical support to the ruling party. Far from breaking with the regime, these criticisms are meant to cast the MSP as a challenger in the eyes of the party's base. Through their oppositional discourse, they aim to remind the popular classes and more modest electorate that they are on their side. By opposing the government and some of its decisions, the MSP hopes to show these classes the supposed distance between them and the government, especially when it makes decisions seen as against the interests of their social base and partisan structure.

Its participation strategy allowed the MSP to access ministerial portfolios, yet the sensitive ministries of Education, Justice, Interior, and Foreign Affairs remain far from their reach. Hence, they do not carry as much sway as they would like in government policy. In this sense, the MSP is more useful to the government than the other way around. Indeed, the MSP serves as a symbolic justification for the regime, allowing it to claim that it is more democratic and inclusive.

After more than twenty years in the corridors of power, it seems difficult for the MSP to break its relationship with *le pouvoir* and become a true opposition party. Indeed, the party has undergone a sort of *embourgeoisement* "gentrification". Its officials have become habituated to the benefits and privileges of power, and they will be reluctant to give them up. The MSP has become so tied to the regime, tamed, and co-opted that it cannot serve in any way as a real challenger or counterweight to Algeria's ruling authority. In other words, their strategy of participation and their alliances in coalition government diluted their oppositional identity. The MSP became an oppositional party, but at the cost of any real influence it might have had.

Study 2

The Many Facets of Political Islam's Struggle in Kuwait

Mubarak Algeri

Introduction

This paper seeks to analyze the most important reasons for the political struggle among the components of political Islam "the Sunni component with its offshoots, and the Shia component with its diversity" in the country of Kuwait, by looking at the essence of this struggle and its main trajectories. The nature of the political regime, and the method of governance defined by the constitution of Kuwait are two important bases that form an important entryway to understanding the nature of the political conflicts between the political trends on the one hand, and the ruling authority as a party to this conflict on the other hand.²²⁶ The political conflict in Kuwait is multifaceted, and has many layers. This is what we want to show in this paper, by discussing the landscape of political interactions, and their role in the change in the conflict's status.

Preface

The political conflict in Kuwait has many facets, but it does not include a conflict over who should rule "Article 4 of the Kuwaiti constitution". Rather, it is focused on the manner of governance and its outputs "Article 6 of the Kuwaiti constitution". In other words, the conflict, whether political or social, is centered on the question of the citizens' rights to steer governance. Whenever the governing authority is concerned with public rights and freedoms, this helps in successfully managing the conflict between the governing authority and the political and social components. The opposite is also true. The nature of the conflict is determined by the extent to which real democracy is present in Kuwait.

The Islamic political movements are a part of the aforementioned political conflict, but there is still a controversial relationship between one faction of these movements, the Sunni political component "the Muslim Brotherhood and political Salafism", and the issue of democracy, which is one of the main axes of the political conflict. This relationship can be considered a major facet of the conflict over governance in Kuwait. Traditional Salafism still rejects the term "democracy," which it considers to be forbidden by Islamic Sharia, and therefore not a permissible basis for government.

As for the other political Salafist groups, which broke off from traditional Salafism, and Hadas or the Islamic Constitutional Movement "the Muslim Brotherhood", they believe that democracy must not conflict with Islamic Sharia.²²⁷ Therefore, the effort to

²²⁶ Article 4 of the Kuwaiti constitution states that Kuwait is a hereditary emirate, held in succession by the descendants of Mubarak Al-Sabah. Article 6 states that Kuwait's system of governance is democratic, that sovereignty is vested in the people as the source of all authority, and that the exercise of this authority shall be as pronounced in this constitution.

²²⁷ Emad, Abdulghani. "The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait." Islamic Movements in the Arab World. Supervised by

find a balance between democracy and Islamic Sharia is part of these groups' efforts to renounce previous extreme positions. This discussion around democracy and Sharia has deepened following the rise of political Islam that the Arab world witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco after the Arab Spring revolutions, and these renunciations have plunged Sunni political Islam into internal and external conflicts.

The history of the conflict between the ruling authority and the trends of political Islam in Kuwait has not been bloody, unlike the case in some Arab countries "Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria". Similarly, the history of the formation of political Islam in Kuwait did not include any crisis for survival. On the contrary, the birth of these movements was stable and the political impediments were limited, and did not prevent them from political participation in parliament, or from being involved in forming successive governments. In addition, some of these movements gained importance in the Kuwaiti economy, and exert a strong influence on culture and education.

Those who follow the political history of Kuwait note that the start of the rise of political Islam occurred with the support of the Kuwaiti government. The Muslim Brotherhood witnessed a noticeable rise after the 1967 defeat. This is confirmed by Dr. Falah Al-Muderis when he says, "The rupture experienced by the movement in Kuwait led to the strong emergence of religious organizations. At the same time, they were active in organizing their ranks and broadening their appeal. They received official acceptance from the political authorities, which, in the religious trend, had found what they were looking for in order to enter the battle to settle their accounts with the leftist and nationalist forces."²²⁸

From the end of the 1960's until the start of the 1980's, the Muslim Brotherhood stood alone in the political field, in the absence of other Islamic trends. Therefore, this movement was able to form a strong social and political base, which made it difficult for the government to control the increase in the Muslim Brotherhood's size in Kuwait. This led the government to support the Salafi trend in its modern form, and to establish the Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage in 1981, with the goal of confronting the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood.²²⁹

1. Towards an Understanding of the Nature of the Political Conflict

There are three important entry points through which one can understand the nature of the conflict between the Islamic political movements in Kuwait and other political trends.

First: The Nature of the Regime and the Form of Governance

The regime in Kuwait is hereditary, but the governance is democratic and sovereignty lies with the people, as described in Articles 4 and 6 of the Kuwaiti constitution, as previously mentioned. These two articles define the shape of the political conflict with the other political trends and forces, including the Islamic political movements. The conflict

Abdulghani Emad. 1st ed., Beirut: The Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2013, pp. 518.

²²⁸ Al-Muderis, Falah. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. 2nd ed., Kuwait: Dar Qurtas Publishing, 1999, pp. 30.

²²⁹ Haidar, Khalil. "The Islamic Movements in Kuwait." The Islamic Movements in the Arab World. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 2232-2233.

is not a fight for existence, nor is it over sovereignty or stability. Whenever the conflict becomes violent it is met with legal, cultural, and societal rejection. The most important issues in the conflict in Kuwait are political reform, elected government, political interests, parliamentary representation, and the formation of the government.

Second: The Social Culture

The political conflicts in Kuwait did not produce any societal clashes or civil wars. On the contrary, at times the societal culture built on communication between the groups in Kuwaiti society forms a calming mechanism and a way to contain political conflicts. It can be said that the societal culture contributes in a primary way to the rationalization of political conflicts, whether conflicts that occur between the political authority and a political trend, or those that occur among the political trends themselves. In most cases, political differences do not lead to social break-up and, if they do, it is a rare occurrence.

Third: The Map of Islamic Political Movements

Political Islam in Kuwait is not uniform, rather, it is divided into two types:²³⁰

Sunni Political Islam	Shia Political Islam
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hadas "The Islamic Constitutional Movement" 2. Political Salafism, which is divided into: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. The Salafi Alliance. b. The Salafi Movement. c. Al-Ummah Party. d. The National Constants Alliance. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The National Islamic Alliance "The Social Cultural Association". 2. The Justice and Peace Alliance "The Shirazi Group". 3. The National Pact Alliance "Dar Al-Zahra". 4. The Humanitarian Message Alliance "Hasawi Shia". 5. The Islamic National Accord Movement.

It is clear from the table above that there is a significant degree of diversity in the political Islam groups in Kuwait, in both ideology and doctrine. This diversity carries with it a pivotal conflict among these groups themselves. It cannot be ignored or overcome, since it is no less important than the conflict between political Islam and the "other" "meaning the political authorities and the non-Islamic forces and political trends, etc.".

²³⁰ For the details of the formation of the Islamic movements, see: Haidar, Khalil Ali. "The Islamic Movements in Kuwait." Ibid., and Al-Muderis, Falah. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. Ibid.

2. The Facets of the Conflict of Political Islam

Reviewing the history of political Islam in Kuwait helps in identifying and explaining the most important facets of the conflict, which can take the following forms:

First: The internal conflict "among political Islam groups", meaning conflict and disagreement among the political Islam groups, which can be divided into:

A. The Conflict withinin Sunni Political Islam:

There is a historical conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, in its different branches and groups. This conflict began in the 1980's and continues to this day. Naturally, the reasons for the conflict change, and are not fixed. However, the conflict itself is the constant. The main cause of this conflict is political and ideological differences regarding democracy.²³¹ Likewise, the conflict between these two entities revolves around authority, or the proximity or distance from authority. An example of this is the political discourse during the parliamentary elections and government formation.

Also, one can observe indications of conflict within a single entity. Political Salafism has splintered into multiple Salafisms, with bad blood among the different factions. Perhaps the most important indicator illustrating the magnitude of the conflict is their positions on reform issues, the issue of an elected prime minister, and the percentage of parliamentary representation.²³² Also, their differing positions on the Arab revolutionary movements and the political movement in Kuwait increased the divisions further.

As for Hadas "the Islamic Constitutional Movement", its situation is different because the internal conflict is not visible, but it can be understood through the roles of the members and leadership of this group. This is especially true in relation to the election of the general secretary, and the voting on a given political position "the decision to participate in the parliament and the ideological and political dispute among the members of the group". The internal dispute, in its different facets, could, in the future, lead to the formation of Islamic or political movements that have broken off from Hadas "the Islamic Constitutional Movement".²³³

B. The Conflict within Shia Political Islam:

The conflict among the Shia political movements in Kuwait is smaller in size than the conflict among the Sunni Islamic groups "the Salafi-Muslim Brotherhood conflict". Often, the differences are among Shia religious authorities, or Marjas "Khamenei, Al-Ihqaqi, Al-Shirazi, and Mohammad Fadlallah", which could be the main reason for the conflict between the Shia political trends in the political arena "the parliament and the formation of the government".

²³¹ Emad, Abdulghani. "The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait." *Islamic Movements in the Arab World*. Ibid. pp. 526.

²³² See Mohammad Eid's study, "The Salafi Trend in Kuwait: The Reality and the Future." Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, May 2012. <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2012/05/201252912302826133.html>.

²³³ Tariq Al-Mutairi, one of the founders of the Civil Democratic Movement in Kuwait and its former general secretary, resigned from Hadas "the Islamic Constitutional Movement" in 2010.

C. The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Political Islam

The conflict between the Sunni and Shia political movements is self-evident in the Kuwaiti political landscape. It takes a doctrinal or sectarian form, and is a long, historical conflict. We do not want to discuss it in detail.

Second: The external conflict, or the political conflict with political Islam movements "Sunni movements in particular". This can be understood at several different levels, as follows:

1. The Intellectual Level: This is represented in the conflict with the liberal and leftist trends.

It is an ideological conflict, focused primarily on differences around the issues of freedoms, the nature of the state, and the position of Islamic Sharia in relation to the constitution – should Sharia be a primary source for the constitution, or the primary source? This conflict is still ongoing, and forms an important part of Sunni political Islam's discourse, and an important part of liberal discourse. Ideological differences drive the conflict among these trends.

2. The Social Level: The Conflict with the Tribe

While the tribes in Kuwait cannot be considered political trends, they are an important and fundamental part of the map of political interactions in Kuwait. Each tribe has its representatives in the Kuwaiti parliament. At times, these representatives constitute half of the 50-seat Kuwaiti parliament. Also, Kuwait's tribes are involved in forming the government. There is sometimes conflict between the political Islam trends and the tribes in the parliamentary elections and in parliamentary representation, to say nothing of the members of tribes who are also members of Islamic trends, particularly those who are members of parliament. The tribes could pressure these members regarding their political positions on interrogations, for example. Some tribes are very sensitive towards the issue of some of their members' relationships to Islamic trends, but this conflict is not severe, and can be contained at times.

3. The Political Level: The Conflict with the Authority "The government and the governing elite"

There are several historical examples of this type of conflict, but we will focus on the time period following the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions, their effect on the most prominent political Islam entities in Kuwait, and their relation to the conflict.

The conflict with Hadas "the Islamic Constitutional Movement": This conflict began with the rise of political Islam in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. This rise had an effect on the aspirations of Hadas, as the issue of elected government became an important part of its political discourse, moreso than before. However, it is important to note that this issue was included in Hadas's political literature several years before the Arab Spring revolutions.²³⁴

²³⁴ See Mubarak Al-Jeri's study "The Islamic Movements in Kuwait after the Arab Spring: Hadas as an Example." Doha: Al

From 2011 until 2015, Hadas faced a conflict in which the state became indirectly involved, by way of the media, political trends, and politicians. This conflict resulted from Hadas's position in support of the Islamic ascent, which was interpreted as: Hadas works in accordance with external agendas that could affect the country's stability.

In April 2012, the group entered a difficult phase, after it opposed the decree of necessity that changed voting from five constituencies and four votes to voters only casting a single vote. The group considered this decree of necessity to be meddling with the Kuwaiti constitution in order to elevate the individual approach.

In this political stage, the group boycotted the National Assembly, and participated in the popular movement Karamat Watan "the Dignity of a Nation". Here, the conflict reached its apex, and the group, like the political opposition, faced many political pressures. After the 2013 parliament was dissolved in October 2016, the group moved to a new stage, deciding to participate in the 2016 elections. After having boycotted two sessions, it was able to gain four seats in the Kuwaiti parliament. In this way, the conflict moved inside the parliament, when it had been outside of the parliament. In a statement, Hadas explained the reasons for its participation, and why it ended its boycott. The most important reasons include the issues of revoking citizenship, the state's economic policies, and the rebalancing of the National Assembly's relationship to the government.²³⁵

The conflict did not end with Hadas's participation, rather, it is still ongoing. Some of the political trends, and parts of Kuwaiti society, are engaged in it, especially some of the youth in the popular movement who feel that Hadas abandoned the principles for which it boycotted the National Assembly in the first place. On the other hand, there is another part of society that supports Hadas's decision to participate, because it adopted a solution for the problem of withdrawing citizenship, amending the citizenship law, and changing the government's economic policies "the most important of these changes are reducing government debt and raising the cost of oil".

The summary of these conflicts: Despite the decline of political Islam in the region, and the Arab political and media movement to demonize the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group, the politics of the state in Kuwait were not influenced by this. Kuwait did not enter into a violent conflict with Hadas. Perhaps this policy, along with the damage to its political interests, was the most important reason for Hadas's political transformation, and its movement towards political normalization, with its participation in the Kuwaiti parliament.²³⁶

Conclusion

It is not possible to understand the Islamic political movements in Kuwait without understanding the history of this political entity or its historical context. Through this, one can observe its most important transformations. The conflict with political Islam in Kuwait, which we discussed in this paper, has a special character, and is different from the experiences of other Arab nations. It is one of the most important factors in the political Islamic movements' political and ideological transformations.

Jazeera Center for Studies, September 2016. <http://bit.ly/2BwSIxZ> Accessed on May 2017.

²³⁵ Hadas "Islamic Constitutional Movement", "Statement on the Upcoming Parliamentary Elections." 26 May 2016. <http://bit.ly/2EscsBM>

²³⁶ See: Al-Jeri, Mubarak. "The Islamic Trends in Kuwait after the Arab Spring." Ibid.

However, there are issues that are shared with the conflicts and challenges of political Islam in other Arab countries: 1" The conflict over power, influence, and size; 2" the conflict with secular forces, and its political and ideological ramifications; 3" the conflict between political Islam and jihadist Islam; and 4" the conflict between Western countries and political Islam.

There is also a set of internal reforms that have become an important factor in the makeup of internal political Islam. The most important of these are the division between proselytizing and politics, and the transformation into a civil political party. The Arab revolutions, and the resulting rise and retreat of some of the Islamic movements, especially the Tunisian Ennahda Movement and the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party, are some of the most important reasons for these reforms and transformations.

Chapter Five

Moving Towards Division: A Case Study of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

Introduction

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan – along with the Islamic Action Front "IAF", which represents the organisation in partisan life, has undergone a massive transformation in the past two decades, in terms of its relationship to the government and the tensions and internal crises that have emerged through the evolution of intellectual, organisational, and personal disputes, which led to successive splits. This resulted in the formation of three separate political parties in the last twenty years "two parties have been created in the past few years",²³⁷ in addition to another organization that carries the Muslim Brotherhood name, which has become officially recognized while the original Muslim Brotherhood lost its legal status and property to the new organisation, which enjoys support from the government and official state institutions.²³⁸

Today we have two groups that call themselves the Muslim Brotherhood, the first of which is not legally recognized, but is very popular and controls the IAF, which has a full political role and participates in parliamentary elections separately "as in 2016." The second group is not hugely popular but has officially taken the name of the Muslim Brotherhood, and supports the Zamzam Party in political life.

At the level of political parties, there is the IAF, which performed strongly in the 2016 elections and gained a number of seats. They also participated in the 2017 municipal elections and achieved the best overall party results. There is also the Islamist Centrist Party, founded in 2001, which suffers from numerous substantive and structural problems. Finally, there is the Zamzam Party, while the Partnership and Rescue Party is still in the process of formation.

The new parties "Zamzam and Partnership and Rescue" have presented an ideological discourse that goes beyond the traditional arguments of Political Islam and implicitly announced the launch of a "post-Political Islam" stage through their statements

²³⁷ The Islamist Centrist Party was officially announced in 2001, and consists of a solid nucleus of Brotherhood leaders who split from the organization after its boycott of elections in 1997. The Zamzam Party was announced last year by former Brotherhood leaders who had previously announced a new initiative called the Zamzam initiative "named after the hotel where the preparatory meeting was held." The creators of this initiative were also leaders of the Constitutional Monarchy Initiative, which was rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring. Another wing of the Islamic movement called the Partnership and Rescue Party was announced, though it is still under incorporation and is not yet formally recognized by the government.

²³⁸ The establishment of the new organization carrying the Muslim Brotherhood name, or the so-called correction of the organization's legal status, was announced in 2015, under the leadership of previous Controller General Mohammed al-Majid Thanibaat, who took the same position in the new organisation. In turn, the group separated itself from him and everyone else in the new framework. See: Mohammed Abu Rumman: "The Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, End of Circular Conflict and the Beginning of Political Floating," the Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, June 16, 2016 . URL: <http://bit.ly/2Bof05h>

and positions. They refrained from using the term "Islamist party" itself, included personalities from outside of the Islamist trend, and worked to offer political visions compatible with other parties of the state and develop its discourse on the civil state, democracy, political participation, the position of minorities, and public and individual freedoms.

On the other hand, the original Muslim Brotherhood went through similar processes of amendments and developments to its internal organisations and political discourse. Leaders in these movements began to talk of separation between religion and politics. The new statute of the original Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan ends its relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which in practice means growing separation and independence of a local Brotherhood from its parent organisation in Egypt.²³⁹

In this section, we will present four research papers that bring us closer to the current contradictions between Jordanian Islamists, especially between the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF on one hand, and the new parties on the other. Zaki Beni Arsheed, a prominent leader in the Jordanian Brotherhood and IAF, who is considered to be the engineer of the transformations that have occurred in recent years, offers the Brotherhood's vision of the required revisions as well as the future. Dr. Nabil al-Kaoufhi, a former leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, and later a founder of the Zamzam party, provides a paper that offers the rationale for founding the Zamzam Party, the changes it has made to the ideological platform, and its vision for the required role. Gheith al-Qada', who was formerly responsible for the youth agency of the IAF and later founded the Partnership and Rescue party offers his vision of the Brotherhood crisis and prospects for the future. Finally, Dr. Neven Bondokji, a researcher in Islamic Movements, writes about the differences and discussions among Islamists, and the methodological framework through which we understand the Brotherhood's interaction with the regime on one hand, and internal crises on the other.

²³⁹ See: The Muslim Brothers of Jordan terminate their organizational link the "Brotherhood" in Egypt, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 2/14/2016. URL: <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=481919> See also: Mohammed Abu Rumman, The Brotherhood of Jordan and the Pragmatic Path, Qatar's Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 8/10/2017.

Study 1

The Muslim Brotherhood: A Situation Assessment and Future Outlook

Zaki Bani Irsheid

If the law of challenge and response is considered one of the most significant drivers of history throughout the ages, and the law of causality as laid out by Ibn Khaldoun explains the political and social scramble witnessed by the region in recent years, then it becomes important for us to understand the nature of the major changes that occurred locally, regionally, and internationally during the second decade of this century. It is also necessary to understand the mechanisms of what happened at all levels, and its impact on the situation of the Muslim Brotherhood and its future, which is the objective of this research.

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded after a series of calamities inflicted on the Islamic Ummah which resulted in the subjugation of the Arab world to the domination of foreign colonialism, fragmentation, and division. The natural response to this was the ignition of religious zeal and advocacy of the Islamic community, the unity of the Islamic world, and facing unprecedented challenges against the identity of the Ummah and its religion by orientalists and others.

Thus, the foundations of the schools of Islamic revival were set once it became clear to them that the call for modernity and modernization was not meant in the sense of development and changing methods of administration, government and educational curricula to respond to modern challenges, but rather demanding at their discretion, whether consciously or unconsciously, to eliminate the heritage and doctrine of the Ummah.

Under these circumstances, a call emerged to resume Islamic life and establish the Islamic project. The Muslim Brotherhood was started in order to achieve these goals and has gone through different political, organizational, proselytizing, and social experiences and has achieved both success and sometimes failures. Presently, some see that the inevitable movement of history is turning the page on the Muslim Brotherhood's influence on the political scene and social reality. Some also believe that the Brotherhood is declining, and is searching for the alternatives expected to fill the void left by the absence of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as for what comes after "Political Islam." Is this reading realistic and what justifies it? Or is it a false reading not based on society's norms and political science?

Before answering these questions, it is necessary to begin with logical introductions that help diagnose and assess the situation, and articulate the future.

First: The Arab Spring movement was a natural result of the Arab political

horizon, the spread of corruption, the monopoly of political power, the suppression of dissenting opinion, the violation of citizens' dignity, and violations of human rights. This was accompanied by the failure of the Nahda project and economic development as there was an expansion of poverty and deprivation and an absence of social justice. If the beginning that launched the Arab Spring was a surprise – in both time and place – the continued disregard of the state of "accumulated frustration" reflects decision makers' inability to understand the movement of history. More than one Arab president made the same utterance before they met their fate, famously saying, "Now I understand you!"

Second: The success of counter-revolutions and the return to a phase of corruption and tyranny does not mean the end of the popular will to bring change or stop the path to democratic transformation, especially given the dismal failure in the management of countries that turned against the choices of their peoples, the lack of stability or security, economic, social, cultural, and political crises. The reasons for another wave of attempts for progress and reform are only increasing.

Third: The case of the Arab spring is not limited only to regimes, but also the new climate that has penetrated all official, popular, and civilian components as living entities that are governed by the laws of causality and laws of the universe that are overwhelming to those who clash with them. The future of any movement can be predicted based on its ability to capitalize on a combination of experiences, events, variables, carrying out serious revisions, continuous evaluation, and self-criticism. The Islamic Movement, which is going through labor pains and an internal scramble, is a candidate for progress towards the future. It could perhaps see a successful internal reconciliation, reintegrate and regain its organizational cohesion, as in the case of Algeria. The movement could also witness a departure of a new regiment from the organizational framework, which is considered an additional failure by some while others see it as necessary to restore the flexibility and relevance of the movement, going into other experiences outside of the organizational incubator and perhaps forming supporters for the Islamic project on the basis of integration and distribution of roles.

Fourth: All parties of the national equation must reconsider the current situation and received tradition, not just the Islamic movement.

Fifth: It is essential that there is a serious national dialogue involving the whole country, and to establish a new social contract that keeps up with modernization, ends stagnation, and empowers the people to participate in politics and embrace peaceful rotation of power.

In light of this introduction, the future of the Muslim Brotherhood can be identified. It will be determined by the will and ability of the organisation to overcome this stage and seize the opportunities that accompany challenges or create totally new opportunities. The key is the ability for strategic planning, as the future has no room for the old, the lazy, the fools, and the dead are the ones who don't ever change their opinion, as Hemmingway pointed out in *The Old Man and the Sea*. Regarding the state of disagreement and divisions in the Islamic movement, it is not the first time of such a state for the Islamic movement, as it was preceded by the Islamic Liberation Party

and the Islamic Centrist Party. The Muslim Brotherhood has maintained the most active presence, communication, and representation of its constituents and ideology.

Sixth: Overall, most movements arising from or splitting off from their roots are unsuccessful, and this rule cannot be discounted because of exceptional cases. The political sphere is widening to include all, and the success of any one instance enhances the chances of success for the project to which we all belong.

Seventh: The IAF party in Jordan began an audit under the title "Restructuring." If the party is able to succeed in this operation, it can be considered to be the reformation of the party because it constitutes a modern and progressive approach containing a model that accounts for all variables and challenges, especially given that the amendments dealt with ideas, foundations, principles, vision, and goals.

Study 2

The Zamzam Initiative: Causes, Goals, and Prospects

Dr. Nabil al-Kofahi

Introduction

The importance of Islamist movements in the Arab world is not limited to the fact that their ideology is deeply rooted to the religion of the majority of Arab citizens, and their politics also align with an overwhelming majority of people. Not only are these movements the champions of the struggle against westernization and subordination and at the forefront of the Palestinian cause, but also revered for the moral conduct of the majority of their members.

The Islamic movement in Jordan is no less important than its counterparts in the Arab world. It has taken a constant position in the social and political scene for more than half a century, and has been present in many fields including social work, charity, and education. It has established committees for Zakat, care for orphans and the poor, schools, colleges, universities, clinics, hospitals, sporting clubs and more. They have also participated in politics through parliamentary and municipal councils in most sessions throughout the Kingdom, and has stood with the state and political regime during cases of foreign and domestic targeting. Its "soft political" presence has won the trust of the regime and many other political components in many cases.

The experiences of the Arab world are not isolated from one another, every country has affected the other somehow, whether negatively or positively. These movements are trying to learn from each other to the point of occasionally cloning one another despite differences in the countries' circumstances, systems of government, and how they deal with political trends, specifically Islamists.

The deterioration underway in the Arab world is not a result of the experiences of Islamic movements in all areas, but rather authoritarian policies and corruption that rule in the Arab world are causes of the current state of affairs. Regarding the state of destruction in the region, the current evaluation is not objective due to the contradictions and interventions in setting the scene.

1. The Term "Political Islam"

With some reservations about this term and its use in politics and media, I will use the term within its general context. The term "Political Islam" has become prominent of the western media in the past two decades in reference to Islamic movements that deal with politics. It has quickly transitioned to the language of media and politics of the Arab

world, where it is used, as with other political terms, to blindly mimic "the powerful." This term is clearly used to refer specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world.

However, this classification is not completely accurate in describing the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood as its political activity is not the only means of its presence. Perhaps it is an easy way for Arab regimes and media to attack these groups as a competitor to "the state," and sometimes even try to restrict it given the culture of these regimes' monopoly over political work and managing the state.

In the past twenty years, there has been overlap between Islamist movements that work in politics and others that practice military activities. All of them have been grouped together under one name, and this is due to the prominence of Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and then al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and later Iraq.

The rapid ascent of "armed Islamists" in the political scene, which reaffirmed their confidence in their ability to impact and expand, in my opinion, reflects poorly on movements that only work in politics. This impact became clear with the rise of al-Qaeda and its subsequent decline due to the negative and apprehensive outlook on the group both locally and globally, including by all Islamist movements. Then there was the introversion of Hezbollah after intervening in favor of the Syrian Regime rather than in favor of ending the separation between Gaza and the West Bank and the consequences of that, making both parties responsible for damaging the efforts to liberate Palestine.

2. The Jordanian Experience: Formation and Transformations of the Relationship with the Regime

It is important to return to the conditions that nurtured the Islamic Movement in Jordan in order to understand the consequences that followed as well as the changes happening to the movement. The different aspects of the relationship must also be analysed. All of this will help illustrate the potential consequences for this relationship.

The Brotherhood was founded in 1946 with official permission, received a warm welcome from society, and had a mostly positive interaction with the regime throughout the early stages. This is due to common factors such as: the regime's religious self-characterization and its harmony with the character of the religious community, unity in opposing the Zionist project, and the regional targeting of both the regime and the Brotherhood.

There were several historical turning points for the organisation "political turmoil in the 1950s and the dissolution of parties, the events of the 1970's including Black September in 1970, after which the Brotherhood proceeded to disengage itself from – all of which had a positive impact on the group's relationship with the regime and strengthened the legitimacy of the Brotherhood's social and political presence.

The relationship was then affected by several incidents that led to divergence and separation between them. These included the beginnings of the Arab Awakening and the situation in Syria, the post-peace treaty period, the Arab Spring and subsequent events.

Despite these events and their negative impact, the Brotherhood was still able to maintain its official and public presence.

The Jordanian Brotherhood's continued presence made their experience unique within the region, and it helped preclude the occurrence of social or political shocks in Jordan. The group's historical role as a factor in social stability could be evoked in most scenarios, even the most divergent ones.

Transformations of the relationship were caused by external factors at first, and later internal ones. The events in Syria from 1978-1983 and the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood had an impact on this relationship. The need for the Jordanian regime to reinvent its relationship with the Syrian regime led to suspicion and restriction of the Brotherhood in Jordan until the return to Parliamentary politics in 1989. A renewed state of tension impacted the relationship after the first Gulf War upon military defeat of Iraq, followed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 when it became clear that there was a need to silence all "anti-peace" movements and voices due to pressure from the United States and Israel. This led to the tightening of the noose on the Brotherhood politically through the One Voice Law of 1993. Thirdly, there is the Hamas' victory in Palestinian elections and the international and regional pressure resulting from its impact on the "Settlement Plan."

The Palestinian issue was one of the key causes of disagreement during this second phase. The Jordanian regime adopted "peace and negotiations" as a strategic choice to define its relationship with Israel, the US, "moderate" Arab nations, and the Palestinian Authority "PA" and its rival Hamas. The Islamist Movement, however, took on a completely different course.

Finally, there is the Arab Spring and its regional repercussions. The military coup in Egypt and the collapse of the Brotherhood experiment in Egypt had a significant impact on the increasing pressure from Egypt and GCC countries on the Jordanian State regarding its relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood. Trust was additionally rattled during the events of the Arab Spring within Jordan as a result of errors made by popular reform movements that failed to realise the nature of the internal balance of power and the impact external factors had on local decisions.

It is clear that external factors were the most significant in shaping the relationship between the Jordanian Regime and the Islamist movement. However, there were many internal factors as well. Regarding changes in internal alliances, we find that the alliance with leftists became stable and ongoing, which has been and will continue to be detrimental to the Islamic Movement. There are also tribal alliances viewed by the Islamists as a primary competitor in parliamentary and municipal elections. Then there is the secular movement, which believes that the Islamist movement is completely at odds with their ideology.

In addition to these alliances, there is also a change in the way in the historical and societal role of the Brotherhood is viewed by the state. The way the state is administered and the factors needed to preserve its stability have fundamentally changed from what they were before.

Their relationship can be divided into two main phases. The first of which "1953-1982" would be best described as satisfactory and was marked by "implicit understandings" between both sides. This transformed into a situation that could be described as "unsatisfactory," with some describing it as even as "veiled conflict" which became public at times, such as the period following the signing of the Wadi Araba Treaty, after Hamas' electoral victory in 2007, and after the 2014 coup in Egypt. However, this period still included a short period of harmony and cooperation between 1989 and 1993, marked by "the resumption of democratic life and establishment of political parties."

3. Internal Disputes and Differences

There is clearly a divergence within the group around the concept of constants and variables. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has held many conversations and experienced many disputes around this concept, and overall opinion of the rules and leaders of the group leans towards expanding the circle of constants outside of the framework of beliefs and worship to practicing religious proselytization and political activities. The phase of political opening and the establishment of IAF was the beginning of these discussions that later turned into disputes and different alignments over time.

The group held a series of internal dialogues in the form of conferences. The last of which was held, to my knowledge, in 2010 and was organised by the Political Department and included different views revolving around four topics: the path to reform and change, the relationship with the regime, national identity, the Palestinian issue and its relationship with Hamas. Despite these attempts at dialogue, no consensus on political practices was reached and there were clear signs of suspicion and mistrust on many occasions. One such example was the statement issued by the Brotherhood in 2007 after Marouf Bakhit was elected for his first term, which was considered at the time by some in the group to be a "declaration of allegiance to the regime." Even the group's decision to boycott elections was not solely based in political considerations, but rather the interference of "concepts of Sharia" in guiding the opinion of the Brotherhood's bases of support.²⁴⁰

The four issues referred to in the 2010 conference are all still points of disagreement, even as internal fractioning and splintering has continued to snowball. This led to incidents such as the establishment of the Zamzam Initiative at the end of 2012 and had transformed in the National Congress Party by 2016. Also significant was the request made by some Brotherhood members to rectify the legal situation of the group in 2015, resulting in the registration a new, different Muslim Brotherhood under Jordanian Law. There is also the Internal Reform Initiative "Partnership and Rescue" which turned into a political party at the end of 2016. Even the remaining members of the original Brotherhood do not agree on any common vision or on the thorny issues from the past "the path to political reform, the relationship with the regime, national identity, and the relationship with Hamas." Perhaps the only thing that unifies current members of the Brotherhood is the culture of "external targeting" that has always been used to overcome

²⁴⁰ It was Dr. Mohammed Abu Faris in his well-known book *A Ruling on the Participation of Islamists in Ministries*, when the Brotherhood announced their intention to participate in Mudhar Badran's government in the 1990s.

intellectual differences and different political visions. Although this culture remains to a certain extent, it has been quickly unravelling over the past five years.

Despite the occasional signs of flexibility shown by the group, including its participation in the 2016 Parliamentary Elections, they have not developed deep concepts widespread within its bases of support and its leadership. Therefore, these initiatives have not adequately reinforced confidence in the Islamic movement, even as the crackdown upon it continues. There is a wager on whether or not the group will be able to change the stereotypes surrounding it within the next three years.

4. Flexibility and Self-Renewal

The movement has made many attempts at renewal itself and demonstrate its flexibility in dealing with the social and political environment. One of the most notable attempts was the establishment of the IAF in 1992, when it also included independent figures from outside of the group. The number of party members from outside the group has declined due to its lack of flexibility in dealing with non-Brotherhood members as well as the restrictions faced by the party.²⁴¹

Later, an idea came to make a "conglomeration of opposition parties" in the wake of the Wadi Araba Treaty that saw the group ally itself with leftists and nationalists. Later, the Constitutional Monarchy Initiative in 2008, which involved some personalities with non-traditional political backgrounds. Then, during the Arab Spring, an alliance was formed between Islamists and other forces including the National Front for Reform,²⁴² and later the Popular Congregation for Reform.²⁴³ However, these alliances were based on "uniting against the other"²⁴⁴ rather than trying to increase the common denominators between the factions, so there was considerable separation, similar to what happened on a larger scale with the coup in Egypt and revolution in Syria.

The Zamzam Initiative was launched in 2012 by some leaders at the forefront of renewal of the Islamic movement in an attempt to overcome the work mechanisms and previous alignments and present a new vision with different principles to the current state of the Muslim Brotherhood. The initiative was tripartite: participatory, cooperative, and pragmatic. This meant participatory in all social political, and democratic components, consensual in the stages of transformation happening in the Arab world, and pragmatic by working and searching for alternatives to current problems. Zamzam decided to

²⁴¹ One of the goals of founding the IAF was to include both Muslim Brotherhood members and non-members. However, the founding members from outside mostly withdrew after the Brotherhood dominated the party's internal elections, and for a long period controlled leadership positions and who was allowed to fill them. "from the Editor"

²⁴² The National Front for Reform was announced in 2011, and included opposition parties, former Prime Minister Ahmed Obeidat, and the Muslim Brotherhood. See: 'The National Front for Reform in Jordan', Al-Jazeera, 21/05/2011. <http://bit.ly/2E0g6lX>

²⁴³ The Popular Congregation for Reform was announced in December 2012 and consisted of political figures, including leading figures from the Muslim Brotherhood including former Comptroller General Salim al-Falahat. The Congregation's platform had a higher political ceiling compared to traditional political parties. "editor" See: <http://www.gerasanews.com/article/95130>

²⁴⁴ The "other" here is referring to the the system of government

separate the political from religious advocacy, considering them both human activities subject to right and wrong and that it was not beneficial to mix them. They opted to adopt the concept of the civil state as a slogan and practice for the type of country we want. The initiative included citizens from different political and intellectual backgrounds, even Christians. It also called for everyone to come together and work on the basis of programs and not backgrounds, and made citizenship and efficiency the criteria for screening and selection. Zamzam also drew a balanced approach between "loyalists and the opposition," not considering itself part of either side, and sought that local politics be removed from the circle of Arab and international conflicts. However, it was met with rejection and conflict from most MB leaders, and later broke away and established the National Congress Party in 2016.

The licensing of the second Muslim Brotherhood occurred in 2015 as one of the initiatives to demonstrate political and legal adaptation to the rapid changes in the region and world. The reversal of the Arab Spring as well as the fallout from the military coup in Egypt exerted pressure on the Jordanian regime, which was also viewed with scepticism and distrust by the Muslim Brotherhood.

A reform group "Partnership and Rescue" was also crystalized from within the Brotherhood following the fallout of what happened with the leaders of Zamzam in 2013. They adopted reformist principles for the Brotherhood and IAF. Unable to achieve their goals, they had the idea to follow Zamzam's path and start their own party as Zamzam did in 2016.

Despite the three latest attempts at renewal "Zamzam, the newly licensed Brotherhood, and Partnership and Rescue." the original group has not conducted an in-depth review of its internal approach and political ambition, indicating that the opportunity is ample for new attempts for its members to leave and establish new initiatives moving towards greater flexibility and political adaptation.

5. The Factors of Social and Political "Coexistence and Cooperation"

The political system in Jordan is based on regimes in the Arab world that are relatively open to its citizens. There are periodic elections, although their outcomes have been restricted by non-political laws and numerous interventions. Political space has been narrowed in many cases without bloodshed or violating their honor, nor are there any ideas against Islam or being pious.

Therefore, the reactions towards political strife do not fall outside the framework of "endurance and absorption" by the Islamist movement in general. Despite some changes in the fabric of the regime's mind-set and management, it can be said that it is not completely incompatible with Islamic political action.

Similarly, the general state of society has not reached the point of conflict between different ends of the political spectrum, meaning that there is not continuous estrangement and hostility. Thus, the overall political state of society is closer to the center, with the right and left of the spectrum revolving around it. This mood reflects the view of the

Islamist movement and the procedural engagement with it. It is not conceivable that in the prevailing culture there exist differences so extreme that it would lead to division and conflict. This experience shows that there are points of convergence on many national and regional issues.

As regards leftist and nationalist movements and parties, we find that hostility to the west and a convergence in positions on the Palestinian issue represents an opening for encounter. Even with the moderate parties, opportunities for cooperation on local issues are expanding day-by-day. For example, most moderate parties have a position very close to that of the Islamic movement on the election law.

6. Expected Future Landscape

To predict what the future may look like, one must look at the historical reading and analysis of the political system and motives of all parties in the political sphere, clarifying the external regional factors and their impact on local political trends, understanding all of the Brotherhood's attempts at internal reform and the initiatives they generated, the rise of the national consensus, and the relative stability of the political and security situation compared to the rest of the region.

Based on this information, it is unlikely that these factions will keep diverging to the point of no return, rather, they will remain within the range of previous stages, such as "unspoken understandings," "possibility and absorption," "limited attacks," and occasional "silence and overlooking" of "limited excesses."

The Muslim Brotherhood is expected to develop "limited responses" that indicate its dexterity in dealing with public affairs, as happened recently with their participation in the 2016 Elections. These responses will remain constrained due to factors influenced by the dominant organisational culture, in addition to an awareness of what is happening in the region, especially Palestine, as negative examples of the fruits of broad political participation. This is not related to internal electoral competition over the organization's internal bases of support.

On the other hand, it is expected that new frameworks, such as the Zamzam party and the Partnership and Rescue Party will develop further within the existing local equation, especially in the contexts of the concepts of the civil state, pragmatic partnerships and cooperation in pursuit of national interests.

7. Political Concepts, Principles, and Objectives of the Zamzam Party

The Zamzam initiative is one of the most prominent expressions of realistic adaptation to regional political changes. Here, I will quote some of the provisions of its platform, especially what makes it distinct from the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF in Jordan. It will be presented without comment or explanation, leaving it up to the reader to explore and judge.

Vision: An empowered and compassionate society and a modern civil state.

Message: Gathering and developing energies to achieve comprehensive reform based on citizenship and efficiency according to a gradual, participative, consensus-based, and values-based approach.

The party relies on the following to achieve its goals:

- Islam as a factor of unity, strength, and resurgence
- Arab Islamic Unity is a civilizational necessity, achieved by gradual pursuit to integrate with other countries.
- The Jordanian national identity as an identity for all citizens, which complements Islamic and Arab unity with other countries.

The party's work and activities are based on the following principles:

1. Adherence to provisions of the Jordanian Constitution and respect for the rule of law.
2. Commitment to democracy based on political pluralism.
3. Commitment to guaranteeing freedom of belief, thought, and culture as well as freedom of opinion and expression.
4. Commitment to preserving the neutrality of public institutions towards all citizens in the performance of their duties.
5. Commitment to equal opportunities for all citizens when assuming or participating in a position of responsibility.
6. Consideration of citizenship as the basis for acquiring rights or performing duties.
7. Citizens are the center of the party's interest, and it seeks to serve them and guarantee their freedom, safety, security, and happiness
8. The family is the foundation of society, the source of building and preserving values and is an existential need for society and state.
9. The clan is an important social framework in the makeup and preservation of society. Its participation in competition or political differences is a threat to its role and harms society.
10. The people's free and impartial choice through elections is the way to power in all of its forms.
11. Adopting dialogue as the sole approach to resolve differences within the country, renouncing violence and extremism in both its physical and moral forms, and refusing exclusion on any religious, denominational, political, or intellectual basis.
12. Adoption of Shura, transparency, efficiency, and trust in the management of party affairs.

The party aims to achieve the following goals and objectives:

- Contribute to building a modern democratic civil state based on citizenship, justice, and active participation.
- Developing a broad nationalist trend with a large and impactful presence in political decisions that expresses the people's conscience and captures the imagination, experience, expertise, and ability in the management of state affairs in all fields.
- Deepening national unity and fighting attempts to tear up the national fabric, and defending the dignity of the citizens, their freedom of expression, and their public and private rights.
- Achieving social justice between citizens.
- Serving the citizen and solving problems such as poverty, unemployment, health, education, transportation, housing, and environment through official institutions and civil society institutions.
- Achieving sustainable development and to preserve public rights and freedoms
- Developing legislation and decisions in all fields through political participation
- Fighting corruption of all forms
- Building the national economy of the future and creating an attractive investment climate
- Supporting the role of the private sector of the national economy, reform legislation, and create a real partnership with the public sector.
- Raising the level of public services provided to citizens by official or civil institutions in all regions of the country.
- Empowering the youth to learn, work, participate in politics, and protecting them from manifestations of intolerance, extremism, negativity, and dissolution is a national necessity.
- Empowering women to participate in government work, specifically political work
- Creating a role for unions, syndicates, volunteer organizations, and universities in development and the provision, improvement, and delivery of public services.
- Increasing citizens' interest in public work, raising societal awareness, and directing all institutions and platforms such as schools, universities, media outlets, and mosques competently.
- Enhancing morals and noble values and purifying society of distorted social behaviour and deviancy.
- Protecting national sovereignty and security and creating of continuous strategies in the work of governments and institutions.
- Managing natural wealth and resources to prevent over exhaustion and properly

preserve the environment.

- Developing scientific research, talent, creativity, culture, artists, and protecting public taste.

Study 3

The Partnership and Rescue Party: Rationale, Objectives, and Prospects

Ghaith al-Qudat

Introduction

Let me begin by introducing myself to make my writing about certain peculiarities and information accepted, understood, and clear, and clarifying the perspective from which I approach the subject. In 1987, I joined the Muslim Brotherhood while just a secondary school student, and later joined the IAF as a student at the University of Jordan in 1994. I was head of the youth wing of the latter for a term of four years that coincided with the Jordanian Spring. I used to be a student activist and a board member for the Student Union at the University of Jordan, representing the Islamist trend. I remained close to student, university, and political work after graduating through various positions I held within the Brotherhood. In 2016, I withdrew from the Brotherhood and the IAP.

Last year, myself, along with a large and wide-ranging group of people founded the Participation and Rescue Party. This included a former Controller General of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan who also resigned from the IAF to found this new party with a group of independents, nationalists, and activists. I wrote a number of pieces of political analysis about the Brotherhood in Jordan in which I made predictions for the organisations' future while or pointed out points of dysfunction as part of a critical approach, which drew the most ire from the group at the time. I have been following this path for over 30 years, and have been a part of, and close to many different circles, and lived through the most recent crisis day-by-day. I do not hide that I follow the Islamic Movement's project in Jordan with a sympathetic, loving, sad, and optimistic eye. With that said, I will try my best to understand and break down political Islam in Jordan from the following lenses:

1. An Attempt to Understand and Diagnose the Movement at the Time of the Arab Spring

The Arab spring suddenly rocked our entire world, which was the product of repressive policies, exclusion, and marginalization exercised against the Arab people for many decades. It also shook up Islamist movements, including the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. This occurred at a time when the "Islamic movement" was clearly not prepared for this tsunami of unprecedented societal change. There was a clear defect, unrecognized until the moment when the Islamist movement could not withstand the transformations, which I will summarize:

- There was a disruption in the discourse and ideology of the movement, which has not been subjected to any criticism or undergone any development. They did not realize that the rationale and causes of its inception differ greatly from the rationale and causes of continuation, progress, and making an impact on society. The prevailing internal discourse of the group was condescending towards society and identity and developed their own specific organisational identity that differs from that of society. There are many examples of this in the group's literature, books, and behaviours – which have not been amended a single letter, word, text, or idea since their establishment!
- There was also a structural imbalance in the organizational structure of the group which make it unconvincing that it could fully practice democracy. The structure was and still is secretive to a great extent, and does not internally practice democracy in its real sense. I would describe the Brotherhood as "half-democratic," meaning that there is an absence of accountability and transparency, and no clear ways to make criticisms within the movement. The "sword" of secrecy was used to pass certain decisions or occasionally tampering with some internal elections by using verbal and psychological fear mongering with excuses such as "protecting the organisation from infiltration" or "Preventing certain members of reaching leadership due to concerns about security." Thus, they were able to derail the internal democratic process within the organization.
- The Brotherhood was very stern in its refusal, reluctance, and ability not to participate politically and boycott the elections. However, they are very weak with plans and programs. The jurisprudence of the movement and the organization is much more mature than that of the state and its administration for many reasons, including the state's refusal to give the group a chance to rule, or that it lacked specialists in areas related to managing state affairs.
- Islamists have not yet settled on the very important matter of the state and its answer to it. What kind of state do they want? Is it a Caliphate as described in the foundational literature of Hassan al-Banna, which is still taught among families and battalions of the Brotherhood today? What is its relationship to Islam? What is the best version of the state? Is Jordan acceptable as a state in political terms, given that it is a product of the colonial Sykes-Picot agreement!? I believe that movement's ideology has not yet grasped the nature of the social contract of the modern state, which is based on geography rather than religion. Nor does the modern state include any differences in the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims in its legislation, or where a non-Muslim could become president of a state if he won democratic elections. However, this idea is still rejected in the Brotherhood's literature as set forth in the writing of Hassan al-Banna. Until now, the movement has not yet internalized the dynamic of separation of religion and state in the positive sense rather than the "schizophrenic" compete separation of the two as in revolutionary French thought. The positive version would mean that there is a formula that prevents the state from acting as the guardian of religions, as well as an understanding with secularists on the formula for a state that Islamists see as Islamic and secularists see as secular.

- Islamists in Jordan were suffering from significant internal differences and conflict that developed over many years to become central differences and polarization. The moderate circles that were focusing on the concept of state –and also around the relationship with the Islamic resistance, Hamas and its influence within the group have won. Some of the disputes undoubtedly took on a personal character, which has weakened and torn apart the organization from the inside.

2. What Happened Inside of the Movement During the Arab Spring

The Movement was moving towards political escalation at the beginning of the Arab Spring, especially after the Brotherhood's victory in Egypt. At the time, the Jordanian Brotherhood refused to engage in dialogue with the state unless seven harsh conditions and demands were met. It was difficult for the state to accept these conditions, and discourse in the movement was unified towards escalation; however, this quickly regressed once regional conditions changed.

Internal criticism has increased as the fever of the Arab Spring has penetrated Brotherhood ranks. These included many demands for transparency, clarity, moving towards impactful programs and plans, moving away from emotions and demanding a change in the means and modes of discourse. Calls have also increased to end of internal tampering due through influencing followers by assassinating or marginalizing Brotherhood personalities. There was also genuine demand to separate the political party from the Brotherhood, as well as a clear call from a specific trend inside of the group to pay attention to the internal situation in Jordan and make this their foremost priority. However, they have been accused of provincialism and representing narrow interests; thus the disputes have increased in number and deepened.

As disputes intensified, they went from being exclusively internal to being publicly known through various media outlets articles that all had different points of view. This is an issue that the Brotherhood had not dealt with on this scale throughout the group's history.

The division within the Brotherhood deepened and reached an impasse, especially after the introduction of a national initiative led by Brotherhood leaders based on only one stream of thought, without returning to the organisation to take other opinions – this is forbidden in customary Muslim Brotherhood regulations, but the "coercive stick" for obedience was used by the organisation to separate some leaders and cut their ties to the Brotherhood as a punishment for what they did. Later, the new licensed Muslim Brotherhood was established and turned the tables, making the parent Brotherhood organisation reconsider many calculations and even accept many of the changes and demands requested by the reformists inside of the group through many initiatives that did not actually enjoy acceptance. However, all of the responses came too late. This confirms clearly that the Brotherhood's leadership lacks an open-minded political methodology, and cannot foresee events or show leadership through this period despite much advice and warnings from broth friends and enemies.

3. The Future of Political Islam in Jordan

I will attempt to briefly explain my predictions in the following points:

- I predict that the future will be extremely difficult in this troubled region. In light of the 100 million Arabs dealing with armed conflict, and in absence of networks of social security or protection, the dilemma is not that of Islamist Movements, but the dilemma of all Arab states. It is a complete crisis that affects all observers, but it is certain that the Brotherhood will keep its presence due to the demographic makeup of Jordan. Given the fact that most of the leaders who remained in the organisation are middle aged and seem likely to control and manage the Brotherhood in the future, and undoubtedly have the same mentality of the old guard, I believe that the group's rhetoric will not be as dominant and impactful as it once was, and that their influence on society will regress. They will lose the stature they have enjoyed over the years. There have been many opportunities for them to reinvent themselves before the splits but they wasted all of these opportunities.
- I participated four times in conferences speaking about the future of the political Islam, and the dangers surrounding it which have been organized by different international bodies and research centers. However, it is remarkable that those responsible for the crisis are still not conducting research and internal studies about these matters! In my opinion, the only Islamist movement that has done so is the Nahda movement in Tunisia. This is due to the inability of the others to recognize the danger of societal transformation and the constant belief that everything which befalls them is the result of an external conspiracy or the injustice of regimes.
- I believe that most of the reconsiderations made by the Islamist movement and the repositioning that happened after the Arab Spring are not a result of genuine methodological reviews, but were rather a response to various and complicated local and regional political pressures that forced the Brotherhood to do so. The choice to participate in the most recent parliamentary elections and the fact that they did not use "Islam is the solution" as their slogan, was a choice made primarily to protect the organisation and prevent it from dispersing. This will never lead to true change in the methodology or mentality of the original Muslim Brotherhood. It will remain a prisoner of the past, a prisoner of the same old rhetoric that has not been criticized or developed, and a prisoner of old means and methods. The Brotherhood is still dominated by the IAF, as the latter has become a political refuge for the parent Brotherhood to protect itself and use its position and identity as a registered political party for any activity since the legalization of the new Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. This will ensure that the conflict over authority and frames of reference will continue. The current conflict around taboo yet fundamental issues must be discussed among the Brotherhood – for example, the concept of the civil state, its clarification, explanation, and its relationship to the Islamic frame of reference. It is the dispute we have been hearing and seeing about recently between two sides within the movement around the concept of the civil state, which has not yet matured or been agreed upon in the movement in a convincing manner.

- The Islamist movement is still a prisoner of the idea that they are in conflict with security services, and a prisoner of conflict with other government agencies and the movement's exclusion from them. However, this mentality must end, and the movement must change its strategy from seeking power or continuing the conflict with state agencies to a strategy that liberates the people from tyranny and creates a state of awareness in society. It must also be noted that the state must realise that the Brotherhood is an essential component of society and that it cannot be ignored or at like it does not exist.
- There is a future for the parties that have already split from the Brotherhood, or will emerge from it later. These parties were able to disengage themselves from the complexes and psychological pressure of restricted thought, opinion, and action. They formulated the political visions that were required while they were previously inside of the movement, and clearly answered all of the crucial questions related to the Jordanian state. In their literature, they provided clear answers to the issue of citizenship democracy, and clear sense of national belonging. It was also clear that these parties – the Zamzam Party and the Partnership and Rescue Party – named themselves to be Jordanian national civic parties and not Islamist parties. They were freed from the "Islamist" label, which Islamists used to love to attach to any project to make it succeed. The parties also were established for wide participation of an entire spectrum of different people in society, without any desire to acquire, influence, control or dominate. There is a great opportunity for these parties to progress and succeed, especially if they develop a pragmatic platform that addresses issues like education, unemployment, debt, fighting corruption, and reviving the nation.
- I am also predicting that these parties that have emerged from the Brotherhood will form together to form one entity along with other parties in the future, and that the IAF could be among them. This is possible because these modern parties possess similar ideas, platforms, and principles which could indicate the formation of a new powerful and influential political force in society that is harmonious.
- In the background of the scene there are youth, social, and national movements that have begun to grow and spread in universities, villages, and regions. This indicates that we are entering a new political era where "Political Islam" will not be the only nor the biggest driver, and the Muslim Brotherhood will no longer have a large presence, as happened after the fall of the Caliphate. We must recognize that what fell in the Arab Spring was the "barrier of fear and illusion" in front of the Arab people, in addition to the wall of blind obedience. The Arab psychology and personality will be rebuilt and will be shaped by events and circumstances based on a national and local dialogue. Local affairs, the national interest, and fighting corruption will all become the slogan that takes precedence over all others. National dialogue will undoubtedly advance to the forefront. Islamic discourse will no longer be an important or motivational form discourse as was in the past at the time of the establishment of the Brotherhood, which led to the rapid spread of the group and its ideas. We have become aware that the opposition has developed tribal and nationalist characteristics. This societal change has already happened and will impact the future political reality. The atmosphere

has become "national and local," a natural response after it had been eliminated from minds, ideas and practice for a long time.

- Finally, the movement and the state, with their various apparatuses and trends, believe that there is no real competitor to the Islamic movement in Jordan. However, I believe that the future will reveal the complete opposite, and that political reality has reached the point of no return. We will also witness the ascent of nationalist trends that will not mention the slogan "Islam" in their literature or during elections, not forgetting the result this has garnered by Islamists in different elections in these times. There are new nationalist trends that have begun planting seeds, of which we will eventually see their fruits. Everyone will also witness watch the decline of Political Islam in the Arab world in Jordan in favour of nationalist movements that have clear answers written out and that are the same in secret as they are in public about the questions of identity, the state, citizenship, belonging, fighting corruption, and reviving the nation. These movements also have previous partisan, political, student, and youth experience that they acquired in their previous positions.

Study 4:

The Prospects of Islamic Movements and Parties in Jordan

Neven Bondokji

The Islamist Movement in Jordan has always been a unique case when discussing the flexible and varied relations between Islamists and the state. The history of the Islamic Movement in Jordan was shaped over long periods of tactical alliance with power, within the framework of the loyal opposition. However, the situation has changed following the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement which has filled the relationship with tension.

Then came the revolutions of the Arab Spring and all of their regional impact and consequences, and their impact on this push-pull relationship as well as on internal Islamist disputes. Today, we see that the Islamist movement is fragmented and contradictory, and suffering from internal disputes and both legal and political restrictions imposed on them by the government. Even though the Islamists participated in the September 2016 elections, this was meant to prove that the movement had a presence and had nothing to do with engaging in tactical maneuvers with the government.

This paper offers a reading of the Islamist political scene in Jordan within a conceptual framework that focuses on the most important chapters and challenges faced by the Islamist Movement, and discusses the possible future paths for Islamist parties in light of the current local and regional political situation.

This paper focuses on three main axes:

First: A reading of the splits and divisions experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood since 1994, which result in several separations and new Islamist political parties that emerged as a result of protests against the Brotherhood's refusal to embrace reform.

Second: A reading of the situation of Islamist parties and movements regarding the theory of integration-moderation and how the current scene can be interpreted on this basis.

Third: The future of Islamist parties and movements in the framework of post-Islamist and the organisational and ideological changes to which these parties may resort, either voluntarily or driven by local circumstances.

1. Shared Responsibility for the Brotherhood's Divisions

As is widely known, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan had been experiencing much strife and many disputes. These became widely public after 2007, specifically due to the approach of participation or boycotting the elections in light of successive governments manipulating the results, in addition to the nature of the relationship between Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. These divisions had emerged previously but became

much clearer after 2007.

The traditional argument around the divisions within the organisation revolved around the dispute between the hawks and the doves within the movement, and the opinions that resolved the differences in the two-fold framework based on the Jordanian/Jordanian of Palestinian duality. However, these readings had been applied to previous stages.

Since 2008, ideological disputes have become even deeper. We began to see the reformist current within the movement engage in self-criticism and looking for changes that would enhance the group's political presence and standing, and strengthen the Jordanian organisation in its goals and discourse, in addition to meeting the aspirations of Brotherhood youth for more elastic organizational mechanisms compared to the current structural rigidity of the organization.

The result of these interactions over the years, and the refusal of the traditional leadership's rejection of the reform initiatives, was a number of splits that emerged from the Brotherhood. The most notable was the Jordanian Initiative for Building- Zamzam in October 2013, which established itself as a Jordanian nationalist political movement far removed from the religious framework of the Brotherhood, and made alliances with powerful non-Islamist figures. Zamzam later registered a political party called the National Congress Party in August 2016.

The second secession from the group was the licencing of the second Brotherhood request by Abdul Majid al-Thaniibat, a former Brotherhood leader. He submitted the request – as reported in the media – in response to the government's demand in the Party Licensing law that the group register as a public association in Jordan and to rectify their legal status.²⁴⁵ Nael Maslaha gave his account of a February 2015 meeting between the King of Jordan and Al- Thanibat to search for a solution that removes Jordan from the regional pressures to classify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation as occurred in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. This was done to register the group legally in Jordan and cut its organisational ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.²⁴⁶ Al-Thaniibat accordingly submitted his request and the government responded. After this, the original Muslim Brotherhood lost its legal status in Jordan to the new group and its property was confiscated. Today, we find in Jordan the unlicensed, original Muslim Brotherhood and the new licensed Brotherhood, although it enjoys less legitimacy than the original group.

The third instance of separation was the Participation and Rescue party, established in October 2016, under the leadership of reformists traditionally labelled as doves within the Brotherhood. This group of people was known to be wise, and decided to form and leave after the success of the Zamzam Initiative succeeded in its attempt at internal reforms. These wise members clashed with leaders of their parent organisation after they refused to undertake radical reform from within the movement.

²⁴⁵ See: Bilal Hassan al-Tal 'The Muslim Brotherhood: Setting the Record Straight', Jaridat al-Rai, April 5, 2015. <http://bit.ly/2E42ar5>

²⁴⁶ Nael Masalha and Shadi Hamid, "More than just the Muslim Brotherhood: The Problem of Hamas and Jordan's Islamic Movement," Brookings Institution, 2nd of February, 2017, <http://brook.gs/2E1UKoy>

These three instances of separation are the most prominent in the Islamic Movement's history, and were the result of years of tension and disagreement within the movement between a reformist trend and a rigid traditional trend. The result was these parties leaving the group and bringing the reform trend with them.

In general, the Islamist Movement should have utilised these experiences and its continuous failure to embrace the reformist trend. It is important that they assume responsibility for these divisions. Islamist movements are often quick to criticize ruling regimes, and regional and international powers, although it would be more worthwhile to end its distance from the citizen and their failure to embrace reform, and accepting the mechanisms by which the group can develop its presence and political discourse. Salman Farahat, former Controller General of the group in Egypt, and among the leaders of the Partnership and Rescue Party, offered his view on the Brotherhood and criticized them in his book, *The Islamist Movement in Jordan: The Muslim Brotherhood "2016"* and explained his vision of the challenges inside of the movement.

However, it is also fair to recognize the responsibility of the state in weakening the Muslim Brotherhood and took advantage of these division. According to Hasan Abu Hania the government "follows an approach based on the group's abstention, exerting pressure on the IAF, and pushing the moderate branch to further polarization."²⁴⁷ It is apparent that the Single Voice Law of 1993, which according to former officials, was designed to weaken the Brotherhood and their strength in the Parliament.²⁴⁸ Even the Election Law of 2012, which was issued amidst demands for political reform in 2011 and 2012, as well as the 2016 law, all of which included loopholes intended to reduce the power of the Parliament and its representative power.²⁴⁹

In terms of administrative and procedural constraints, the government has restricted the Muslim Brotherhood in several ways, including the withdrawal of their Islamic Centrist Party in 2007, the groups' most important socio-economic wing. The case was kept the within the judiciary so that the state could pressure the Brotherhood when needed.²⁵⁰ We have also mentioned how the Party Registration Law legalised the new Muslim Brotherhood but made the original illegal and seized its property. Before this, Zaki Bani Arshid, former Deputy Controller General was imprisoned for 18 months "February 2014," for criticizing the Emirates' decision to classify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation in a comment on his Facebook page.²⁵¹ These examples demonstrate the level of tension between the government and the brotherhood which has continued in the past few years.

Observers of the Brotherhood's relationship with the government and political

²⁴⁷ Hasan Abu Hania, "Has the Muslim Brotherhood Overcome the Risks of Fragmentation and Prohibition", Arabi 21, October 2, 2016. <http://bit.ly/2EFGSUm>

²⁴⁸ See: Sean L. Yom, "Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 4 "2009": 154

²⁴⁹ Omar al-Atout, 'The Elections Law: The Devil is in the Details' Hibr, February 25, 2016. <http://bit.ly/2E2q6LJ>

²⁵⁰ Tariq al-Naimat, "Zamzam and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 21, 2014. <http://ceip.org/2BmW2Mk>

²⁵¹ 'Former Deputy Comptroller General of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan Zaki Bani Arshid Arrested for criticizing UAE' BBC Arabic, November 21, 2014. <http://bbc.in/2Ehsiwn>

regime generally know that they went from being the loyal opposition to facing an escalating tension between them after the signing of the Wadi Araba Treaty in 1994, even though they each still respected the authority and role of the other. This is despite the fact that current literature around Islamist movements categorizes the role of the Jordanian government as oppressing Islamists,²⁵² or conversely as an example of conditional coexistence.²⁵³ The relationship between them is more a cold relationship of merely accepting the other's existence, mutually recognizing legitimacy but never converging. For example, the Jordanian government has not classified the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, unlike Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Egypt. Nor have they arrested members of the movement or carried out a security crackdown like the large-scale ones that happened in some other states. From the other side, the Brotherhood has remained loyal to governing institutions and respected the basics of political life and the authorities in the Kingdom.

The quarrels and divisions within the Islamist Movement and the exclusionary policies of the government have weakened and divided the Brotherhood. The group lost its presence in the political sphere for years because of their decision to boycott the 2010 and 2013 elections. It is especially true because the Islamic Centrist Party, which separated from the Brotherhood in 1994, won 16 seats out of 150 in the 2013 elections. In addition, the movement's failure to reform itself and renew its political discourse, program, and mechanisms has also weakened its presence and status among members.

It may be useful to recall how the Brotherhood in Egypt lost many of its youth throughout 2015 and 2016 due to the so-called "organizational apostasy." The youth turned against the group because it failed to adapt in order to confront the internal and external they faced, in addition to the responsibility of the political regime for the losses and marginalization of the Movement. In his analysis of this demographic, Ahmed Nour al-Din argues that these youths still believe in the movement's ideology but are moving in two different directions, either towards "moral secularism" or joining an armed group to fight against the state and aspiring for Islamic rule.²⁵⁴

Although the situation in Egypt differs from that in Jordan, it is useful for the Islamist movement to be aware of the experiences and changes impacting Brotherhood youth in other nations, and connect it to what is currently happening to the Islamist movement and the divisions that have undermined the legitimacy, political presence, and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.

These divisions and results of the Movement's failure to reform itself, which have been reviewed in this section, form the historical context that greatly impacts the reality and options of the Islamist movement in the coming period.

²⁵² Lynch, Mark 'In Uncharted Waters: Islamist Parties Beyond Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', Carnegie Middle East Center, 16 December, 2016, <http://carnegie-mec.org/2016/12/16/ar-pub-66511>

²⁵³ Nasr al-Sane'a, "Alliances of the Islamic Project and its Regional and International Relationships" from *The Projects of Change in the Arab World and Their Future*, p.573-608 edited by Nitham Barakat "Amman, The Center for Arab Unity" p.579

²⁵⁴ Ahmed Nouredine, "The Naked Brotherhood: From al-Banna's Paper's to Bafra Paper.. What is Left of the World' Professorship?" SASA Post, April 20, 2017. <http://bit.ly/2sDfqlB>

2. Integration-Moderation and the Islamist Movement in Jordan

The Integration-Moderation Theory says that political parties and movements tend to moderate "move towards the center" when they participate in democratic political processes.²⁵⁵ This moderation is ideological in the form of accepting the principle of the people's authority and political pluralism.²⁵⁶ Procedurally, the moderation is indicated by accepting the rules of the political game, forming alliances with other actors, and entering compromises and trade-offs with various political powers.²⁵⁷

Ideological moderation is a long process governed by several factors, the most important of which are the internal reviews done by the members and leaders of Islamist movements, and are the result of long ideological debates.²⁵⁸ The questions around the national project versus the Islamist project are the most important questions, in addition to the question of rule by Allah or rule by the majority according to democratic principles, the legitimacy of state institutions, and the relationship of a party or movement's objectives with the state.

In addition to internal revisions, the institutional frameworks through which these Islamist parties work affect the extent of its moderations. This relationship is correlative, according to a study that compared the Moroccan Justice and Development Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.²⁵⁹

Given the experiences of some Islamist parties, we see that there is some inconsistency in proving or disproving this theory. For example, one researcher believes that the theory has been realized in Turkey and Indonesia, while the experience of Islamists in Kuwait and pre-civil war Yemen completely contradicts the theory.²⁶⁰ One could also argue that this theory has been realized in Hezbollah's domestic experience in the context of Lebanese politics, while it was not substantiated when looking at their positions on international issues such as Israel and their participation in the Syrian war.

In discussing this theory, a few points must be taken into consideration. One team of researchers believe that moderation is not realised solely through political integration, but also due to government pressure. They present two examples for this: Egypt before the revolution and Jordan.²⁶¹ Some researchers also believe that integration

²⁵⁵ Jillian Schwedler, "Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties," *Development* 50, no.1 "2007": 56-61; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 "2004": 205-228.

²⁵⁶ Güneş Murat Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation* (Texas, USA: University of Texas Press, 2010).

²⁵⁷ Omar Ashour, *Votes and Violence: Islamists and The Processes of Transformation* (London, UK: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2009), <http://bit.ly/2FJmApY>

²⁵⁸ Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

²⁵⁹ Katarina Pevna, "Moderation of Islamist Movements: A Comparative Analysis of Moroccan PJD and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood" in ECPR Graduate Conference, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria, 3rd -5th of July, 2014; <http://bit.ly/2nCdfeZ>

²⁶⁰ Kent Goldingay, "Political Islamists and the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis," *Kentgoldingay*, 26th of January 2015, <http://bit.ly/2seb11B>

²⁶¹ See: Shadi Hamid, "Can Repression Force Islamist Moderation?" In *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal*

or participation in the political process do not necessarily lead to moderation. Ashour thinks that some organisations may participate in the political process without completing genuine reconsiderations of their ideologies.²⁶² The antithesis to this idea, that pressures and political exclusion lead to militancy, has also not been proven. This is evidenced by the fact that before the revolutions, Egyptian and Tunisian Islamists faced many forms of prosecution, marginalization, and exclusion without either of them being pushed towards violence and militancy.²⁶³

However, the experience of Islamists in Jordan indicates that their moderation was the result of integration and state pressure. For instance, before the political horizon widened and the return to parliamentary life in 1989, the Brotherhood witnessed a number of reconsideration throughout the 1980s regarding democracy, consultation, and the legitimacy of participating in elections. In 2011, several theses about Constitutional Monarchy surfaced, which were submitted by Erhil al-Gharabia, who later separated from the Brotherhood to launch the Zamzam initiative.

In 2013, the Brotherhood made a number of changes to its by-laws that refer to institutional steps to regulate certain aspects of the relationship between the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood "although these were just procedural facilitations and nothing more".²⁶⁴ In the 2016 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood put forward a list under the name "Reform" and with the slogan "national revival and dignity of the citizen", far from the Islamic slogans and dialogue of the traditional Brotherhood, and also desired Christians and women to be amongst their candidates.

Part of this moderation is an inevitable result of the legal pressure of the state and its skilful exploitation of the Brotherhoods divisions. The authorization of the new Muslim Brotherhood in 2015 was one of the aspects of this pressure to force the movement to re-examine its literature and regional relationships. The government wants to keep the Brotherhood around, but wants the Movement to be unstable.²⁶⁵

The rapid changes of the past five years affected the coherent picture of the Brotherhood and has shaken its rigid structural image. It was necessary that the movement participate in the 2016 elections to preserve its presence in the political arena at the very least. Abu Hania said that this participation as part of the identity aspect of the movement, meaning that the participation was meant to preserve its legal presence and cohesion, and confirm its weight in politics. The Muslim Brotherhood wanted to participate to assure the government of their ability to adapt and develop their discourse.²⁶⁶ This presence was

Democracy in a New Middle East "New York : Oxford University Press, 2014", 61-85; Kent Goldingay, "Political Islamists and the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis," Kent Goldingay, 26th of January 2015, <http://bit.ly/2sebl1B>

²⁶² Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* "New York: Routledge, 2009", 18.

²⁶³ Mona El Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 37 "3", 2005, 373-395.

²⁶⁴ Neven Bondokji, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Time to Reform* "Doha, Qatar: Brookings Doha Center, 2015", 5, <http://brook.gs/2G1tdnJ>

²⁶⁵ Samer Khair Ahmad, "Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood: Divided but for how long?," *The New Arab*, 14th of March 2015, <http://bit.ly/2nSOpps>

²⁶⁶ Hasan Abu Hania, "Has the Muslim Brotherhood Overcome the Risks of Fragmentation and Prohibition"

confirmed by results, as the Brotherhood received a higher share of votes than any other parties that separated from it.

In this regard, it should be noted that political parties are affected by the surrounding political environment and make decisions based on the current political landscape.²⁶⁷ The Brotherhood has proved its flexibility historically in dealing with various challenges. However, they have maintained their organizational unity despite ideological differences, which has made them aware of surrounding changes and the importance of quickly addressing to them. For example, they have not changed their tactics nor their discourse, and have failed to take advantage of the energy and ideas of their youth.²⁶⁸

Another fact in this regard regarding Islamist parties and movements is that they are first and foremost political parties and not ideological parties. In other words, pragmatism is a fundamental aspect of their work, as politics has often been called the art of concessions. Here lies the dilemma of Islamist Movements. They build their proposals based on an Islamic ideology, and look at these proposals with a sanctified look, according to Abu Eid.²⁶⁹ However, religion is non-negotiable, while policy-making is based on bargaining.

One of the most pressing challenges facing the Islamist Movement in Jordan is returning to the theory of integration and moderation, because the most important facet of ideological and procedural moderation is the separation of religious advocacy from their political work. A party's adoption "the IAF in this case" of resources, personalities, and mechanisms of the parent movement will undermine the independence and efficiency of the party, and complicates the relationship between the religious advocacy role of the movement, and the political role of the party.²⁷⁰

Although the problem of separating religious advocacy from politics is not new, as literature dedicated to it has appeared in the past two decades, but the Jordanian Brotherhood has not clarified their position on this separation. Despite the success of the Moroccan and Tunisian experience in this area, the position of the movement in Jordan is no less uncertain than in Egypt.

This confusion comes as a result of several factors, including those outlined by Abdullah Balqiz reported on the challenge of institutionalization of religious parties. The relationship of religious authority to politics in Arab countries has been based on this authority's legitimation and acceptance of most aspects of legislation besides personal status law. The discourse of religious parties is based on literatures of their old imams

²⁶⁷ Khalil al-Anani, "The Brotherhood in the Regional Balance" *al-Araby al-Jadid*, March 10, 2015

Lynch, Mark 'In Uncharted Waters: Islamist Parties Beyond Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', Carnegie Middle East Center, 16 December, 2016, <http://carnegie-mec.org/2016/12/16/ar-pub-66511>

²⁶⁸ Tariq al-Naimat, "Zamzam and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan"

²⁶⁹ Arif Abu Eid, "Challenges and Opportunities for the Islamist Project and its Interaction with Other Projects", from *The Projects of Change in the Arab World and Their Future*, "Amman, The Center for Arab Unity" edited by Nitham Barakat, p 609-618.

²⁷⁰ In a previous study, I explained the aspects of this overlap. See:

Neven Bondokji, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Time to Reform* "Doha, Qatar: Brookings Doha Center, 2015", 5, <http://brook.gs/2G1tdnJ>

and is free from modern revisions. Religious parties present themselves as a spokesperson for religion, and uses that to turn religion to a political ideology. Infusing religion into political disputes leads to division and ambiguity, and the party becomes a sectarian tool and not an Islamic institution as these movements claim.²⁷¹ Although the last two are not applicable in Jordan, it has been shown clearly in Iraq and Lebanon.

The first three factors apply to the Islamic movement in Jordan. Firstly, they have not presented Islamic laws, theses or reference frameworks that would take the place of positive law. Conversely, the Movement has not confirmed that it accepts the foundations of the civil state besides its slogan for the 2016 elections. Thus, we do not know the Movement's attitude regarding the national civil state versus the Islamic project for the Ummah. Secondly, much of the literature and educational materials of the Movement rely heavily on the writings of Hassan al-Banna, although there are some essays of Ghannouchi and Mourou as modern thinkers of Islamist movements. Thirdly, the Brotherhood movement has long presented itself as the spokesperson as Islam and advocate of the Ummah's values. We do not know how the new fissures and the two parties of the National Congress –Zamzam and the Partnership and Rescue Party influence the monopoly of speaking in the name of Islam. However, metrics indicate this factor will remain present because these parties present themselves as national Jordanian initiatives.

The new parties have not offered any new to distinguish their presence and political discourse. They have not moved away from broad generalizations nor have they promoted any political or economic programs that address challenges on the national level. Not wanting to hold on to their Islamist identity, they wanted to present themselves as a national alternative, as shown by the comments of these parties' leaders. The parties have not yet offered their conceptions of the civil state in Jordan, and have not provided a broad base for partnership that includes Islamists "their opponents" within the Jordanian national structure. As a matter of political pragmatism, these new parties must work with Islamists and accept them as an active political partner. We would ask and expect the same from the Islamist Movement as well.

This ambiguity is a strategic opportunity for the parent Muslim Brotherhood to act now and redefine its political identity to be centered around its historical legitimacy and popularity. The shallow impact "keeping in mind that the Partnership and Rescue party was only formed in October 2016 and is still being established" reflects the strength and centrality of the parent Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan. This is the exact opportunity needed by the Movement so that it can remake itself, identify its roles and references: religious advocacy for the Brotherhood movement, and party and political activities for the IAF.

With reference to the Integration-Moderation Theory and the need to separate religious advocacy, and given the overall flexibility of Islamist parties in dealing with local changes, the government must take the following actions:²⁷²

²⁷¹ Abdullah al-Balqiz, "Introductions to Reform in the Religious Field" *Al-Mustaqbal al-Araby* Vol. 455"2017" pg19-54, citation from 40-41

²⁷² Lynch, Mark 'In Uncharted Waters: Islamist Parties Beyond Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', Carnegie Middle East Center, 16 December, 2016, <http://carnegie-mec.org/2016/12/16/ar-pub-66511>

First, it must provide a pluralistic political climate conducive to strengthening the participation of parties, which will encourage moderation. The government must note that the parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, must be confident that their political participation as a party will compensate them for the loss of their popular base that will result from the separation of religious advocacy and politics. Therefore, the state must work transparently to develop political work in Jordan so that these parties can integrate, and then reach the level of moderation desired by the government.

Second, the government must become aware that the popular grassroots base supporting the Islamists is still strong. Today, there is a large segment of young people with an Islamist orientation looking for a political voice that represents them. It is important to provide peaceful Islamist political choices to accommodate young people rather than them moving towards extremist movements active in the region. This is not merely a political priority, but a psychosocial necessity, because young Muslims hoping to work in political work will look for options that satisfy the needs of their Islamic identity and partake in collective Islamic work.

3. Post-Islamism and the Islamist Movement in Jordan

The discussion about Islamic identity and collective Islamic action naturally brings us to speak about the other possible challenge and direction of identity for the Islamist Movement. Today, it is possible to speak of separation of religious advocacy and politics in the framework of Integration-Moderation. However, there is another option offered by the post-Islamism for the Islamist Movement in Jordan, the option which requires the Movement to stop avoiding internal reconsideration, and to search for its currently available options. Post-Islamism has presented an option that may be acceptable to the parent movement if it chose to completely change its identity rather than wagering its bets on separation between religious advocacy and politics.

The idea of post-Islamist emerged from Iranian intellectual Asif Beyet, who provided an analytical framework to explain the changes experienced by Islamist movements in the mid-1990s. He focused on the general social context and how the social changes impacted the work and orientation of Islamist Movements, and how the latter affects society.²⁷³ Heba Ezzat warns against accepting the term "post" as simply a linear view of history. She argues that post-Islamism is not the stage that comes after Islamism, but rather a concept that forms the general society framework of identity and explains the transformations of Islamist movements.²⁷⁴

If Islamism refers to the ideas and movements that seek to establish an Islamic state according to the tenets of Sharia, then post-Islamism is the trend of Islamist political parties towards adopting the values of freedom and justice, and focusing on rights instead of duties, and the trend of Islamic movement towards social work in a bigger and more

²⁷³ Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford: California Stanford University Press, 2007)

²⁷⁴ Heba Raouf Essat, 'Post-Islamism: A Critical Theory', *Al-Ahram Al-Dimuqratiyya*, November 6, 2013. <http://bit.ly/2BVdjJ3>

tangible way than in the past.²⁷⁵

The difference is that previously, Islamist movements previously tended to engage in social work as it was the only available option for them in the absence of real access to power. However, in post-Islamism, these movements will voluntarily choose Islamic social work as a strategic choice, because, through it, they will be able to preserve their Islamic identity or society and resist the states desire to impose other trends in society, but through social work rather than political work.

This potential change in the work of Islamist movements is due to two factors: First, the absence of an active and influential position of Islamist movements. The movements have not won many elections in the Arab world with the exception of Algeria, according to Oliver Roy, who wrote about these transformations in the 1990s.²⁷⁶ Despite the strong participation of some Islamist movements in the political process after the Arab Spring, most of them besides al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Justice and Development Party of Morocco suffer from political and legal strife, leading to a weakening and foundering presence.²⁷⁷ In Jordan, the Islamist Movement today is divided, weak, and vague.

The second factor is the general social transformation, and the transformation of the collective Islamic consciousness. Today, the Islamic Persona has transformed from membership and engagement with a political party, into daily social and Islamic self-choices. This is crystalized in simple choices about eating, personal finance, clothing, and more. In a broader context, this means that Muslims still have a desire for community action to realise Islamic values, but do not see the Muslim Brotherhood as the sole force that represents it.²⁷⁸ This has become prominent through charismatic movements and personalities such as Omar Khalid and Ahmed Shugairi, that encourage social work and Islamic self-development, but without partisan orientation.

The success of these personalities cannot be ignored because they represent a change in societal awareness, especially among the youth who are attracted to the simple and appealing vision offered through interactive means of communications which allow young people to interact with ideas and add their own personal judgement. If we look at the failure of Islamist movements in exploiting the energy of their youth and developing rigid political discourse, we see the depth of the crisis facing all Islamist movements unable to keep up with the needs of their youth, as well as youth with other affiliations throughout society. Thus, the movements are currently losing their social and political

²⁷⁵ Heba Raouf Essat, 'Post-Islamism: A Critical Theory', Al-Ahram Al-Dimuqratiyya, November 6, 2013. <http://bit.ly/2BVdjJ3> Hamza Yassin, 'The Meaning of Post-Islamism to Asif Bayat, Al-Tagrir. January 12, 2017. <http://bit.ly/2ilBNEF>

²⁷⁶ Roy also believes that, as part of Islamist movements' efforts to integrate into the political process, have worked to show glimpses of moderation to ensure their involvement in the mechanisms and institutions of the state. In the meantime, the movements have lost their distinction, and that politics now overshadows religion. Thus, there is no longer something to distinguish them from other parties. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*. Translator Carol Volk. "Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1994".

²⁷⁷ Lynch, Mark 'In Uncharted Waters: Islamist Parties Beyond Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', Carnegie Middle East Center, 16 December, 2016, <http://carnegie-mec.org/2016/12/16/ar-pub-66511>

²⁷⁸ Peter Mandaville, "Is the Post-Islamism Thesis Still Valid?," POMEPS, 24th of January, 2014, <https://pomeps.org/2014/01/30/is-the-post-islamism-thesis-still-valid>

presence and influence.

Within the framework of these theoretical theses and practical approaches, and in reference to the future reality of the Islamist Movement in Jordan, one can speak of the original Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan's urgent need for internal reconsiderations that will determine the movement's identity moving forward. They could choose to completely separate religious advocacy and politics so that the IAF adopts a partisan agenda that operates according to alliances dictated by political need and the time frame of the electoral process. The parent Muslim Brotherhood would be reconstituted as a socio-religious movement. The other possible option is the transformation of the Brotherhood to a post-Islamist movement that adopts a rights-based discourse, through which seeks to foster Islamic identity and values for society, apart from direct political ambitions. These efforts could help Islamists attain power, but the objective and work of the parent movement will be reshaped according to the post-Islamic thesis. Today's Islamist parties have an opportunity to invest in the change occurring to the frameworks and mechanisms of social work, and the desire of Muslims to engage in collective action in order to change society.

No one can dictate choices to the original Muslim Brotherhood, it is a choice that must come after the careful completion of reviews and studies from within the movement from which they can determine their ideology in addition to their social and political objectives. In light of the weakness and fragmentation of the Islamic Movement in Jordan and the emergence of four parties representing it "the Islamic Centrist Party, which separated from the group in 2001, the newly licensed Muslim Brotherhood, the National Congress Party, and the Partnership and Rescue Party" in the framework of organizational challenges facing the parent movement. It could be argued that the post-Islamism option may be the right choice for Jordan in light of local realities.

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"By order of appearance"

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6. **Abdulrahman al-Haj:** Professor at the Social Sciences University of Ankara, specialized in researching and studying the relation between religion, politics, and society. His works include: "Political Rhetoric in the Quran: Power, Community, and Value System" 2012, "The State and the Community: Political Aspirations of Religious Groups in Syria "2000-2010"", 2011, and "Shiite Ba'ath in Syria "1918-2007"", 2008. Al-Haj has published several academic studies and participated in international and regional conferences, with his research published in scientific journals.
7. **Ahmad al-Daghshi:** Professor of education principles and philosophy at Sana'a University, Faculty of Education; researcher on Islamic groups; holder of PhD from the University of Khartoum, Faculty of Education, Education Philosophy Division, titled: "The Theory of Knowledge in the Quran and Its Pedagogical Implications" "1998 – First edition published by the International Institute of Islamic Thought, Virginia, USA, Amman branch "2002"; awarded the 2010 Presidential Award for Scientific Research "incentive award" for his book "The Perception of Others in Islamic Education Philosophy" ; author of several studies for scientific journals and published books including "Contemporary Zaydiyyah Movements: Houthis" as part of a book titled "The Houti Phenomenon or Houthis" "2009", Dubai, Al Mesbar Center, and "Contemporary Educational Studies on Women's Issues" "Kuwait: Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, Rawafed, 2017".
8. **Dalia Ghanem Yazbek:** Fellow scholar at Carnegie Middle East Center and winner of al-Aryan grant. Her research is centered on political violence and extremism, fanaticism, Islamism, and Jihadism, with special focus on Algeria and women's enrolment in jihadi organizations. Before winning the grant, Yazbek worked as a research analyst at Carnegie, assistant professor at Williams College, Massachusetts, and research assistant at the Center for Political Analysis and Regulation at the University of Versailles. Her many publications include: "Obstacles to ISIS Expansion in Algeria" "Cipher Brief, September 2016", and "Algeria on the brink of the Abyss: What Bouteflika's Seventeen Years in Power Has Accomplished" "Carnegie, April

2016".

9. **Mubarak Salih Aljeri:** Independent researcher on political Islam; part-time researcher at Alsalam Center for Development and Strategic Studies and Aljazeera Center for Studies; writer for Kuwait's Al-Jarida newspaper, and former TV host of a weekly political talkshow on Kuwaiti Derwaza channel and one other channel; holder of a Master's Degree in Political Science from Kuwait University; author of many published studies, including: "Islamic Movements in Kuwait After the Arab Spring: Model of the Islamic Constitutional Movement" "Aljazeera Center for Studies, 2016", and "Shifts in Political Islam: Model of Tunisia's Ennahda Party" "Nama Center for Research and Studies – Riyadh, 2017"
10. **Zaki Bani Irsheid:** 4th Secretary-General of the "Islamic Action Front" "IAF", the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, and IAF Islamic leader; and former Deputy Inspector-General of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan for 2012-2016.
11. **Nabil al-Kofahi:** College professor of civil engineering at Jadara University, Irbid; co-founder of Zamzam Initiative that led to the establishment of the National Congress Party in Jordan; elected as mayor of Irbid in 1999; and several times parliamentary and municipal candidate for Irbid.
12. **Ghaith al-Qudat:** Co-founder of the Partnership and Rescue Party – Jordan; former member of the Islamic Action Front party where Engineer Ghaith al-Qudat was chairman of IAF- Tla al-Ali branch in 2015 and head of IAF Youth Divion "2009-2013" before he resigned. He was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan before resigning in 2016. He participated in many international conferences on political Islam, the fight against extremism and terrorism, and youth action in the Arab World. Recently, he established Sa'is Center for Research and Studies in Amman.
13. **Dr. Neven Bondokji:** Peace studies and conflict transformation expert specializing in the principles of peacemaking in Islam and the religious justifications of violence. Her work includes a book under the name of "Hammas: Social Identity, Violent Resistance, and Force Policies" and a report titled "The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Time for Reform". Her professional experience includes working as a visiting fellow at Brookings Doha Center and a visiting lecturer at Qatar University and the University of Sydney, and working in executive and research projects on peacemaking through refugees' humanitarian services.

About this book

Whether in positions of power, parliamentary seats, peaceful legal opposition, or outside the rules of the political game, Islamist movements are an important and leading player in Arab politics and society. Yet from its very first moments in 2011 (since the outbreak of revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen), and on through its subsequent stages (the Syrian and Libyan revolutions), the Arab Spring has re-shaped the roles of these movements and created new trends, and political, social, and cultural environments altogether different from anything with which Islamists had previously dealt.

In the first phase of the Arab Spring, Islamists came to positions of power through elections, entering parliaments and later forming governments in Tunisia and Morocco. Then, after obtaining an overwhelming majority in parliament, they gained control of the presidency in Egypt. With international and western communities no longer fearful of political Islam as in previous decades, and with global attempts to test them in the future as ruling powers in the Arab world, it seemed as if the "era of political Islam" had finally arrived.

But by 2013, things began to change, the Muslim Brothers fell in Egypt and returned to prisons, out-law status and confrontation with the state, Syria, Yemen, and Libya descended into civil war and internal militarism, and militant Islam drew new breath in the form of a hybrid entity that surpassed even al-Qaeda in its extremism and radicalism and succeeded in establishing a state in the name of Islam and a Caliphate stretching from Iraq to Syria.

These changes, reflected in the various trends that exist within the spectrum of political Islam, and their various ideological, dynamic and political ramifications, have imposed significant and fundamental questions on political Islam, its prospects, its predicament, and its future. This book seeks to deconstruct the growing pains experienced by Islamist movements, and indeed their effects, and to examine the state of Islamist movements, as well as the crises, indicators and trends related to their future.

ISBN: 978-9957-484-80-4

