|
||
|
![]() |
Politik und Gesellschaft
Online International Politics and Society 4/2000 |
|
Options for the consolidation
of Kosovo The
only permanently viable option for the entire region of south-eastern
Europe, i.e. the consolidation of modern political nations on the basis
of the participation of all citizens and not on the basis of ethnic
homogeneity, is still a long way off. In view of renewed expulsions
even following the war in Kosovo, and in view of the dissatisfaction
of the Kosovars with the international presence and the continuing bad
economic situation, people are increasingly asking whether the high
political costs of the NATO involvement can be justified. It is possible
to identify five options with rising degrees of autonomy or sovereignty
for the final status of Kosovo: continuation as a part of Yugoslavia
and Serbia; substantial autonomy in the Yugoslav federation; substantial
autonomy as an international protectorate sui generis; ethnic division
between Serbs and Albanians, possibly followed by the integration of
the separate units into Albania and Serbia; independence, possibly followed
by integration into Albania. Since it is unlikely at present that the
implementation of any one of these options will be legitimised by the
Kosovar population, the UN mission to Kosovo should keep the options
open. Here, the only possible basis for continued international involvement
is the principle of peaceful coexistence of the various ethnic groups.
Ultimately, however, the Kosovo problem cannot be solved from outside:
it needs to be solved by the Kosovars themselves. Initially, the international
protectorate must be continued. It could be presented as „trial independence“
if all Kosovars were granted the right to live in Kosovo. But no linkage
should be made with a final decision on status. The prospect of an independent
Kosovo should only be raised on condition that the borders of the neighbouring
states remain in place and the human rights of all Kosovars, irrespective
of their ethnic identity, are upheld. Until there is an acceptable solution
for everyone involved, the financial basis for the international presence
should be provided by the UN and NATO.
MICHAEL DAUDERSTÄDT / ANDRÉ W. M. GERRITS Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion
Intersecting trajectories:
Republicanism in the U.S. and France Republicanism
in both France and the United States rejects a concept of liberal
democracy whose procedural justice may safeguard individual liberties,
but at the same time disguises competitive commercial relations and
renders political inclusion and participation difficult. In order
to make political inclusion possible, French republicanism advocates
a state welfare policy, whilst its American counterpart aims to shape
the political commonweal in such a way that social inclusion becomes
possible. The differences between American and French republicanism
derive from the different courses taken by and the different intentions
of the American and French Revolutions: in France, the republican
tradition arose as a Jacobin reaction to the egoistic individualism
unleashed by the destruction of the old order; in America, republicanism
responded to the transformation of what was originally a participatory
into a merely formal democracy in which laws ruled, not people. Both
versions of republicanism contain an „activist“ element: they regard
themselves as practical criticism of the given social interrelations,
but they find it difficult to put a name to the subject of their political
action. The transfer of sovereignty from the monarch to the people
creates the insoluble problem of how a community of particular interests
can form a collective will to act. If republicanism is not to fall
victim to the illusion of a popular will, it needs to aspire to a
politics beyond the „politics of will“. The alternative is a „politics
of judgement“, which differs from the politics of will primarily in
the way it handles social „anomie“. Just as, in Kant’s critique of
reason, beauty cannot be explained by scientific laws, anomie in modern
societies is defined by the fact that it is not encompassed by any
law. But this does not mean it disappears from political communication
– just as beauty may not be capable of scientific proof, but is accessible
to aesthetic communication. The more differentiated an institutional
order, the smaller the danger that one institution will raise itself to be
the embodiment of the „popular will“ (checks and balances), and the
greater the likelihood that initially „anomic“ particular phenomena
will find an institutional „hearing“ and thereby lose their anomic
nature. A republican democracy in this sense is dynamic, pluralist
and always open to innovations. It can absorb experiences both from
below (e.g. trade unions) and from above (e.g. European Union) the
traditionally accepted political institutions.
Designing reality as
a product: „The shift in values“
in the Western world More
than virtually any other diagnosis of society over the last 20 years,
the „shift in values“ has enjoyed an international career and has
stimulated debate both inside and outside the social sciences in
numerous Western industrial countries. The diagnoses of society
produced by contemporaries with degrees in the social sciences largely
coincide with those made by contemporaries without such a qualification.
They translate the generalised perceptions of the layperson into
social science categories and intensify them. They describe the
state of society, but they do not explain it and do not provide
any basis for prognoses. The broad range of sociological diagnoses
reflects the state of society: society is insecure and desires an
orientation which confirms existing perceptions and prejudices,
but is not interested in a genuine understanding which corresponds
to the complexity of reality. The sociological talk of a shift in
values – it is not a theory in the true sense – is a fine example
of this type of social diagnosis. Typically, literature on the shift
in values uses relatively simple stereotypical distinctions. One
of the most popular of these is the distinction between materialistic
and post-materialistic values. However, a precise look at the empirical
evidence shows that such categories are arbitrary and of no value
for a genuine understanding. The long-running success enjoyed by
„shift in value“ theories in the Western world derives from the
fact that they meet the public’s need for interpretation and endowment
with meaning. This type of success in terms of public reception
is driven by factors which ultimately belong in the field of marketing.
To a large extent, social science is oriented towards these criteria
and is thus neglecting the real criteria of academic quality.
Helmut
Reisen/Marcelo Soto
Why foreign capital
is good for post-crisis Asia Today,
following the financial crisis of 1997/98, most of the East Asian
developing countries have already returned to high domestic savings
rates which suffice to finance an extremely rapid accumulation
of capital. Similarly, the earning of the foreign exchange needed
to import capital goods and raw materials is not a problem for
these high-export countries. Pushing ahead with economic development
on the basis of domestic savings is commonly regarded as a strategy
superior to the use of foreign savings. This is particularly true
in the wake of the financial crisis, which made the risks related
to capital inflows from abroad abundantly clear. Nevertheless,
the countries of East Asia would be better advised to rely more
on foreign savings instead of doing all they can to keep domestic
savings both at a high level and in the country. In the long term,
the latter approach means that the savings are invested more and
more inefficiently. In order to prevent a reduction in efficiency
across the economy, structural reforms are needed, which will
initially result in a decline in domestic savings, even if they
also create the conditions for continued high growth in the future.
These structural reforms include the recapitalisation of the banking
sector after the financial crisis (at the expense of public-sector
savings) and a greater opening of the import markets (at the expense
of private savings). The influx of foreign capital can offset
the decline in domestic savings and maintain the rate of capital
accumulation. Foreign capital per se enhances economic efficiency.
Amongst other things, it helps to deepen the capital market, making
investment cheaper and facilitating necessary restructuring in
the corporate sector. Access to international capital markets
also protects against the risk of country-specific shocks and
helps to support the level of consumption in times of economic
crisis. All these advantages need to be weighed up against the
danger of massive short-term capital withdrawal, as in the financial
crisis of 1997/98. This danger is lowest in the case of foreign
direct investment and long-term bank loans – albeit in the latter
case only when the domestic banks are sufficiently capitalised.
The theoretical considerations regarding the advantages and disadvantages
of capital inflows from abroad in comparison with domestic savings
are reinforced by recent empirical evidence from the 1986-97 period. Green card for Indian
programmers: a challenge to development
policy In
the debate on a German „green card“ for foreign computer specialists,
the focus has been on the advantages for the host country. Surprisingly
quickly, the debate has paved the way for a rational immigration
policy oriented to Germany’s own interests. There has been hardly
any serious discussion of the effect on the countries of origin
of the loss of these highly skilled specialists. In terms of development
policy, however, this question is of considerable significance.
After all, if the international migration of software specialists
and other highly qualified people from the developing countries
is also advantageous for the countries providing the people, it
might be right to encourage it even more in order to accelerate
the economic development and technological modernisation of these
countries. If the reverse is true, i.e. that the detrimental effects
on the countries of origin predominate, then development co-operation
could at least help to offset this, by providing more support
for education and training, for example. India has managed – certainly
more than most of the other developing countries – to partially
reverse the original brain drain and to encourage a significant
number of Indian software specialists, who are enjoying particular
success in the United States, to return or at least to invest
their savings in the domestic software industry. This has built
the foundations for one of the country’s most dynamic export industries.
The boom in Indian software output would have been virtually impossible
without the experience and contacts of the Indian software developers
who had moved to the United States and without their – state-supported
– willingness to invest in India. The Indian example shows that
the international migration of skilled workers between developing
and industrial countries does not have to be a zero-sum game in
which only the countries attracting the workers gain, whilst those
countries providing them lose. Instead, if the correct incentives
and supporting policies promote the exchange of personnel in both
directions, both sides can benefit. And then, development co-operation
could still help to shape structures by promoting co-operation
between German software users and software firms from developing
countries, so that the software specialists located there would
have greater opportunities to engage in the export business from
where they live.
Haggling over
formulas to save the climate On POALI, PAMs
and QUELROs The
Kyoto Protocol on the climate is largely unfinished. The negotiations
leading to the Protocol showed very clearly the emerging tripolar
structure of world climate policy. In practice, the negotiations
were dominated by the United States, which led the countries
participating in the climate conference into an unprecedented
large-scale experiment in the use of flexible mechanisms.
The participants refrained from international co-ordination
of measures to lessen the burden on the atmosphere. Instead,
they negotiated targets for the reduction of harmful emissions
(primarily, but not only, CO2). The commitments
negotiated (which apply in principle to all industrial countries),
i.e. that emissions of gases harmful to the climate should
be cut by five per cent (from the 1990 level) by 2008-12,
can be achieved in a wide variety of ways. This is also an
aspect of the general flexibilisation achieved by the United
States in Kyoto. At present, however, the negotiated objective
of reduced emissions does not yet serve as an instruction
for countries to take specific action. That requires a large
number of implementing regulations, and these are to be stipulated
at the conference in The Hague in November 2000. That conference
should also agree on sanctions for the non-fulfilment of commitments.
Otherwise, the entire climate protocol (so far, only half
a protocol) will be nothing more than a paper tiger. The strategy
pursued by the US delegation in Kyoto, i.e. to aim only at
flexible abstract wordings, is the result of the political
resistance at home which would probably have blocked any further-reaching
agreement. With its flexibility strategy, the US delegation
has at least left the door open for further progress on climate
policy. In comparison with the Americans, the Europeans had
no strategic concept to work from in Kyoto. |
||
![]() |
© Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | net edition malte.michel| 11/2000 |