

A stylized world map composed of a grid of dots. Most dots are light gray, but several are colored red, specifically in North America, Europe, and East Asia, highlighting the regions of focus for the report.

Setting the stage for global trade in the 21st century

The U.S. between TPP and TTIP

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- Observers of TPP and TTIP tend to view the two trade deals solely within their regional economic contexts. But the fates of the two trade agreements are interlinked given that the United States is negotiating both agreements at the same time and dealing with a similar set of controversial roadblocks. Specifically, ISDS, labor standards, and genetically engineered food are among the major sticking points in both TPP and TTIP talks.
- Beyond these difficult issues, the overarching challenge that binds the two trade negotiations lies in building public support and understanding around the benefits of free trade when the details of the agreements are closed to the public. The current debate in the U.S. Congress over trade promotion authority reveals how difficult it is for elected representatives to make the case for additional free trade agreements given the lack of transparency.
- How the United States sells TPP will be instructive for negotiators in Europe whose constituencies are also demanding more information about the potential impact of expanding trade and investment with the United States, particularly related to public safety and sovereignty.



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The United States is currently undertaking the most ambitious trade agenda in its history. It is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 Asia-Pacific countries as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union and its 28 member states. In total, the two trade agreements account for two-thirds of the global economy. As President Barack Obama stated in his National Security Strategy, these trade agreements are vehicles to set »the world's highest standards for labor rights and environmental protection, while removing barriers to U.S. exports...to make America the production platform of choice and the premier investment destination.«¹ What remains to be seen is how current debates in the United States around trade promotion authority (TPA) and TPP are setting the stage for TTIP negotiations.

This paper addresses how U.S. positions taken in TPP talks could affect ongoing trade negotiations between the United States and the European Union, particularly on controversial issues such as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and genetically engineered food, which have garnered significant public attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Beyond these difficult issues, the overarching challenge that binds the two trade negotiations lies in building public support and understanding around the benefits of free trade. When the U.S. House of Representatives debates the Senate-passed trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation this month, lawmakers in the lower house will have a chance to make the case that new free trade agreements will support U.S. economic growth as well as strengthen our commercial and strategic ties with Asian and European partners. As of now, it is far from certain whether the U.S. public will be convinced of these arguments given that the details of ongoing trade negotiations are classified and leaked texts of earlier drafts suggest that certain countries are pushing for positions that may be unpopular back home. Indeed, there exists a vacuum of counterarguments to push back against the narrative that supporting TPA – which authorizes the U.S. Congress to pass TPP and TTIP deals through a simple up-or-down vote – will endanger domestic policies and enrich corporations at the expense of ordinary workers. The substance of TPP and TTIP deals matter. But it is equally important for negotiating countries to demonstrate that

they are standing up for the public's best interest, rather than conceding to corporate interests or yielding to pressure from more powerful nations.

Both TPP and TTIP are exercises in economic integration with enormous geostrategic implications. To fully understand the ongoing debate in the United States around the two trade deals, we must first understand the American system of divided constitutional authority between the executive and the legislative branch on conducting international trade negotiations. We also need to understand the strategic implications of passing TPA, which has become the focal point as the United States weighs the value of expanding trade and investment with Asia and Europe.

1. Trade agreements in the United States

Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution delegates Congress the power to »regulate commerce with foreign Nations« and to »collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.«² Under Article II, the President has the authority to negotiate treaties and international agreements and conduct foreign policy. But it is Congress that must legislate any trade agreement that the President reaches.

As international trade expanded over the decades beyond reducing tariffs to include policies affecting U.S. law (i.e. safety and certification requirements, government procurement practices), Congress adopted »fast track authority« under the Trade Act of 1974. Fast track authority allows for expedited consideration of trade agreements. Renamed trade promotion authority, this process guarantees that the executive branch will receive timely legislative consideration without amendments. In exchange, TPA requires the President to meet a set of trade negotiating objectives as outlined by Congress and consult with Congress and private sector stakeholders before, during and immediately after negotiations have been completed.³ Most importantly, TPA gives the President leverage over trading partners by assuring them that the final agreement will not be amended in Congress and that the terms of the agreement will be

1. U.S. National Security Strategy, February 2015. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015-national-security-strategy.pdf>

2. U.S. Constitution. <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution-transcript.html>

3. William Cooper, Ian Fergusson, and Richard Beth, *Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions*, April 21, 2014. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/225624.pdf>

fully implemented. The most recent TPA authorization was enacted on August 6, 2002 and expired on July 1, 2007. It was used to implement Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, the Central American countries, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, and South Korea.⁴

Currently, Congress is debating a new TPA authorization to replace the previous one, which expired in 2007. On April 16, 2015, Chairman Orrin Hatch and Ranking Member Ron Wyden of the Senate Finance Committee and Chairman Paul Ryan of the House Ways and Means Committee introduced the *Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015* (also known as trade promotion authority). The bill would grant the President the authority to present forth trade agreements to the Congress entered into before July 1, 2018, or before July 1, 2021, if the President requests the extension, subject to congressional resolution of disapproval. If enacted, TPA would be used to implement TPP, TTIP, and any new agreements from the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization's multilateral trade negotiations.

2. Current debate on trade promotion authority

To be sure, trade promotion authority is more than just a vehicle for securing a stamp of approval from Congress on trade agreements governing tariff and nontariff barriers. It signals to negotiating partners that there is unity between U.S. executive and legislative branches of government on the overarching goals of the trade agreement. It also provides an opportunity for elected officials to explain to constituents how foreign trade helps their local economy and creates new opportunities. Finally, a successful passage of TPA in 2015 would build much-needed momentum to conclude TPP talks, which are in their final stages, as well as direct U.S. attention toward TTIP, which is far more ambitious and expansive in scope compared to the TPP.

Public debate on the content and merit of TPA is key for understanding TPP and TTIP for two main reasons. First, opponents of free trade are linking what they see

as the unfulfilled promises of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) with the TPP and TTIP. Such characterizations have made supporting new large-scale free trade agreements politically difficult for Democrats, whose base consists of labor, small business, and unions, among others. Influential Democratic members such as Rep. Sander Levin and Sen. Elizabeth Warren have led the fight against the Hatch-Wyden-Ryan TPA legislation for not addressing congressional concerns around currency manipulation, labor standards⁵, environmental rights, and ISDS, among others.⁶ By portraying TPP as »NAFTA on steroids«, opponents of free trade have placed pro-trade supporters on the defensive about supporting more trade agreements, even for lawmakers from states that would benefit from lowered tariffs and greater investment with Asian and European partners.

Second, the debate around granting the President fast track authority has ushered in louder calls for the American public to access negotiating texts, particularly on issues that will affect domestic policies. Members of Congress, press, and citizen activists are demanding that the content of trade negotiations be made available to the public before there is an up or down vote in Congress. In a letter to President Obama on April 25, 2015, Senators Sherrod Brown and Elizabeth Warren requested that the President »declassify the latest bracketed negotiating text of the TPP and release it publicly... before Members of Congress are asked to voluntarily reduce our ability to amend, shape, or block any trade deal.«⁷ Senators Brown and Warren cite the example of President George W. Bush, who in 2001 made public a draft of the bracketed text of the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement several months before Congress authorized fast track of that deal.

Supporters of greater transparency in trade agreements argue that it would help clear misperceptions about threats that FTAs would pose on non-trade issues such as food safety and internet freedom. It would also dispel

4. Ian Fergusson, *Trade Promotion Authority and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy*, April 27, 2015. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33743.pdf>

5. Staff of Senator Elizabeth Warren, *Broken Promises: Decades of Failure to Enforce Labor Standards in Free Trade Agreements*, May 19, 2015.

6. Committee on Ways & Means Ranking Member Sander M. Levin, *The Hatch-Wyden-Ryan TPA Bill: A Major Step Back on TPP Negotiations*, April 16, 2015.

7. Senators Sherrod Brown and Elizabeth Warren, *Letter to President Barack Obama*, April 25, 2015. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/263074835/Elizabeth-Warren-and-Sherrod-Brown-letter-to-Obama-on-trade>

the notion that only corporate interests have a say in what goes in the trade agreement, not just in TPP but in future agreements written in the next six years as authorized by the TPA bill. On May 19, 2015, Senators Joe Manchin and Elizabeth Warren introduced the *Trade Transparency Act*, which would require the President to declassify the text of any trade agreement 60 days prior to granting TPA.⁸ As Sen. Manchin stated, »if [TPP] is as good for the American worker as proponents have claimed, then the Administration should let the American worker see the details before Congress is forced to grant the President Trade Promotion Authority.«⁹ Critics of this argument contend that disclosing too much information about ongoing talks could make it harder for negotiating countries to make concessions that will be politically risky or unpopular. Regardless of what Congress decides to disclose regarding the details of pending trade deals, the debate will have direct implications on TTIP negotiations. In particular, the European public has been reluctant to embrace the goals of TTIP due to a lack of transparency.

3. Trans-Pacific Partnership and its implications on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

TPP talks have been ongoing for nearly five years and are almost complete. TPP is seen as an integral part of the Obama administration's strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. This agenda has clear strategic and economic implications, covering nearly 40 percent of global GDP and about a third of world trade. All negotiating countries are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and other APEC members such as South Korea, Taiwan, and China have also expressed an interest in joining TPP.¹⁰

TTIP carries immense economic and strategic importance for U.S.-EU relations as well. It is a negotiation between the United States and the European Union with the goal of breaking down barriers to trade and investment across

the Atlantic and generating regulatory coherence. Talks began in July 2013 and the 9th round concluded in April 2015. According to the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, eliminating transatlantic tariffs could boost U.S and EU exports each by 17 percent, or five times more than the KORUS FTA.¹¹ Eliminating or harmonizing half of non-tariff barriers such as import licensing requirements would add 0.7 percent to the EU economy and 0.3 percent to the U.S. economy.¹² If implemented, TTIP would be the world's biggest trade deal.

U.S. commercial ties in Asia largely consist of trade in goods, whereas U.S. commercial ties with Europe are comprised mostly of investment and trade in services. Yet in certain sensitive areas, TPP talks illuminate positions that would be highly relevant for European negotiators.

Below are three issues in TPP talks and their implications for TTIP negotiations:

3.1 Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)

ISDS has become »the most toxic acronym in Europe,« synonymous with big companies challenging the right of states to regulate.¹³ Under ISDS, individual foreign firms have the same status as sovereign governments and can sue governments before extrajudicial tribunals without any appeal mechanism. Established in the 1960s, the purpose of ISDS was to ensure that foreign investors operating in countries with weak judicial systems could »obtain compensation if their ›hard‹ investments – factories, mines or land – were expropriated.«¹⁴ Critics of the ISDS system contend that it would increase onerous litigation by corporations over government policies that could undermine foreign companies' bottom line.

8. On May 21, 2015, Senator Orrin Hatch blocked a motion to consider the Trade Transparency Act as an amendment to the TPA bill.

9. »Senators Warren, Manchin Introduce Trade Transparency Act to Require Release of Trade Deal Text Before Congress Grants Fast Track Authority,« *Press Release from the Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren*, May 19, 2015.

10. Ian Fergusson, Mark McMinimy, and Brock Williams, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress*, March 20, 2015. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf>

11. Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union, and Trans-Atlantic Business Council, *The Transatlantic Economy 2015 Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment between the United States and Europe*.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Dr. Anna Cecilia Malmström, *Remarks at the Statesmen's Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies*, May 4, 2015. <http://csis.org/multimedia/video-statesmens-forum-dr-anna-cecilia-malmstrom-eu-trade-commissioner>

14. Lori Wallach, »Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,« *Transatlantic Stakeholder Forum Working Paper Series* by Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2014.

The TTIP contains the ISDS provision, galvanizing opponents of free trade on both sides of the Atlantic to a degree not seen on any issue between United States and Asian countries throughout TPP talks. Opponents of ISDS argue that it is not needed in TTIP because existing levels of protection in the EU and the U.S. provide legal security for investors. Deferring to opponents, in May 2015 EU Trade Commissioner Anna Cecilia Malström presented the European Parliament and the EU trade ministers with steps they could take to change the ISDS into one that functions more like a traditional court with an appeals process and greater transparency.

Public knowledge about ISDS in the United States was relatively low until a recent leak of the TPP Investment Chapter and the start of Congressional debate about TPA. Since revelations of ISDS provision in TPP, prominent Members of Congress, U.S. law professors and activists have questioned why it needs to be included in new trade agreements. These parties have called for ISDS to be stripped from the TPP Investment Chapter because of its potential impact on American domestic policies. For instance, according to Public Citizen, an American nonprofit organization that advocates on behalf of consumer interests, enactment of ISDS would »increase U.S. ISDS liability to an unprecedented degree by newly empowering about 9,000 foreign-owned firms from Japan and other TPP nations operating in the United States to launch cases against the government over policies that apply equally to domestic and foreign firms.«¹⁵

One TPP country that has voiced strong objection to ISDS is Australia. It opposed the inclusion of ISDS in its free trade agreement with the United States, which was implemented in 2005, and is also opposed to including ISDS in TPP.¹⁶ In 2012, Australia faced an ISDS challenge by Philip Morris International for mandating the use of plain packaging and graphic health warnings on cigarettes as part of its anti-smoking policies. Other countries that are concerned about ISDS's impact on domestic public health policies are closely watching this challenge to Australia's packaging law. The issue is also likely to remain at the

forefront within the context of TTIP. For instance, the United Kingdom became the first EU member state to impose similar regulations on cigarette packaging. Ireland and France are also considering following suit.¹⁷

In August 2013, Malaysia proposed carving out tobacco health regulations from potential lawsuits under the ISDS mechanism in TPP. The United States tabled a less legally meaningful proposal, simply reaffirming that tobacco regulations would fall within the scope of an »already existing general exception for measures necessary to protect human life or health.«¹⁸

How TPP countries manage the perceived threats of ISDS, particularly as they affect public health, will be instructive for TTIP negotiating countries as they seek to convince a skeptical public about the need to include ISDS in any trade agreement with the United States.

3.2 Labor standards

Europeans see TTIP as an opportunity for the United States to go beyond the »lowest common denominator« approach toward higher level of worker protections by ratifying core labor standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO). European labor law complies with ILO's fundamental conventions and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that protect freedom of association and collective bargaining. To date, the United States has ratified two out of the eight core ILO standards. U.S. law allows employers to permanently replace workers who exercise the right to strike. It also allows employers to campaign against workers' organizing efforts in violation of core ILO standards.¹⁹ The fear among EU countries is that harmonizing transatlantic regulatory standards will lower their worker and union protections.

Berlin has led the charge in calling for the United States to ratify all eight core ILO standards. The German public overwhelmingly supports this position. A 2014 Pew

15. »TPP Leak Reveals Extraordinary New Powers for Thousands of Foreign Firms to Challenge U.S. Policies and Demand Taxpayer Compensation,« *Public Citizen Press Release*, March 25, 2015.

16. See the leaked copy of the Investment Chapter of TPP from June 2012 for details. <http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf>

17. David Jolly, »Tobacco Giants Sue Britain Over Rules on Plain Packaging,« *New York Times*, May 22, 2015.

18. »U.S. Official Says TPP Countries Will Consult Internally On Tobacco Proposals,« *Inside U.S. Trade*, August 28, 2013.

19. Lance Compa, »Labor Rights and Labor Standards in Transatlantic Trade and Investment Negotiations: An American Perspective,« *Transatlantic Stakeholder Forum Working Paper Series by Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, July 2014.

Research Center survey found that Germany and the United States sharply disagree over the issue of making transatlantic regulatory standards as similar as possible: Americans support such an effort by a margin of four-to-one while just 45 percent of Germans support that approach.²⁰ Given Berlin's economic and political weight in Europe, the development of the German public debate around what they see as basic human rights could play a major role in passing any transatlantic trade agreement.

Agreeing on the scope and depth of provisions on worker rights has proven to be an equally challenging issue for TPP partner countries given the wide range of labor practices among negotiating nations. Countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Mexico generally have weak or nonexistent protections for workers to organize and collectively bargain and in some cases allow forced labor and child labor.

The United States' own position on labor rights has evolved over time. Most recently, under the May 10th Agreement of 2007, the United States incorporated for the first time internationally recognized labor standards in FTAs with South Korea, Colombia, Panama and Peru. The agreement required each of the parties to uphold five internationally recognized workers rights in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and are enforceable under FTA dispute settlement procedures.²¹ The *Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015* contains general language in line with the May 10th Agreement but does not have a mechanism to ensure compliance by TPP countries.

It is unclear whether the Obama administration is pushing for enforceable May 10th Agreement language in TPP negotiations because the talks are still ongoing. One possible solution is to adopt what House Ways and Means Committee Ranking Member Sander Levin proposed in January 2015, which is to create an independent panel of experts to oversee any TPP country that »must substantially transform its labor regime.«²² This could be a more effective enforcement mechanism

than one established government-to-government, which is rare and does not yield timely resolution of violations.

In May, fourteen Senators called on President Obama to push for higher labor standards before any final TPP deal enters into force, pointing out TPP presents »a unique opportunity to measurably improve the lives of workers in all TPP countries, but only holds such promise if countries are required to meet and uphold the agreement's labor standards before the agreement is implemented.«²³ The same way that American officials are calling on developing countries with weaker labor standards to adopt higher standards for workers, European officials are seeking alignment between U.S. and EU labor standards by lifting standards for everyone, not lowering them. Therefore, the success of TPP countries to institute a labor regime that protects internationally recognized workers' rights would build momentum for harmonizing labor standards between TTIP countries.

3.3 Genetically engineered foods

Maintaining consumer trust in food supply chains has become a challenge in recent years as new production technologies such as genetically engineered (GE) foods (also referred to as genetically modified organisms, or GMO) entered the market. Opposition from consumers and pressure groups in the EU against accepting American GE foods has intensified in the past year and this currently stands as an issue that could potentially »make or break« the TTIP agreement.

Most European consumers prefer naturally produced foods, while American consumers are more tolerant of products developed by alternative forms of agricultural production, valuing cheaper products and biotechnological developments.²⁴

20. »Support in Principle for U.S.-EU Trade Pact,« *Pew Research Center*, April 9, 2014. /

21. Fergusson, et al, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress*, March 20, 2015.

22. Representative Sander Levin (D-MI), *The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Path Forward to an Effective Agreement*, January 22, 2015. <http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans>.

house.gov/files/documents/A%20Path%20Forward%20to%20an%20Effective%20TPP%20Agreement%201.pdf

23. Senator Sherrod Brown et al, *Letter to U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and Secretary of Labor Thomas Perez on TPP and worker protections*, May 8, 2015. <http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-cardin-schumer-stabenow-casey-franken-markey-baldwin-peters-udall-blumenthal-schatz-merkle-and-warren-call-for-strong-labor-standards-in-trans-pacific-partnership-and-implementation-of-standards-in-tpp-countries>

24. Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian Jones, *Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP): In Brief*, June 11, 2014. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43158.pdf>

Under current rules, the European Commission must agree that GE food can be grown or imported without restrictions in the EU if the European Food Safety Agency deems that it is safe for human consumption. In April, the European Commission presented a more restrictive regulatory proposal, which allows EU member states to ban imports of GE foods and feed products on grounds unconnected to health, safety or environmental factors. If enacted by the European Parliament, this could divide the EU into 28 separate markets for the circulation of certain products and complicate the movement of goods within the EU market under TTIP.²⁵

It remains to be seen how the national import ban on GE foods would affect agricultural practices of individual European countries. For example, countries such as Germany overwhelmingly reject food produced from GE plants yet import GE soy on a large scale for livestock feed.²⁶

Among TPP countries, public debate over GE foods has been ongoing but much more diffused compared to the EU. Calls for mandatory labeling of GE products have come mostly from developed countries with strong GE labeling requirements such as New Zealand, Australia and Japan. The perception is that the U.S. is pushing for all TPP countries to remove labeling requirements because of the low level of domestic market acceptance when food products are labeled as genetically modified. Observers point to the powerful agricultural lobby in the United States and companies such as Monsanto that would profit from greater market access as reasons why the U.S. has taken this position.

It is unclear whether the final TPP text will contain language that binds parties to change their labeling regulations on GE foods for human consumption and/or livestock feed. What is clear is that the U.S. has for years sought to build global acceptance around GE foods based on science and research, with strong support from U.S. Congress. When asked at the Senate Finance Committee hearing in May 2014 what USTR was doing to normalize regulatory approval of GE products in more countries, U.S. Trade Representative Froman

stated that the U.S. government is working to address »trade disruptions resulting from differences globally in approval systems for agricultural products derived from modern biotechnology« and is working with »liked-minded partners and international organizations, such as the OECD, and plurilateral efforts, such as the Global Low Level Presence Initiative, to promote predictable and science-based approvals processes around the world.«²⁷ Much work remains to socialize countries about the safety of GE products, especially in EU countries where consumers are unlikely to buy GE products even if they were deemed safe.

Whether TPP countries succeed in satisfying both their public safety concerns and the U.S. preference for removing labeling requirements on GE products will set an important precedent for TTIP negotiators.

4. Conclusion

As both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, the decision by President Obama to pursue two large trade deals simultaneously offers the United States a unique opportunity to expand trade globally across diverse economies. It also presents a chance to establish high international trade standards and norms for rising powers such as China that are debating their role in the international economy.

Observers of TPP and TTIP tend to view the agreements on separate tracks and solely within their regional economic contexts. But as this article illustrates, the fate of the two trade agreements is interlinked given that the United States is negotiating both agreements at the same time and facing a similar set of controversial roadblocks. As Daniel Hamilton observed, »since TPP is likely to be concluded and considered for legislative approval ahead of TTIP, it – more than TTIP – is likely to be the lightning rod for U.S. domestic debates about the value of additional trade agreements.«²⁸

The next round of TPP talks is expected to take place soon after the House of Representatives passes TPA,

25. »USTR Expresses Concern over EU Proposal to Allow Member States to Ban the Use of GE Food and Feed Deemed Safe by EU,« *Press Release*, April 22, 2015

26. »Germany skeptical of national import ban on GM foods,« *EurActiv*, April 27, 2015.

27. »President Obama's 2014 Trade Policy Agenda,« *Hearing before the Senate Finance Committee*, May 1, 2014.

28. Daniel Hamilton, »America's Mega-Regional Trade Diplomacy: Comparing TPP and TTIP,« *The International Spectator*, Vol. 49, No. 1, March 2014.



which could be in early June 2015. Meanwhile, TTIP negotiators are aiming to have a draft deal completed by the end of this year. As negotiators of the two free trade agreements reach the finish line, concessions will be made on sensitive issues such as those described above. The challenge is that the more the content of the agreements are obfuscated, the more fervent the call will be to reject any deal. How TPP countries sell the final deal to their citizens may be the most instructive lesson of all for Europeans who are watching TPP closely. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said, »the ultimate rulers of our democracy are not a President and senators and congressmen and government officials, but the voters of this country.«



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